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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this report is to provide Congressman Bob Riley (R-AL) with findings about the 
state of emergency preparedness in Calhoun County, as it relates to CW (CW) storage and 
incineration at the Anniston Army Depot.  We addressed the situation in Calhoun County with this 
research question: Given that incineration is set to start at the Anniston Army Depot in 
September 2002, what information would provide the basis for practical dialogue about 
emergency preparedness in Calhoun County and provide a possible foundation for policy 
leaders to reach consensus over this critical issue in order to ensure citizen acceptance, 
understanding and compliance?   
For over ten years, residents of Calhoun County have known that the U.S. Army was 
considering incineration as the means of destroying CW at the Anniston Army Depot.  The 
impending start of incineration has highlighted the need for an emergency preparedness plan for the 
community.  The Army is set to begin incineration in September 2002, yet the community still lacks 
a working emergency preparedness plan.  The goal of this project is to assess the lack of consensus 
concerning the plan.  Recognizing that experts in CW, emergency planning, and policy have been 
involved in the Calhoun County situation from the start, our intent is not to debate the finer details 
of the plan or discuss the merits of incineration or any other CW destruction technology.  Rather, 
we set out to clearly portray the positions of all of the stakeholders involved so that consensus can 
be built.  Our hope is that the information we obtained from the Calhoun County Community 
Survey and our policy leader interviews will contribute to a better understanding of the problem and 
facilitate better communication and cooperation between policy leaders, while increasing community 
preparedness for the destruction of CW. 
MAJOR FINDINGS 
Our overall findings are intended to provide new and valuable information about policy leader 
and community perceptions of the current problem, emergency preparedness, and community 
impacts.  In addition, we examined the implications that these perceptions have on relationships, 
risk mitigation, and compensation.  Our group hopes that these findings will provide the basis for 
practical dialogue about emergency preparedness in Calhoun County and a possible foundation for 
policy leaders to reach consensus over this critical issue.   
PREFERRED METHOD OF WEAPONS DESTRUCTION 
? Most policy leaders prefer the method of incineration and feel that most residents prefer 
incineration while only a vocal minority opposes it.   However, our survey found that the 
community is divided over the issue of incineration.  About half of all community survey 
respondents prefer incineration as a method of weapons destruction, while the remainder of 
residents are divided between preferring to wait for the development of other methods and 
preferring the use of an existing alternative technology. 
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PROBLEM PERSPECTIVES 
? In the view of local policy leaders, Anniston, Alabama is a unique situation, and therefore, 
cannot be easily compared to Johnston Atolle or Toella, Utah.  Unlike other U.S. CW stockpiles, 
the Anniston Army Depot is located in a community with more than 70,000 residents.  Policy 
leaders are concerned that attempts to force a standardized federal structure on a unique, local 
situation will prevent the proper treatment and protection of Calhoun County, placing them in 
greater danger.  
? The definition of maximum protection varies among policy leaders, thereby creating an 
obstacle to consensus.  Policy leaders were uniform in describing the components of 
maximum protection in terms of safety measures and the protection of citizens.   While some 
policy leaders believe that maximum protection is not achievable, others presented us with steps 
necessary to ensure maximum protection.  These ranged from the distribution of personal 
protective gear (protective hoods) to the over-pressurization of all schools and hospitals.  
? Local policy leaders have not reached consensus on what it will take to prepare for a chemical 
emergency.  This translates into the lack of a single voice with which to educate and 
communicate with the public.  As a result, open and effective communication between policy 
leaders and agencies has been compromised and public confidence in emergency preparedness 
has been undermined. 
? Policy leaders tend to understand their roles, responsibilities, and constraints, and those of their 
counterparts in other official positions, in conflicting ways.  Common knowledge on the clear 
roles assumed by policy leaders does not exist.   
? Residents with special needs were of great concern to policy leaders.  Special needs 
individuals include those with difficulty walking, driving, or those that are otherwise unable to 
comply with the emergency response plan (sheltering-in-place, evacuation, or the utilization of 
protective hoods).  The majority of policy leaders contacted addressed the importance of 
identifying those with special needs and devising a plan to ensure their safety. 
? Policy leaders agreed that the public lacks proper education on the issues surrounding CW 
incineration and emergency preparedness.  The community survey reinforces this belief that 
citizens do not know how to respond in the event of an emergency.  Of those survey 
respondents who seem to know what they should do, there exists a substantial fraction who 
indicate that they would not comply with those instructions. This matter is further complicated 
by the fact that some policy leaders disagree about whether the responsibility for education lies 
at the federal or local level.   
? Sixty-five percent of community survey respondents reported that television is their 
primary source of information.  However, an individual’s source of information did not 
appear to have an effect on their knowledge of the emergency response plan or of sheltering-in-
place procedures.  Nevertheless, respondents who relied upon the radio for information were 
much more likely to doubt the effectiveness of the emergency plan. 
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EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
? There is substantial confusion over the current state of emergency preparedness in 
Calhoun County. As a result, residents are not prepared in the event of a chemical accident at 
the Anniston Army Depot. 
 
? If an accident happened today, non-compliance rates would be substantial. The non-
compliance rates for sheltering-in-place would be 21 to 47 percent. Similarly, the non-
compliance rate for evacuation measures would be 29 to 35 percent.  Emergency planners must 
take a serious look at mitigating non-compliance rates.  In addition, families with children are 
likely to think of their children’s safety before their own. Of the parents living within eight miles 
of the Depot, almost 47 percent stated that they would pick up their child from school in the 
event of an accident. 
 
? The community is looking for consistent government leadership in emergency 
preparedness. Sixty-two percent of the respondents indicated that listening for directions was a 
required component of the emergency response plan. This finding places a high burden on 
government officials at all levels and indicates that a coordinated emergency response plan is 
necessary.  
COMMUNITY IMPACTS  
? The purpose and benefits of the incineration of CW in Calhoun County are national in 
scope; however, the costs associated with incineration are localized.  These “community 
impacts” affect every aspect of community life and can be costly to the public.  In the context of 
Anniston, Alabama this includes: 1) risk, 2) the financial burden of reducing air infiltration for 
sheltering-in-place and, 3) the stigma associated with the storage and incineration site and how it 
impacts residential property values, use and enjoyment of property, and business migration. 
Risk 
? Residents of Calhoun County perceive both the storage and incineration of CW to pose 
serious risks to the community.  However, on average, the storage of CW is 
perceived to be slightly riskier than incineration.  Nevertheless, approximately 50.2 
percent of respondents perceived the incineration of CW as presenting a high risk to the 
community.   
? Most survey respondents report being concerned about negative impacts on their 
families’ health.  In addition, many citizen groups believe that the incineration of CW 
in Calhoun County will release dangerous pollutants into the air that would have a 
negative impact on human health and the degradation of the natural environment.  
These concerns are particularly relevant considering the background PCB contamination 
that has affected the local community.  
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Financial Burden of Reducing Air Infiltration 
? Anniston has the largest number of dwellings built before 1970 and the largest number 
of dwellings built before 1950 of any of the eight CW sites.  In our community survey of 
Anniston, only 59 percent of the respondents said it would be possible to make 
one room in their home airtight if they had to use a sheltering-in-place kit.  The 
average reported household cost to “make one room airtight” was $2961.27. 
Stigma  
? Our analysis demonstrates that respondents are willing to pay less for homes near 
the Anniston Army Depot, than they would pay for homes located further away.   
? Many policy leaders perceive the presence of CW in Calhoun County to have a negative 
impact on the ability of the community to attract new businesses.  Survey 
respondents echoed this belief with 56.4 percent of respondents indicating that the 
incineration of CW would decrease the number of new businesses coming into the 
county.  
? Many survey respondents indicated that living near the Anniston Army Depot 
would have a negative impact on their use and enjoyment of their homes.  
Approximately half of all respondents indicated that living near the Depot would result 
in their decreasing or stopping activities such as working in their lawn and garden, having 
outdoor barbeques and picnics, and allowing their children to play outside.   
 
USE OF INCENTIVES 
? As a result of the perceived costs associated with incineration, incentives may be 
necessary to help balance the costs and benefits of hosting the incineration facility and 
to increase local support of CW destruction. The majority of community survey respondents 
stated that mitigation and compensation measures would make them either more favorable to 
incineration or maintain their current level of support.   
? Our analysis revealed that mitigation of risk is much more important to the community 
than compensation.  Therefore, if incentives are to be effective in Calhoun County, mitigation 
must be offered, and the community should be involved in the identification of mitigation 
options.  A disproportionate emphasis on compensation could result in a substantial portion of 
the community perceiving compensation as a bribe.   
? Overall, the community preferred evacuation route improvements, relocation, the coverage of 
medical costs, and protective suits for emergency responders.  Those who opposed 
incineration as the CW destruction method responded most favorably to relocation and 
evacuation route improvements.   
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COMMUNICATION 
? Who the public trusts affects what they believe about incineration and the emergency 
preparedness plan.  Those citizens who expressed trust in policy leaders at all levels of 
government viewed storage and incineration as significantly less risky than citizens who 
distrusted even one group of leaders.  These citizens were also more confident that the 
emergency preparedness plan would effectively protect the community. 
? Each policy leader has a stake in increasing public trust for their counterparts in other involved 
governments.  Given the interlocking roles each plays in emergency preparedness, it should 
come as no surprise that community distrust for any one of these policy leaders erodes 
confidence in the entire program.  The implication is that each leader must assist in the 
enhancement of the capacities, credibility, and community-mindedness of each of the 
others and then contribute to the education efforts.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
For over ten years, residents of Calhoun County have known that the U.S. Army was 
considering incineration as the means of destroying chemical weapons (CW) at the Anniston Army 
Depot.  The impending start of incineration has highlighted the need for an emergency preparedness 
plan for the community.  The U.S. Army is set to begin incineration in September 2002, yet the 
community still lacks a working emergency preparedness plan.  The purpose of this report is to 
provide Congressman Bob Riley (R-AL) with findings about the state of emergency preparedness in 
Calhoun County, as it relates to CW storage and incineration at the Anniston Army Depot.  We 
addressed the situation in Calhoun County with this research question: Given that incineration is 
set to start at the Anniston Army Depot in September 2002, what information would provide 
the basis for practical dialogue about emergency preparedness in Calhoun County and 
provide a possible foundation for policy leaders to reach consensus over this critical issue in 
order to ensure citizen acceptance, understanding and compliance?  
This first chapter provides an introduction to the history of the CW stockpile in the United 
States and in Anniston, Alabama, and the current emergency preparedness situation in Calhoun 
County.  In addition, we discuss our project proposal, our research methodology, and the structure 
of this report.   
CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
The history of CW stockpiles is pertinent to the current situation in Anniston, Alabama, as it 
provides background and aids understanding of the current lack of consensus.  In the following 
discussion we provide information on CW stockpile sites around the country, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention Treaty, the presumptive method of CW disposal- incineration-, and the 
uniqueness of Anniston in relation to the other CW stockpile sites.  
 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE IN THE UNITED STATES 
The United States military has long been on the cutting edge of the development and use of 
technology for the defense of a nation, which included the exploration of CW.  The military 
produced many more CW than were detonated, and so long-term storage of these dangerous 
weapons became necessary.  During the 1940’s the military began secretly stockpiling these weapons 
in nine depots across the nation.  Eventually, it was no longer a secret where these stockpiles existed; 
Utah, Oregon, Johnston Island, Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, Indiana, Arkansas, and Colorado all 
became home to the unwanted munitions (refer to Figure 1.1).  Then in 1993, the United States 
joined with 129 other nations in signing the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty, which went into 
effect on April 29, 1997.  In hopes of creating international peace and security, the treaty provides 
for the complete destruction of all CW and chemical weapon production capabilities.  The treaty 
required signatories to comply by the set deadline, April 29, 2007 (Organisation for the Prohibition 
of Chemical Weapons, Date Unknown).  The treaty did not, however, specify the preferred means 
of CW destruction.  The Army originally selected incineration as the most tested and trusted means 
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of chemical weapon destruction in the early 1980’s (NRC, 1999). The National Academy of Sciences 
supported the Army’s choice of incineration in 1984 (NRC, 1999).  
 
Figure 1.1: Locations of U.S. Chemical Weapons  
Stockpile Sites 
SOURCE: Chemical Weapons Working Group, 2002 
CHEMICAL WEAPON STOCKPILE IN ANNISTON 
Chemical weapons were first transported to Calhoun County in 1940, but the full purpose of the 
Anniston Army Depot was not known by the community until 1960.  Since that time, there have 
been several leaks, reminding everyone of the imminent need to establish an emergency 
preparedness plan.  With construction on the incinerator now complete, the reality of incineration 
has placed the spotlight on the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Alabama 
Emergency Management Agency (EMA), Calhoun County Commissioners, and the Army as they 
discuss what an emergency preparedness plan for Calhoun County should entail.   
Anniston is different from the other eight storage sites in that it exposes more people to 
potential harm than any other site. In contrast, CW storage sites like Toelle, Utah and Johnston 
Island, have relatively small populations that surround the site. Although Aberdeen has the same 
number of housing units as Anniston, these homes are newer and safer structures (Vogt and 
Sorensen, 1994, 6-7).  As of 1999, almost 30,000 housing units were located within nine miles of the 
Anniston incineration facility (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1999).  Furthermore, there are 
approximately 83,000 citizens that live in the immediate response zone (IRZ), the most dangerous 
zone (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1998).   
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CHEMICAL WEAPONS EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 
In order for an emergency preparedness plan to be developed, there has to be a certain level of 
consensus among affected parties. In the subsequent discussion, we provide information regarding 
the responsibilities of various federal, state, and local officials, including a particularly significant 
disagreement among officials concerning emergency preparedness equipment.  
 
FEDERAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS  
The Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program (CSEPP), which was established by 
Congress in 1985, places the responsibility for emergency preparedness with two groups: Army and 
FEMA.  A Memorandum of Understanding was signed by the Army and FEMA in August 1988.  
The MOU outlines the roles of each agency as well as areas of needed cooperation between the two 
in an effort to maximize efficiency of resources.  FEMA agreed to assume responsibility for off-post 
emergency planning activities while the Army maintained its original program role of providing on-
post technical assistance and review of, and support to, FEMA.  In 1994, the management structure 
of CSEPP was changed when the Army and FEMA adopted a Joint Memorandum streamlining the 
program and enhancing the cooperative relationship between the two agencies.  According to this 
memorandum, the Army continues to take the lead in all CSEPP affairs.  Specifically, “the Army 
institutes on-post preparedness plans, upgrades response capabilities, conducts necessary training, 
and integrates on-post and off-post emergency preparedness capabilities” (CSEPP Planning 
Guidance, 1994, ch.2-p. 5).  FEMA, on the other hand, plays a support role, working with state and 
local governments in “developing off-post emergency preparedness plans, upgrading response 
capabilities, and conducting necessary training” (ch.2-p.5).  FEMA and the Army, in cooperation 
with one another, will “develop protocols for assessment of readiness of state and local jurisdictions 
and Army installations…while FEMA regional offices continue to review plans and evaluate 
exercises and training” (ch.2-p.5). 
In 1997, the Army and FEMA entered into a revised Memorandum of Understanding 
addressing “some of the management problems that were caused by unclear roles and 
responsibilities and the lack of coordination” (GAO, 2001, p. 3).  According to this MOU, FEMA is 
responsible and accountable for all aspects of off-post emergency preparedness.   Particularly, 
FEMA is charged with administering off-post funds; supporting development of response plans; 
preparing, developing, delivering and evaluating training; providing technical assistance; and 
developing programs to evaluate off-site readiness capability1 (p. 5).  The role of the Army was 
defined as continued management of on-post (installation) emergency preparedness and the 
provision of technical and financial support for both off-post and on-post activities (p. 5). 
                                                          
1 Found at http://www.fema.gov/library/ct01_01.htm
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STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
Congress established a framework for emergency preparedness at the state and local level by 
passing The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) of 1986.  This 
legislation requires emergency planning at the state and local levels in order to increase knowledge 
within communities. This framework outlines three main requirements.  First, local and state 
emergency planning efforts must include public awareness of potential chemical hazards; second, 
local and state planning agencies must assist in preparing communities for potential emergencies, 
including ways to prevent and respond to emergencies; and last, agencies must make available 
pertinent information necessary for effective emergency planning (EPA, Date Unknown) 
 Specifically, EPCRA mandates the establishment of State Emergency Response Commissions 
(SERCs) (EPA, Date Unknown). These SERCs are charged with coordinating Local Emergency 
Planning Committees (LEPCs) who in return coordinate local districts and supervise them.  
 
CALHOUN COUNTY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
The 1988 MOU between the Army and FEMA “authorizes the Secretary of the Army to provide 
maximum protection for the environment, the general public, and workers when carrying out the 
destruction of the United States chemical stockpile” (CSEPP Planning Guidance, 1988, ch.2-p.2).  
The definition of “maximum protection,” however, changes depending upon whom you ask.  This 
creates varying levels of expectations for policy leaders and sets them up to disagree.  
The General Accounting Office issued reports in 1996 and 2001, evaluating the preparedness of 
Alabama, as well as other stockpile sites.  In the August 2001 report, CSEPP was criticized for not 
providing local communities with adequate assistance (GAO, 2001).  Specifically, the GAO rated the 
following critical elements of emergency preparedness in Calhoun County as partial: distribution of 
tone alert radios, coordination of evacuation and sheltering-in-place protective action strategies, 
staffing of positions to man 24-hour tasks, construction of over-pressurization systems of identified 
facilities, and guidance on reentry planning (GAO, 2001).  “Calhoun County in Alabama is far from 
being fully prepared, does not have an agreed-upon response plan, and has not done enough to 
educate the public about the program” (GAO, 2001, p. 3). 
While the United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty in 1993 with the 
understanding of completing the destruction of CW by 2007 (Organisation for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons, Date Unknown), the U.S. Army has announced it does not foresee completion 
until 2009.  Facing opposition to incineration and lack of support from FEMA to release $40.5 
million for protective equipment and supplies to protect public buildings, as agreed upon by the 
Department of Defense in November 2001, continued delays may further push back this date.  On 
February 1, 2002, Alabama Governor Don Siegelman announced plans to file suit to delay 
incineration given Calhoun County’s lack of emergency preparedness.  This same day, FEMA agreed 
to release $25 million of the $40.5 million previously held up by the agency. Five days later, on 
February 6, FEMA and other federal representatives met with delegates from Calhoun County in an 
effort to reach consensus on emergency preparedness.  Delegates attempted to hold FEMA 
accountable for a November Department of Defense agreement, authorizing distribution of federal 
funds to Anniston for emergency preparation efforts.  Consensus, however, was not reached in the 
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matter.  Consequently, Governor Siegelman filed suit on February 14, 2002, to prevent 
commencement of incineration and surrogate trial burns.  The Calhoun County Chamber of 
Commerce countered by petitioning the Governor not to delay incineration.  Despite this lawsuit, 
surrogate trial burns began on March 16 and ended the following week.  Shortly thereafter, FEMA 
agreed to release $7 million to be applied toward protective equipment for residents closest to the 
Anniston Army Depot.   
Although twice the amount of federal funds has gone towards preparing Calhoun County for 
incineration ($107.8 million, as of August 2001) than to the next most expensive community 
(Oregon - $49.5 million), there is still great public outcry that the community is not prepared for the 
risk that it has been required to assume (GAO, 2001).  Despite this funding, local, state, and federal 
officials are still unable to reach a consensus on emergency preparedness.  
If state and local officials do not believe there is a workable emergency preparedness plan in 
place, it will be difficult for the Anniston Army Depot to begin destruction of the CW stockpile 
(GAO, 2001).  If the state delays the start of incineration, it will cost the Army millions of additional 
dollars and it will prolong the risk posed by continued storage of CW (GAO, 2001).  If the Army 
proceeds with incineration and there is no agreed upon emergency plan, the perception of risk for 
incineration is likely to be exacerbated. It is clearly in the best interest of all parties involved to reach 
an agreement on emergency preparedness as soon as possible. 
 
THE PROPOSAL 
Our research team is made up of six graduate students from the George H.W. Bush School of 
Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University.  With a focus on public service and 
administration, students are required to complete a semester-long consulting project.  A “capstone” 
experience, this project is the culmination of our educational experiences while at the Bush School.   
In serving as the client for our capstone project, Congressman Bob Riley has placed the 
community first.  Calhoun County, the area most affected by the storage and destruction of CW, 
falls within his congressional district.  Reaching a consensus on CW emergency preparedness in 
Calhoun County is a priority of Congressman Riley and the focus of this project.   
In a preliminary meeting with representatives from Congressman Riley’s office, our team was 
charged with two tasks: 1) to identify policy leader and community perspectives of emergency 
preparedness in Calhoun County, and 2) to assess the magnitude of impact the presence of CW and 
the incinerator has had on the local community.  We accomplished this charge by performing 
background research, conducting a Calhoun County community survey and over 40 policy leader 
interviews, and analyzing the resulting data.  This analysis of our collected data serves as the 
backbone of our report. 
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POLICY LEADERS 
In an attempt to gather valuable information about the current situation, we identified policy 
leaders who have a substantial stake in the Calhoun County chemical demilitarization process.  The 
roles of these individuals include decision-making, implementing, regulating, and funding elements 
essential to community preparedness and policy-making.  Policy leaders also include community 
organizations, coordinating and support agencies, and interest groups.  Specifically, leaders and 
agencies contributing to the creation of an emergency preparedness plan were identified as critical 
stakeholders.   
Local policy leaders comprise both city and county officials, consisting of elected, appointed and 
non-office holding positions.  State policy leaders include elected, appointed and non-office holding 
positions, as well.  Federal policy leaders consist of representatives from defense, regulatory, 
budgetary, and emergency agencies.  A partial list of the policy leaders contacted, and a copy of the 
interview request letter sent, are included in this report as Appendix A and Appendix B.  In order to 
uphold our commitment to protect the identity of those interviewed, we attribute interview findings 
to “policy leaders,” and do not assign specific viewpoints to individuals or their organizations.  
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
To identify methods useful in improving communication and cooperation among government 
and community leaders and the public, and to address techniques that may be utilized in the design 
and implementation of effective emergency preparedness in Calhoun County, we have implemented 
a multi-phase approach.  
Primary research was conducted during phase I and included the review and analysis of federal 
documents produced by the General Accounting Office, Department of Defense, and Department 
of Energy; local newspaper articles; Congressional records; journal articles; and relevant websites.  A 
series of video-conferences were also held with Congressman Riley’s office to clarify our charge, 
provide and obtain feedback, and define the focus of our analysis.   
Phase II of our project included the creation of a community telephone survey as well as the 
generation of interview questions to be asked of identified policy leaders. Our purpose in conducting 
a community telephone survey was to gauge community perceptions regarding local, state and 
federal policy leaders; emergency preparedness; communication; community impacts; and 
compensation and mitigation measures (refer to Appendix C for Calhoun County Community 
Survey and Frequency report).  
Phase III of our efforts included the implementation of the Calhoun County Community 
Survey, completed by the University of New Mexico’s Institute for Public Policy.  The Institute 
conducted the survey using their computer-assisted, telephone-interviewing laboratory, which 
randomly selected interviewees.  More than 700 Calhoun County resident interviews were completed 
by March 31, 2002.  Respondents were selected using a random-digit dialing (RDD) sampling frame 
that gives equal probability of inclusion to all households with working telephones in Calhoun 
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County, Alabama. (Refer to Appendix D for technical summary report, which includes survey 
operation rate, overall response rate, refusal rate, and sampling error.) 
Phase IV was marked by a site visit to Anniston, Alabama where team members interviewed 
local policy leaders and federal policy leaders living in Calhoun County.  Telephone interviews of 
additional local, state and federal policy leaders were conducted in the following weeks.  
The final phase of our project included analysis of the community survey and policy leader 
interview responses.  Various forms of data analysis were conducted including descriptive statistics, 
comparison of means tests, logit regression analysis, and contingent purchase analysis.  Analyses of 
leader interviews and report writing were also incorporated into phase V. 
 
REPORT METHODOLOGY    
For purposes of this report, we assume that the method of CW destruction will be incineration.  
We do this not because we advocate incineration, but because evaluation of incineration and its 
alternatives is beyond the scope of this study.  With this in mind, our goal in this project is to 
provide analysis that assists the community in its efforts to reach a state of preparedness so that 
destruction of CW (by whatever means) can proceed as safely as possible. 
This report uses Calhoun County Community Survey and policy leader interview data to obtain 
an overview of policy leader and community viewpoints on issues such as incineration, emergency 
preparedness, trust, and risk (Chapter 2).  This discussion is followed by a detailed look at 
emergency preparedness in Calhoun County, including policy leader and community preferences and 
understanding of the current plan (Chapter 4). Then, survey and interview data are used to assess the 
magnitude of impact the presence of CW and the incinerator has had on the local community 
(Chapter 3).  Next, we explore how these perceived impacts can serve as a basis for considering the 
use of mitigation and compensation measures to increase public acceptance of incineration (Chapter 
5).  Chapter 6 focuses on how the state of interagency relationships and public communication 
affects public fear and trust surrounding the incineration of CW in Calhoun County. Finally, we 
describe further research that will assist movement toward consensus on an effective chemical 
emergency preparedness program for Calhoun County.. Our group hopes that our findings will 
provide the basis for practical dialogue about emergency preparedness in Calhoun County and a 
possible foundation for policy leaders to reach consensus over this critical issue.   
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PROBLEM PERSPECTIVE 
In an effort to identify methods by which communication and cooperation can be improved 
among governments, community leaders, and the public, and to assist in the design and 
implementation of effective emergency preparedness in Calhoun County, a series of interviews was 
conducted, and an extensive community survey was implemented.  More than 40 in-person and 
telephone interviews were conducted with policy leaders, and more than 700 phone surveys of 
randomly selected community residents were completed.  
Policy leader interviews were conducted to develop an accurate understanding of what 
community leaders are thinking about the CW disposal issue, what organizations are planning or 
doing with regard to the potential risk presented by the CW, and what steps are being taken to 
address the issue of emergency preparedness in Calhoun County.  A partial list of the policy leaders 
interviewed is included in this report as Appendix A. 
The Calhoun County Community Survey was implemented to gather data on the perceptions, 
understandings, and opinions of local citizens on the issue of emergency preparedness.  A listing of 
questions and response frequencies is included in this report as Appendix C. 
The following discussion addresses the problems posed by CW storage and disposal from the 
perspectives of both policy leaders and community respondents, employing the data collected in 
both surveys. 
 
POLICY LEADER PERSPECTIVES 
In conducting this research, we identified leaders at the federal, state, and local levels and 
contacted them for interviews.  These individuals included elected officials and other policy makers; 
officials from regulatory agencies, emergency response agencies, economic and community 
development agencies; and representatives of community organizations and interest groups.  These 
identified policy leaders were contacted and interviewed in an attempt to capture the full range of 
policy perspectives among the active participants in the Calhoun County CW storage and disposal 
issues.  During the interview process two broad categories of data were gathered: 1) the leader’s 
perspectives on incineration and emergency preparedness, and 2) the leader’s understanding of the 
community’s needs and perspectives regarding CW storage and destruction and emergency 
preparedness. 
 
LOCAL POLICY LEADER PERSPECTIVES 
The following describes the perspectives of local leaders, as developed in our community leader 
interviews, on three issue areas: 1) their functions and tasks relating to CW emergency preparedness, 
as well as their perceptions on the functions and tasks of other leaders, 2) definitions and 
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components of “maximum protection” as it applies to the CW issue in Calhoun County, and 3) 
processes and procedures associated with the implementation of CW emergency preparedness.  It is 
important to note that “local leaders” include both city and county stakeholders, as well as 
community organizations and interest groups. 
Functions and Tasks 
After policy leaders defined or framed the current situation, they were asked a series of questions 
designed to identify their perspectives on critical functions and tasks relating to roles and 
responsibilities, structural frameworks and processes, obstacles in generating consensus, and 
interagency communication. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
Local policy leaders were asked to define their roles and responsibilities with respect to 
emergency preparedness.  Local officials, leaders, and emergency responders identified their roles as 
protecting the citizenry; raising public awareness; improving the emergency preparedness plan; and 
serving as advocates for the needs of the community.  Ensuring that CW destruction begins on 
schedule was also identified as one of their responsibilities. 
In defining the perceived roles and authorities of other policy leaders, we identified 
inconsistencies.  The way in which a policy leader identified his/her position, responsibilities and 
authority, often differed from the ways in which other policy leaders described that same person’s 
role and authority.  Specifically, we identified institutional constraints and different levels of 
knowledge among policy leaders, and we believe that this may contribute to the observed 
inconsistencies.  
Structural Frameworks and Processes 
Responses regarding structural frameworks and processes revealed that identification of those 
responsible for implementing the technical component of an emergency preparedness plan varied, 
while identification of those responsible for funding safety provisions of the plan remained 
consistent.  Perspectives on communication of the emergency preparedness plan to agencies as well 
as the general public revolved around two opinions.   
Specifically, policy leaders have a basic understanding of the chain of command in the event of 
an emergency.  The details of this chain and the precise duties assumed by other policy leaders 
remain unclear.  In most cases, there is a clear understanding of the distinction between on-post 
(Army) and off-post (civilian) responsibilities and authorities.  Local policy leaders acknowledge the 
federal government’s responsibility in funding CW destruction and the distribution of this money by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).   
While all policy leaders agreed that the public lacks proper education on the issues of chemical 
incineration and emergency preparedness, two perspectives were commonly reported: weaknesses lie 
at either the federal level or at the local level.  These perspectives, however, are related to the policy 
leader’s job position and are linked to perceptions regarding funding and the distribution of 
responsibilities and authority; proximity to, and understanding of, Calhoun County communities; 
and responsibility to increase public awareness.  Specifically, local policy leaders argue that those at 
the federal level have failed in their efforts to properly educate the public.  Therefore, local officials 
and agencies are now predominantly responsible for communicating to and educating the public. 
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Obstacles in Generating Consensus 
We asked local policy leaders to identify both obstacles to, and opportunities for, achieving 
consensus on eliminating CW and planning for emergencies.  Responses were dominated by three 
related themes: 1) bureaucracy and bureaucratic processes, 2) monetary issues, and 3) perceptions of 
trust, believability, respect and authority.  It is interesting to note that policy leaders did not identify 
interagency communication as an obstacle or problem until we asked specific questions about 
patterns of communication and interactions among the involved policy leaders. 
Interagency Communication 
When asked to provide perspectives on interagency communication between local, state and 
federal entities, responses differed by the respondent’s position and level of government.  Many 
respondents identified positive relationships and open communication channels with officials or 
agencies sharing similar viewpoints on emergency preparedness and/or preferred methods of CW 
destruction.  While the majority of policy leaders felt that communication among local entities was 
open and effective, the lack of agreement on substantive issues among them was identified as a 
problem.  Disagreement centers on perspectives of emergency preparedness and incineration, 
including the roles and responsibilities of policy leaders.  Many local leaders identified 
communication flow between local and state levels, and local and federal levels as more problematic 
than local communication flow.  Again respondents acknowledged the delineation between on-post 
(Army) and off-post (civilian) responsibilities and the lack of communication links between the two.  
This lack of communication and knowledge sharing is an obstacle to emergency preparedness and 
the disposal of CW.  
Maximum Protection 
Definitions of maximum protection and preferences regarding emergency preparedness options 
differed greatly among local policy leaders.  “Maximum protection” means different things to leaders 
at different levels, thereby creating an obstacle to consensus.  While a portion of our respondents 
believe that maximum protection simply is not achievable, they did present us with their definitions 
which often included ways of increasing safety.  Steps identified to increase protection ranged from 
the distribution of personal protective gear (protective hoods); to over-pressurization of all schools 
and hospitals; to the implementation of every conceivable measure to protect the community from 
harm.   
In defining what to do in the event of an emergency, some respondents operationalized 
“maximum protection” as implementing evacuation and/or shelter-in-place with the distribution of 
protective hoods to residents in the “pink zone,” or the immediate response zone, those zones 
closest to the Depot.  In discussing incineration, many policy leaders emphasized the need for the 
Army and its contractors to be both competent and diligent in the incineration process so as to 
reduce the risk of an accident due to human error.  One policy leader identified “maximum 
protection” as an individual’s personal choice or comfort zone with respect to the perceived risks 
posed by CW, and suggested that it would vary from person to person. 
While the definitions of “maximum protection” are quite different among policy leaders, they 
share similar perspectives on the various safety methods in consideration.  A frequently expressed 
opinion was that protective hoods will not work and are not a viable option.  Respondents cited the 
inability of hoods to be effective if individuals have facial hair or fluctuate in their weight.  Concern 
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was also raised over the protection of infants and children, and the necessity for individuals to carry 
hoods at all times.  The small likelihood that an accident will occur “when convenient,” and the 
difficulty in training the public on the proper use of protective hoods were cited as major points of 
contention.  In addition, the majority of respondents found evacuation to be the least viable option, 
citing traffic congestion and the increased possibility of accidents; the inability to practice an 
evacuation plan; and the marginalization of those without transportation. 
Respondents also addressed the concerns associated with both sheltering-in-place and 
evacuation.  Preferences toward sheltering-in-place and evacuation were divided, even among those 
most closely linked to the local community.  Some community leaders felt that sheltering-in-place is 
not a viable option, while others felt it is the best option available.  Those most closely linked to the 
local community did tend to support the distribution of protective hoods to residents in the pink 
zone.  Still other local policy leaders preferred sheltering-in-place, acknowledging that it does have 
its place as a viable option in the emergency preparedness of Calhoun County. 
Also of great concern to all of the policy leaders interviewed were residents with special needs 
including those with difficulty walking or driving, such as the elderly, and their ability to shelter-in-
place, evacuate, or utilize protective hoods.  The majority of policy leaders contacted addressed the 
importance of identifying those with special needs and devising a plan to ensure their safety.  
Retrofitting the homes of special needs residents in the pink zone and prioritizing them as the first 
to receive assistance from emergency responders were suggested safety measures.  Similarly, policy 
leaders many recognized the need for tiered responses, or the endorsement of various safety 
methods according to location and proximity to the depot.  All respondents were in general 
agreement with regard to the level of risk associated with those residents living in the immediate 
response zone.  Policy leaders acknowledged that the greatest risk of CW storage and destruction 
exists for pink zone residents and that the amount of time they have to react in the event of an 
emergency is a critical issue in emergency preparedness.   
In the same way, the time necessary to notify residents throughout the area in the event of an 
emergency was also addressed.  Concerns surrounding interagency communication and the 
availability and quality of radios for emergency response agencies and officials at local, state and 
federal levels were identified.  Many policy leaders expressed the need to ensure that pertinent 
individuals and agencies be equipped with radios of the same frequency range to enable for efficient 
communication in the event of an emergency.   
While policy leader responses varied, it is clear that definitions of maximum protection are 
identified in terms of safety measures and the protection of citizens.  
Processes and Procedures 
Overall, three important themes were conveyed with respect to incineration and emergency 
preparedness.  First, in the view of all of local policy leaders interviewed, Anniston, Alabama is a 
unique situation and, therefore, cannot be easily compared to Johnston Island or Toelle, Utah.  
Unlike other U.S. CW stockpiles, the Anniston Army Depot is located in the midst of a community 
with more than 80,000 residents.  Second, of great concern to policy leaders are attempts to force a 
standardized federal structure on to a unique, local situation.  The implications of taking a 
standardized approach prevent proper treatment and protection of Calhoun County communities, 
placing them in greater danger.  Almost every local policy leader contacted expressed the opinion 
that federal decision makers are “too far removed” from the local situation to suggest what is best 
for the community or to guide community responses.  Perceived as outsiders, it is difficult for 
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federal officials to identify with residents and understand the situation from a local perspective.  
Third, the principal concern among all local policy leaders contacted is that of safety.  Concerns 
regarding destruction of CW were expressed only in terms of public safety, and not in terms of 
financial incentives.  Of primary concern to policy leaders is the protection and education of 
Calhoun County residents.  Leaders addressed policy options and preferences with a focus on safety 
and protection. 
 
LEADER PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 
Policy leaders also provided us with their perceptions of the community regarding incineration 
and emergency preparedness.  The following discussion outlines the major themes that emerged 
with respect to community preferences, concerns, and levels of knowledge.  The four themes 
presented below explore: 1) risks and preferences, 2) confidence and trust, 3) levels of public 
understanding, and 4) safety and preparedness. 
Risks and Preferences 
The consensus among local leaders regarding the community’s support for incineration is that a 
vocal minority of local residents is opposed to incineration in weapons in Calhoun County.  A 
number of policy leaders outlined the percentage of the community in favor of and against 
incineration.  One leader claims that 70 percent of the public is in favor of incineration, while the 
remaining 30 percent is in opposition.  A different leader indicated that 20 percent of the population 
is in favor of incineration, 20 percent is in opposition to incineration, and the remaining 60 percent 
is either undecided or indifferent.  Others took the opportunity to comment on the process by 
which the incineration option has been proposed and implemented, noting in particular that 
community members essentially have become resigned to the idea of incineration, or “worn down” 
to grudging acceptance.  The variation in perceptions of the community results, in part, from policy 
leader perspectives on the roles, responsibilities, and authority of other stakeholders. 
Confidence 
While many stakeholders refrained from discussing in detail perceptions of trust, competency 
and believability, many were willing to discuss the broader theme of the differing capacities of local 
leaders and decision makers in comparison with those at the federal level.  Again, these perceptions 
of confidence and trust are the by-product of the positions held by local policy leaders.  For 
example, with respect to public education, local leaders feel that the federal level has failed to 
properly educate the citizenry; consequently, the responsibility now primarily rests with local leaders.  
Another theme that arose surrounded the perceptions of the roles and authorities of other policy 
leaders.  Where inconsistencies exist, levels of trust, competency and believability associated with 
policy leaders are compromised.  Some leaders also noted issues over agency credibility, citing 
concerns over the validity of information released to the public.   
Levels of Understanding 
A substantial majority of local leaders interviewed revealed serious concern with the public’s lack 
of knowledge, awareness and understanding of incineration and emergency preparedness methods 
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and consequences. For the most part, leaders feel that a significant fraction of local residents are 
confused and unclear about what to do in the event of an emergency.  Based on the location and 
proximity to the Depot, policy leaders perceive different understandings of what is required of the 
various sectors of the community in the event of an emergency.  Policy leaders attribute this 
phenomenon to the lack of communication with the public and weak education campaigns.   
Safety and Preparedness 
As representatives of the community, policy leaders identified community concerns as primarily 
related to safety and preparedness.  In describing what local leaders thought would make the 
community at large more receptive to incineration as the chosen method for destruction of CW, 
responses included diverse safety and awareness measures as well as procedural elements.  Various 
safety measures included the over-pressurization of all schools and hospitals, the education of the 
public on the incineration process and protection issues, and the continued dissemination of 
evacuation maps and literature.  Process oriented elements included consensus building among 
policy leaders, assurance that strict guidelines preventing the transportation of weapons into 
Anniston for incineration are upheld, and developing a track record of incinerating without accident.  
The way in which policy leaders perceive the community’s perspectives on incineration and 
emergency preparedness tends to mirror their own perspectives on the issues.  For example, many 
local leaders in favor of incineration feel that the majority of the community is also in favor of 
incineration.   
 
STATE AND FEDERAL POLICY LEADER PERSPECTIVES 
State and federal policy leaders were also interviewed in an attempt to acquire the full range of 
perspectives on CW storage and destruction and emergency preparedness.  The following discussion 
will identify the perspectives of state and federal leaders on three issue areas: 1) their functions and 
tasks as related to emergency preparedness, 2) definitions and components of “maximum 
protection” as it applies to Calhoun County, and 3) processes and procedures associated with the 
implementation of emergency preparedness.  It is important to note that state and federal leaders 
include both those living in Calhoun County and non-residents of the County. 
Functions and Tasks 
The same questions were asked of state and federal policy leaders as local leaders.  These 
questions identified state and federal perspectives on critical functions and tasks relating to roles and 
responsibilities, structural frameworks and processes, obstacles in generating consensus, and 
interagency communication. 
Roles and Responsibilities 
State and federal policy leaders were asked to define their roles and responsibilities.  State leaders 
primarily identified their functions as “support” roles to both local and federal policy leaders.  
Federal leaders identified their roles as the entity responsible for the destruction of the state’s CW 
stockpile or for providing emergency preparedness support for CW destruction.  Additionally, 
federal policy leaders took responsibility for making information accessible to the public.  These 
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policy leaders, however, did not include emergency preparedness planning in the definition of their 
roles. 
Structural Frameworks and Processes 
In distinguishing the level of responsibility associated with policy leaders and emergency 
preparedness and community education, responses were inconsistent.  Perspectives held by state 
leaders indicate that local leaders are not being heard by agencies.  Other state leaders, however, 
hold that communication channels with local leaders are open and effective.  Federal policy leaders 
residing in Calhoun County concluded that they have been successful in communicating with the 
local community; still others identified local leaders as sources of miscommunication.  Federal policy 
leaders not residing in Calhoun County recognized the lack of a unified front among local leaders 
and emphasized the need for local, state and federal policy leaders to join together for the sake of 
the community.  The lack of consensus, or “one voice,” frustrates the community and impacts 
federal policy leaders who attempt to identify current perspectives on incineration and emergency 
preparedness.   
Obstacles in Generating Consensus 
Specific obstacles to consensus identified by state policy leaders include battles over monetary 
issues, local policy leader perspectives, and vocal opposition to incineration.  Federal leaders 
expressly identified the lack of a united voice among local policy leaders not only as an obstacle to 
consensus, but an obstacle to the commencement of incineration.  Federal policy leaders, viewing 
incineration as the solution to the destruction of CW, consider the perspectives of this vocal 
minority to be an obstacle to increased consensus, thereby delaying the incineration process. 
Interagency Communication 
State and federal policy leaders provided their perspectives on interagency communication and 
relationships between local, state and federal entities.  State leader responses describing 
communication channels differ; they are either perceived as limited and not effective or as 
improving.  These improvements were perceived to be the result of a previous task force comprised 
of various policy leaders and decision makers.  A federal policy leader identified accountability as a 
key issue in communication, citing that federal officials are required to account for and document 
their regulations and communications while local policy leaders are not held to the same level of 
scrutiny.  Because of this perception of uneven accountability, these leaders identified building trust 
among the public as a challenge.  Federal leaders not residing in the County reported difficulties in 
communicating with local leaders, conveying information, and receiving clear messages regarding 
local level preferences, knowledge, opinions, perceptions, and risks, therefore describing constraints 
of interagency communication. 
Maximum Protection 
Both state and federal policy leaders preferred incineration as the best method for destroying the 
stockpile of CW at Anniston.  The majority of these leaders, while not providing detail, did define 
maximum protection as the implementation of every conceivable measure to protect Calhoun 
County residents.  One state leader reported that too many safeguards are in place at the incinerator 
site to allow an accident to occur.  However, should an unforeseen accident take place, this policy 
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leader noted that evacuation is not possible.  Instead, shelter-in-place and fans, together with proper 
education, were identified as a sufficient safety method.  
Processes and Procedures 
State leader responses, while reflecting the need for improved public education, do not give way 
to shared themes.  One state leader identified policy leaders and politics as the issue, as opposed to 
interagency communication.  Additional differences were apparent when one state leader identified 
Anniston as a unique situation from other stockpile areas, while a different state leader applied the 
lessons learned from Johnston Island and Toelle, Utah to Anniston.  Federal leaders on the other 
hand, acknowledged weaknesses at the local level, making particular reference to the lack of unity 
among local stakeholders.  This lack of consensus was cited as causing confusion regarding 
incineration and emergency preparedness, resulting in local inefficiencies.   
 
SUMMARY 
The policy leader interviews conducted provide an in-depth look at the perspectives of local, 
state and federal leaders on chemical weapon storage and destruction and emergency preparedness.  
Several basic themes emerged from our interviews.  First, while policy leaders define maximum 
protection differently, there is consensus on the way in which it is conceptualized.  Policy leaders 
described the components of maximum protection in terms of safety measures and the protection of 
citizens.  Second, local policy leaders have not reached consensus on what it will take to prepare for 
a chemical emergency.  This translates into the lack of a single voice with which to educate and 
communicate with the public.  Third, public education efforts have been weak.  Consequently, the 
public is not properly informed on emergency preparedness issues.  Fourth, policy leaders tend to 
understand their roles, responsibilities, authorities, and constraints, and those of their counterparts 
in other official positions, in conflicting ways.  Common knowledge on the clear roles assumed by 
policy leaders does not exist.  Fifth, the lack of leader consensus coupled with misunderstandings of 
the roles assumed by policy leaders creates obstacles to communication.  Open and effective 
communication between policy leaders and agencies has been compromised, and public confidence 
in emergency preparedness has been undermined.  Last, consensus does exist with respect to one 
key element; Anniston is a unique situation and cannot be force into a standardized federal structure 
regarding emergency preparedness.   
 
 
COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES 
In the event of an actual chemical emergency, it will be essential that residents of the community 
accept, understand and comply with safety plans if these policies are to be effective.  For that reason, 
it is critical to understand residents’ perspectives.   In this section we provide an overview of the 
community’s perception of risks associated with the CW (CW) at the Anniston Army Depot. 
In order to obtain a representative sample of the concerns, beliefs and preferences of residents 
of Calhoun County, we used a systematic telephone survey that contacted seven hundred- thirty-one 
Capstone Project  15 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
CHAPTER 2 
residents during February and March of 2002.  When designing the survey instrument, we identified 
five areas of concern for question generation: emergency preparedness, compensation, mitigation, 
trust, and demographics.  From these themes, a series of questions was devised.   These questions 
were worded to avoid miscommunication, confusion, or leading respondents to specific answers. 
The response rate of callers asked to participate in the survey was over fifty-five percent, an 
unusually high response rate for phone surveys.  Random selection of participants increased the 
likelihood that the sample data is representative of the larger community as a whole (see Appendix C 
for a description of the sample). Demographics collected from participating respondents mirror the 
data reported by the 2000 Census for Calhoun County.  Thus, we can be reasonably confident that 
the data are representative of Calhoun County. 
 
COMMUNITY PERCEPTION OF RISK 
One concept important to understand from the community perspective is the risk of storing 
CWs at the Anniston Army Depot and the risks of the chosen method of destruction, incineration.  
Residents’ perception of risk will affect their acceptance of and compliance with emergency plans.  
Therefore, survey questions were created to assess risks resulting from the process of having and 
destroying CWs – storage and incineration – as well as the concern that incineration may have 
adverse effects on family health or quality of life.  
Storage 
The risks that residents of Calhoun County attach to the storage of CWs at the Anniston Army 
Depot must be assessed because it is one that the residents have been living with for decades.  
Residents’ perceived risk of storage also provides a baseline with which to compare their perceived 
risk of destruction of the weapons, which will become important to those making policy 
recommendations and decisions. 
 To assess perceived risks, respondents were asked to evaluate the level of risk to themselves and 
their family that would be associated with storing CWs at the Anniston Army Depot.   
 
Now I would like you to evaluate the level of risk to you and your family that would be 
associated with different situations.  Using a scale where zero means there is no risk and 
ten means there is an extreme risk, how much risk do you associate with each of the 
following: 
 
Storing CW at the Anniston Army Depot 
 
    (answer scale)  0 no risk ? 10 extreme risk 
 
The mean response was 6.7.  Over sixty-two percent of the responses were above mid-scale, 
meaning closer to extreme risk being involved.  Overall, the residents find the process of storing 
CWs to be risky. 
Another way to assess the community’s concerns about the storage of CWs at the Anniston 
Army Depot is to evaluate how likely residents believe it is that an accident will occur during storage. 
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Now, using a scale from zero to ten where zero means an accident will not occur and ten 
means an accident is certain to occur, how likely do you think it is that there will be an 
accident involving the CW stored at the Depot? 
 
   (answer scale)  0 will NOT occur ? 10 CERTAIN to occur 
 
The mean response on a ten-point scale was 4.5.  Over twenty-one percent responded at mid-scale 
(five), and the distribution of responses is heavier below mid-scale than it is above mid-scale.  With 
the heavy responses below mid-scale and a mean of 4.5, it is evident that residents do not think a 
chemical accident during storage is extremely likely. 
In summary, even though the residents perceive storage to be quite risky, a large portion feels 
comfortable that serious accidents during the process of storage will not be very likely.  Public 
perceptions on this issue are important because, whether or not the Depot proceeds with 
destruction, this risk is already present and will remain until the stockpile is destroyed.  The only way 
the community can mitigate this risk is to consider taking on other risks. 
Incineration 
One such risk the community will take on is the destruction of the stockpile in accordance with 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (OPCW, Date Unknown).   The current program, 
nearing start-up, calls for destruction of the CWs through incineration.  Recently, the Army 
completed construction of an incinerator at the Anniston Army Depot and ran test burns on the 
facility.  Results of the test burns are being used to determine whether the incinerator meets 
regulation standards. 
Our community survey sought to assess the residents’ perceptions of the risks of CW 
incineration. One question asks the respondents to evaluate the level of risk to themselves and their 
family that would be associated with incinerating CWs at the Anniston Army Depot.  The question 
was asked as follows: 
 
Now I would like you to evaluate the level of risk to you and your family that would be 
associated with different situations.  Using a scale where zero means there is no risk and 
ten means there is an extreme risk, how much risk do you associate with each of the 
following: 
 
Incinerating CW at the Anniston Army Depot 
 
    (answer scale)  0 no risk ? 10 extreme risk 
 
The mean response, on a ten-point scale, was 6.1.  Over fifty-five percent of the respondents rated 
risk of incineration over the mid-scale response.  It can be concluded then that the residents feel the 
process of incineration is very, if not extremely risky.  It should be pointed out, though, that the 
mean response for risk of incineration is below the mean risk of storage.   
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Similar to storage questioning, our community survey sought to assess how likely respondents 
perceive an accident to occur during incineration.  The question was asked as follows: 
 
Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means an accident will not our and ten means 
an accident is certain to occur, how likely do you think it is that there will be an accident 
at the Depot during the CW incineration process? 
 
   (answer scale)  0 will NOT occur ? 10 CERTAIN to occur 
 
The mean value for response to this question is 4.2.  Interestingly, over fifty-one percent of the 
community responded below mid-scale, meaning that on average an accident is not perceived to be 
likely to occur during incineration.  
In summary, a majority of the community believes incineration to pose significant risks, but a 
majority responded that a chemical accident during the incineration process is not likely.  Overall, 
the likelihood of an incineration accident was seen to be lower than an accident during storage. 
When comparing risks of storage and incineration, it can be concluded that the community feels that 
both storage and incineration are risky.  It is noteworthy that residents believe that a serious accident 
is more likely to occur in CW storage than in CW incineration.   
Comparative Analysis 
Further exploration of the relationship between perceived risks of storage and incineration 
uncovers a new layer of understanding.  By subtracting a respondent’s risk value for incineration 
from the risk value of storage, we were able to discern which process the community perceived to be 
riskier.  Three distinct groups emerge from this analysis.  Exactly 18.6 percent of our respondents 
perceive incineration to be riskier than storage, while 52.8 percent (a majority) believe both are 
equally risky, and 28.6 percent believes that storage poses a greater risk than incineration.   Plotting 
the risk values for both storage and incineration also illustrates these distinct groups (see Figure 2.1).  
Upon closer examination, it is evident that those who rank storage riskier than incineration have a 
much larger range of risk (from 3.94 average risk of incineration to 7.83 average risk of storage) than 
those who rank incineration as riskier (from 4.57 risk of storage to 7.25 risk of incineration).  The 
“storage is riskier” group has a mean risk of storage of 7.83, almost an 8 on a ten-point scale, and 
their mean risk of incineration is below 4.  That is over a one-point difference in range between the 
two groups.  The implication is that there are different groups with varying perceptions of risk 
within the community.  These varying perceptions result in different assumed levels of risk.  Each 
group and their associated level of risk must be considered and addressed by safety plans in order to 
ensure the greatest possible acceptance, understanding, and compliance. 
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of Storage and Incineration Risk Values
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
Other Factors 
It has already been pointed out that the community has lived with the storage process of CWs at 
the Anniston Army Depot for decades.  This is not the case with the incineration process.  This lack 
of experience with the incineration process brings about other concerns for the community 
regarding effects on their daily lives.   
One such concern is possible adverse effects on personal health.  Respondents were asked to 
rate their level of concern about health risks in the following question:   
 
Considering the distance from your home to the Anniston Army Depot storage site and 
incinerator, I would like to know how concerned you are about the risks to you and your 
family’s health? 
 
Please rate your level of concern on a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all 
concerned and ten means very concerned. 
    
(answer scale)  0 not at all concerned ? 10 very concerned  
The mean response on a ten-point scale was 6.5.  Almost sixty percent of the community 
respondents rated their concern above mid-scale.  This indicates that a majority of the community is 
concerned about effects of storage and incineration on their family’s health.  This fear will need to 
be addressed for full community acceptance of the incineration process. 
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Another impact assessed by the community survey is the overall effect living near the Anniston 
Army Depot has on the quality of life for the community.   
 
Overall, do you think that living near the Depot would have a major effect, minor effect, 
or no effect on your quality of life? 
 
1. major effect 
2. minor effect 
3. no effect 
 
The distribution of answers was spread evenly over three responses: 32.5 percent predicted no 
effect, 34.8 percent predicted minor effects, and 32.7 percent predicted major effects.  The 
somewhat even distribution shows varying community perceptions of impact the Depot will have on 
the community.  These varying factions must be recognized and addressed in order to gain 
community acceptance as a whole.  
 
COMMUNITY PREFERENCES 
Another important concept assessed by the community survey was residents’ preferences for 
destruction of the stockpile.  Even though this project assumes that incineration will be the chosen 
method of destruction, it could prove beneficial to identify what part of the community is for and 
against this method of stockpile destruction. Community views on incineration could provide a 
critical “control” variable that can explain a great deal of the variation in perception of the problem.  
Even though it in not the focus of our report, it will help inform the discussion about key aspects of 
the problem. 
The community respondents were asked about their preferences regarding methods for 
disposing of the CW stockpile at the Depot.  They were given three options: to proceed with the 
incineration as planned, wait until other methods are better understood, or to proceed with an 
alternative to incineration.   
 
Which of the following options most closely matches your preference for handling the 
CW stored at the Anniston Army Depot?  Would you prefer to: 2
 
1. Proceed with incineration of the CW as planned; 
2. Wait until other methods of destroying the CW are better understood; 
3. Proceed with an alternative to incineration, such as using wet chemicals to neutralize the nerve agent. 
 
Almost fifty percent of the respondents chose proceeding with incineration as their preferred 
option.  Of the other fifty percent, 34 percent preferred to wait for a better understanding of other 
methods of destruction, and 17 percent wanted to proceed now with an alternative to incineration.  
The response to this question showed no clear majority, but did show incineration to be supported 
by a plurality of the community.   
                                                          
2 To avoid any leading effect, the answer choices were offered in random order for each respondent. 
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TRUST ISSUES 
One challenge in maintaining and destroying a chemical stockpile is that the community must 
trust other people to actually carry out the destruction in a safe and effective manner.  This is a lot to 
ask of the residents of Calhoun County, given their perception of the associated risks and perceived 
likelihood of serious accidents.  The concept of trust can be broken into components of 
competence, believability, and representation of community interests.  When surveying the 
community, the respondents were given four stakeholders to rate on these trust factors: the U.S. 
Army, FEMA, the Alabama Department of Emergency Management (ADEM), and local, city or 
County Officials. These official were chosen because of their direct responsibility for and the 
community’s reliance upon provisions of emergency preparedness.  
To assess competency, the respondents were asked to rate the competency of the four 
stakeholders on a ten-point scale where zero means not at all competent and ten means completely 
competent. The question was worded as follows:  
 
Now I would like to know how competent you believe various individuals or groups are 
to make decisions about the safe storage and incineration of CW.  On a scale from zero to 
ten where zero means not at all competent and ten means completely competent, how 
would you rate the following? 
 
(asked separately) The U.S. Army, the Federal Emergency Management Agency or 
FEMA, The Alabama Department of Emergency Management (ADEM), and local, city, 
or county officials. 
 
(answer scale)  0 Not at all competent ? 10 Completely competent 
Analyzing the mean scores, all measures (competence, believability, and representation) are rated at 
above mid-scale (see Table 2.1).  With regards to competence, it is evident that the community trusts 
the Army and FEMA, on average, to have the greatest technical knowledge to make decisions 
regarding safe storage and incineration of CWs.  The ADEM also rated quite high, with the local 
officials having the lowest mean competence score.   
 A question was also asked regarding the believability of statements made by the four 
identified stakeholders.   
 
When thinking specifically about the CW at the Anniston Army Depot, I would like to 
know whether you would believe statement made by various individuals or groups.  On a 
scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all believable and ten means completely 
believable, how would you rate the following individuals or groups? 
 
(asked separately) The U.S. Army, the Federal Emergency Management Agency or 
FEMA, The Alabama Department of Emergency Management (ADEM), and local, city, 
or county officials. 
 
(answer scale)  0 Not at all likely ? 10 Very likely 
 
The mean responses are shown in Table 2.1. This time, FEMA had the highest mean score, with 
both the Army and ADEM with close numbers.  Again, the local officials’ believability scores were 
lower (though, still above mid-scale).    
Capstone Project  21 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 
 
 
A
ques
 
 
Show
offic
A
high
parti
clust
trust
com
        
3 The
Capsto
Georg  Table 2.1 Trust Components  
Components of Trust 
(on a scale from zero to ten) 
 
Competence 
 
Believability 
 
Representation
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e BSOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 200hird aspect of trust involves representation of community interests.  The community survey 
n asked: 
Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all likely and ten means very 
likely, how likely is it that the following groups or individuals would make decisions 
about the storage and incineration of CW in your area that are in the best interest of 
people in your community? 
 
(asked separately) The U.S. Army, the Federal Emergency Management Agency or 
FEMA, The Alabama Department of Emergency Management (ADEM), and local, city, 
or county officials. 
 
(answer scale)  0 Not at all likely ? 10 Very likely 
 in Table 2.1, FEMA and ADEM received the highest mean ranking with the Army and local 
s following behind.  
seen in Table 2.1, the survey respondents consistently gave the federal and state agencies 
average trust scores than were given to local leaders.  But averages can be misleading, 
larly when there is substantial variation in reported trust scores.  For that reason, we used a 
ng procedure to identify subgroups in the sample that share common views on the 
rthiness for policy leaders.3  On the basis of this, views on trust as reported by the 
nity allow us to identify four distinct clusters of citizens:   
 
? those who give high trust scores to all leaders;    
? those who trust local leaders and the ADEM, but not the federal agencies;    
? those who give low trust scores to all leaders; and  
? those who distrust local leaders but trust federal agencies and ADEM moderately. 
 
                                             
ustering procedure was K-means clustering, using the SPSS statistical package. 
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These clusters of citizens become very important in subsequent analysis. 
The identified levels of trust and subsequent clusters of trust patterns have significant 
implication for policy outcomes.  Knowledge of trust is essential to alleviate concerns, particularly 
when the population is dependent on the Army to safely and effectively undertake CW destruction.  
Community trust must be incorporated into any plan if the community is to accept, understand and 
comply. 
  
SUMMARY 
The information gathered and reported by the community survey provides important findings.  
The community sees storage, which they have lived with for decades, as quite risky.  In order to 
alleviate the risks presented by CW storage, the community must destroy the weapons present at the 
Anniston Army Depot.  Incineration, the presumed method of CW destruction, is also seen as quite 
risky, but is not rated as risky, on average, as CW storage.  The residents don’t feel that an accident is 
very likely to occur during either incineration or storage processes.  As policy preferences, nearly 50 
percent of the community supports proceeding with incineration, while the other half would prefer 
an alternative or to wait for development of new technology to destroy the CWs.  One possible 
reason for the divided preferences might be related to the fact that a majority of the community is 
concerned about health risks related to the presence of the Anniston Army Depot.  The equal 
distribution regarding quality of life impacts shows the community has varied and distinct 
perceptions of how incineration will impact the quality of life in their community.  There are 
factions of the community that hold distinct trust patterns regarding storage or incineration of the 
CWs, which affect overall community support of any policy.  These findings will be helpful to 
understand the perceptions of residents of Calhoun County. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The information provided by the policy leader interviews and the Calhoun County Community 
Survey offers the opportunity to identify issue areas where policy leaders and community members 
perspectives conflict.  The above analyses uncover two specific issue areas where perspectives 
diverge. 
 
?  A majority of local policy leaders perceive that the community is largely in favor of incineration, 
while only a vocal minority is in opposition.  The community survey, however, shows that 49.1 
percent of the community chooses incineration as the preferred method for handling CWs.  The 
remaining 50.9 percent of the respondents are split over proceeding with a current alternative or 
waiting for other technologies to be better understood. 
? The majority of local policy leaders feel that the community would be most receptive to local 
intervention regarding community education of emergency preparedness because the federal 
government is too far removed from the local situation.  The community survey, however, 
illustrates a different perspective.  Respondents rate local leaders lower than state and federal 
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policy leaders with respect to three factors of trust; competency, believability, and representation 
of community interest. 
The perspectives of various local, state, and federal policy leaders, as well as, the community, 
should be kept in mind for the duration of this report.  The data gathered provided new and 
valuable information on CW storage, destruction, and emergency preparedness in Calhoun County.  
Significant relationships between policy leader perspectives and community survey responses are 
analyzed, drawing upon the similarities and differences that may exist. 
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COMMUNITY EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS 
Anniston presents a difficult case for emergency planning and preparedness.  Among the 
communities with CW (CW) stockpiles, it combines one of the largest proximate populations with a 
relatively elderly housing stock.  Combined with a regional geography of river valleys, hills and 
mountains, and traversed by an uneven network of roads and highways characteristic of rural areas, 
the region presents a substantial challenge for planners who must prepare for the unlikely prospect 
of a major chemical accident.  The plan must account for regional variations in topography, 
population density, transport networks, and a host of other factors.  Given that complexity, a vital 
ingredient will be public awareness of the plan, knowledge of what it calls for, and confidence that 
the plan will provide reasonable public protection in the event that a chemical accident occurs. 
In this Chapter, we turn to the question of the current status of public understanding, 
acceptance and compliance with the Calhoun County emergency planning efforts.  To do this, we 
begin with an assessment of the perspectives of the policy leaders.  These leaders can provide 
valuable insight into the current level of preparedness of the County residents, and can highlight 
important potential trouble spots in efforts to fully develop the plan.  We then turn to the residents 
of Calhoun County, and evaluate the degree of understanding and acceptance of the plan.  We also 
ask hard questions about what the residents plan to do in the event of an emergency, in contrast to 
what they believe the plan calls for them to do. Next, we examine a special subpopulation – families 
with school children – to understand how they plan to respond to a chemical emergency.  Finally, 
we estimate the size of the “special needs” population in Calhoun County, and look at the special 
problems confronting this population. 
 
BACKGROUND 
Over the last ten years, the federal government has spent $107.8 million trying to ensure the 
safety of the residents of Anniston. This funding figure represents 30 percent of the total funds 
expended in all communities and is twice as much as the next closest state, Oregon, which received 
$49.5 million. (General Accounting Office, 2001,11-13).  Despite this expenditure, the residents of 
Calhoun County are not prepared in the event of an emergency.  Why is this?  According to the 
General Accounting Office, the lack of preparedness is due to conflict between local and federal 
officials. GAO states that the community is not prepared because of disagreements in five areas: 
notification systems, coordinated plans, over-pressurization projects, shelter-in-place strategies, and 
protective suits.  This analysis does not take issue with the GAO findings, but suggests their analysis 
is incomplete. GAO, per its congressional mandate, is primarily charged with auditing federal 
programs.  The GAO analysis assumes that the priorities agreed upon, and funded, by local and 
federal agencies are indeed the priorities of the Anniston-area community.  The purpose of this 
analysis is to test this assumption. 
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Our analysis is based on five assumptions.4 First, government programs should focus on 
improving the lives of the citizens they serve. Second, the residents of a community, called level one 
or primary stakeholders, should be the focal point of all government actions. Third, a problem 
cannot be managed unless accurate measurement systems are in place. Fourth, emergency planning 
and preparation before an accident are focused on addressing the community’s response during and 
after an accident.  Fifth, emergency planning, although related, is not dependent on the technology 
used to destroy weapons stockpile. 
Our approach is to examine the insights, beliefs and perspectives of both policy leaders and 
Calhoun County residents to develop a baseline understanding of current readiness for a chemical 
emergency. In both cases, our focus is on the degree to which the plan satisfies the basic criteria of 
public confidence, awareness, understanding of response requirements, and ability of citizens to 
respond in the event of chemical emergency. 
 
 
 
 
Emergency Planning and 
Preparation in the Event 
of an Accident 
Accident at the Anniston 
Chemical Weapons Depot
Community Reaction and 
Response to an Accident 
Goal: Achieving 
Maximum Protection for 
the Citizens of Anniston
Ex-Ante Indicator of  
Emergency Preparedness 
 
Measures: Plan awareness; 
confidence in the plan; 
knowledge of plan; 
understanding of emergency 
response procedures. 
Ex-Post Indicator of 
Emergency Preparedness 
 
Measure: Citizen compliance 
with emergency response 
procedures; ability of citizens 
to respond as the plan requires. 
Solution Criteria: 
Given the method of 
weapons destruction, 
what emergency 
preparedness strategies 
address both ex-ante and 
ex-post disaster concerns?
 
Figure 3.1: Emergency Preparedness Assumptions Model SOURCE: Institute for Science, Technology, & Public Policy, 2000
 
                                                          
4 The analysis methodology was derived from the 2000 handbook of the Leadership Development for Integrated 
Emergency Response Program (LDIER). The National Emergency Response and Rescue Training Center (NERRTC), 
the Emergency Services Training Institute, and the Institute of Science and Technology Policy are sponsors of the 
LDIER program. 
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POLICY LEADER PERSPECTIVES 
Leaders generally agreed that preparation for emergency response in Calhoun County is a 
complex undertaking.  Leaders also agree that confusion, disagreement over appropriate plan 
procedures, and interagency conflict have spawned confusion among area residents, and perhaps 
undermined confidence that the plan will provide adequate protection.  Some policy leaders were 
concerned that, due to confusion and lack of confidence, area residents would choose not to comply 
with plan requirements. 
At the same time, most of the policy leaders we interviewed were reasonably optimistic that, 
once a plan was developed and promulgated, members of the public would seek to comply. 
Preconditions of public compliance were seen to be (a) consensus among relevant policy makers and 
emergency responders that the plan would be effective and (b) broad and successful public 
education of what the plan would require. Many policy leaders expressed considerable frustration at 
the difficulty in achieving consensus. 
Two aspects of the overall process appear to have made achievement of consensus more 
difficult. First, the CW demilitarization and the CSEPP programs are complex, interrelated processes 
that require close and continuing coordination across a myriad of agencies at the federal, state, and 
local level. While the lion’s share of the emergency preparedness activities are undertaken at the local 
level, the funding generally flows through federal agencies (Defense to FEMA to state agencies and, 
finally, to local governments and agencies.)  A further complicating factor is that county-level 
governments in Alabama are constitutionally constrained in how they can generate revenues to 
support these programs, making dependence on the federal funding acute.  Second, in the view of 
the local policy leaders, the emergency preparedness process has been designed to provide standard 
kinds and levels of assistance across the array of CW sites.  This has made it difficult for local 
communities to obtain recognition of special circumstances and differences characterizing their 
emergency preparedness needs.  In the worst case, the presumption of a standardized approach 
makes it appear to some that requests for funding to handle unique local requirements are merely 
efforts to acquire funding.  Understandably, this appearance undermines confidence, mutual respect 
and communication on all sides. 
In our view, the current design of the CW emergency preparedness policy builds in unnecessary 
hurdles for successful implementation.  The complexity of the intergovernmental process and 
funding flow, coupled with the attempt to treat all CW sites as roughly equivalent, places an 
enormous burden on officials at all levels of government.  The presumptions and incentives of this 
process appear to us to undermine the kind of cooperation and communication that are essential to 
developing a clear consensus on a plan that is most effective for the Anniston area. 
A more particular set of concerns about emergency preparedness focused on special 
subpopulations of county residents.  Potential problem, raised by a number of the policy leaders, 
was that parents of area school children would disregard shelter-in-place (SIP) instructions and seek 
to retrieve their kids from local schools.  Most had heard anecdotal evidence that fear for the safety 
of their children would lead some parents to attempt to ignore or circumvent plan instructions to 
leave kids in schools, where (in some cases) over-pressurization provides protection.  A second 
subpopulation of concern was residents with mobility impairments who might have difficulty with 
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either evacuation or taking necessary steps for sheltering-in-place.  Of particular concern was that 
little was known about the mobility impaired; how many are there?  What are their special concerns? 
Overall, the policy leaders were in consensus that the Anniston area is not ready for a chemical 
emergency.  While estimates varied, most agreed that the public lacked confidence in current 
planning efforts, and expected that there would be considerable confusion about what to do in the 
event of a chemical emergency.  Worse, some feared that a significant fraction of the public would 
choose not to comply.  Most pointed to confusion and disagreement among officials as the reason 
for these difficulties, and in our assessment the problem is exacerbated by the overall structure of 
the CW emergency preparedness process.  Finally, the policy leaders expressed concerns about the 
willingness and ability of special subpopulations to implement the plan. 
Clearly, from the perspective of the policy leaders, the challenges facing emergency preparedness 
in Calhoun County are substantial.  We now turn to an analysis of emergency preparedness from the 
viewpoint of Calhoun County residents. 
 
CALHOUN COUNTY RESIDENT’S PERSPECTIVES 
In order to determine the current state of emergency preparedness in Anniston, this analysis is 
divided into two phases. The first phase is focused on the general population.  The second phase is 
focused on identified special needs populations. 
The analysis of the general population will assess the community’s awareness and knowledge of 
the emergency plan, their confidence that the plan will protect them, and whether or not the 
community will comply with the plan in the event of an emergency.  The analysis of the special 
needs populations makes comparisons to the general population as well as analyzes unique 
characteristics with the sub-population. 
 
INDICATORS OF PLAN AWARENESS AND KNOWLEDGE 
Given the developing nature of the emergency preparedness plan in Calhoun County, and 
variations in plan procedures over the course of its evolution, policy leaders expected us to find 
substantial public confusion over what the plan calls for them to do in the event of a chemical 
emergency.  Our survey of Calhoun County confirmed these expectations. 
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First, 95 percent of our respondents told us that they had heard or read about the County’s 
“emergency preparedness plan for responding to a chemical emergency at the Anniston Army 
Depot.” However, by their own admission there was substantial variation in understanding of the 
plan.  
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SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 3.2, a substantial fraction - 25 percent - of the respondents scored 
e, indicating poor knowledge of the plan.  Another 41 percent rated 
t.  At the top end of the scale, over 17 percent rated themselves as 
” about the plan.  
 the plan calls for, residents need to know in which of the emergency plan 
de.  Zones closer to the Depot, dubbed “pink zones,” require immediate 
ergency, and are unlikely to permit time for safe evacuation. Therefore 
lic understanding of their zone or residence.  We first asked: “Do you live 
 ‘pink zone’?”   Table 3.1 shows the percentage of respondents who said 
e,” broken out by distance of their residence from the Depot boundary. 
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        Table 3.1: Reported Residence in “Pink Zone” by Distance from Depot 
Distance from Depot 
Boundary 
Report Living in 
“Pink Zone” 
Do Not Live in 
“Pink Zone” 
Zero to 4 Miles 88.2% 11.8% 
Five to 8 Miles 73.4% 26.6% 
Nine to 12 Miles 50.8% 49.2% 
Thirteen to 16 Miles 34.2% 65.8% 
Seventeen or More Miles 26.0% 74.0% 
  SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 
As can be seen in Table 3.1, and as we would expect, the proportion of respondents who 
reported living in the “pink zone” dropped steadily with distance from the Depot.  For those closest 
to the Depot (within 4 miles) nearly 9 out of 10 said they lived in the Zone.  At the same time, 
confusion is evident in that a significant fraction of those who live substantial distances from the 
Depot also think they live in the “pink zone.” 
Another more demanding criterion of knowledge of the emergency response plan was to ask the 
respondents if they knew the emergency response zone number for their residence (refer to Table 
3.2).  Approximately 83 percent said they did not know.  Twenty-one percent of those living within 
four miles of the Depot said they knew which emergency response zone they lived in, and the 
number was lower for those further away.  Depending on distance from the boundary, 79 to 90 
percent of the population was unable to correctly identify whether or not they lived in the “pink 
zone.” Most alarming is the number of residents living in immediate danger, the “pink zone,” that 
are unable to properly make the distinction.  Of the residents living within 4 miles of the boundary, 
79 percent were not able to make a proper identification.  Of the residents living four to eight miles, 
almost 84 percent were not able to make a proper identification of their zone.  Therefore, to the 
extent that effective response to a chemical emergency requires knowing which zone one resides in, 
the community is currently unprepared for such an emergency. 
 
         Table 3.2: Reported Residence in “Pink Zone” by Distance from Depot 
Distance from Depot 
Boundary 
Don’t Know Zone Do Know Zone 
Zero to 4 Miles 79.2% 20.8% 
Five to 8 Miles 83.6% 16.4% 
Nine to 12 Miles 81.6% 18.4% 
Thirteen to 16 Miles 90.2% 9.8% 
Seventeen or More Miles 85.5% 14.5% 
  SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
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Overall, the status of plan awareness is quite mixed. While a vast majority of residents have 
heard of the plan, they rate themselves as only moderately knowledgeable about that plan.  That is 
consistent with their ability to identify the response zone in which they reside. 
 
PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE PLAN 
As is evident in Figure 3.3, confidence in the emergency preparedness plan is not high. Over half 
(56 percent) rate the plan below the scale mid-point, indicating little confidence that the plan would 
protect the community residents. Given the current status of the plan, and the generally modest 
understanding of the plan by the community residents, this low level of confidence should come as 
no surprise. 
Figure 3.3: Confidence in the Plan 
Complete Protection
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
No Protection
P
er
ce
nt
30
20
10
0
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SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
PUBLIC COMPLIANCE IN AN EMERGENCY 
Assuming a plan was widely understood, its effectiveness depends on the willingness of the local 
residents to follow its directions in the event of an emergency.  One might expect that such 
willingness would depend on whether residents believe the plan will, in fact, provide protection to 
the community.  What do the residents of Calhoun County believe the emergency response plan 
would require of them in the event of an emergency?  Would they follow those requirements?   
While most respondents identified listening for directions as a required option (refer to Table 
3.3), there was quite mixed response on whether sheltering-in-place or evacuation were required. 
This is as one might expect, given that the requirements may vary by location.   
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Table 3.3: Emergency Response Requirements as Understood by the Public 
Emergency Response 
Option 
Yes, Option 
Is Required 
No, Not 
Required 
Listen for Directions and Follow Them 62.5% 37.5% 
Immediately Shelter in Place 39.8 60.2 
Evacuate the Area 46.5 53.5 
Something Else 9.1 90.9 
          SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 
However, when broken out by distance from the Depot boundary, there is only slight variation 
in the understood emergency response requirements as shown in Table 3.4. 
 
Table 3.4: Response Options by Distance of Residence from Depot 
Distance from Depot 
Boundary 
Shelter-in-Place 
Required (%) 
Evacuation 
Required (%) 
Zero to 4 Miles 48.5% 40.8% 
Five to 8 Miles 40.5% 42.5% 
Nine to 12 Miles 38.2% 46.5% 
Thirteen to 16 Miles 41.2% 56.5% 
Seventeen or More Miles 33.3% 50.0% 
  SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 
Sheltering-in-place is seen as a plan requirement by substantial percentages of respondents in all 
regions, though the fraction is highest (48.5 percent) among those closest to the Depot boundary.  
Forty percent of those who live within 4 miles of the Depot boundary believe they should evacuate, 
rising to 50 percent for those living at greatest distance. Overall, however, there is no clear 
association between distance from the Depot and the emergency response procedures that 
community residents believe are required of them. 
Respondents were read an array of options, including evacuation and sheltering-in-place, and 
asked which of these actions they would take in a chemical emergency (for full question wording, 
see the Appendix C).  In Tables 3.5 and 3.6 we show the relationships between residents’ beliefs 
about whether the plan calls for them to evacuate or shelter-in-place in a chemical emergency, and 
what they say they would actually do in that event. 
 
 
Table 3.5: Respondent Compliance with (Believed) Plan 
Requirements for Sheltering-in-Place  
 Would Not 
Shelter 
Would Shelter Total 
Should Not Shelter 79.1% 20.9% 100% 
Should Shelter 47.4% 52.6% 100% 
 2
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Table 3.6: Respondent Compliance with (Believed) Plan 
Requirements for Evacuation  
 Would Not 
Evacuate 
Would 
Evacuate 
Total 
Should Not Evacuate 65.1% 34.9% 100% 
Should Evacuate 28.7% 71.3% 100% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
As Tables 3.5 and 3.6 indicate, not all residents expect to comply with the plan requirements in 
the event of an emergency. Of those who believed that sheltering-in-place was required, nearly half - 
47 percent - said they would not take shelter in the event of a chemical emergency. Of those who 
believed that evacuation was not called for by the plan, 35 percent said they would evacuate.  Almost 
30 percent who thought evacuation was required would refrain from evacuation. Thus, a significant 
fraction of the community says they would not comply with what they believed to be the 
requirements of the emergency preparedness plan. What explains this non-compliance?  We find 
some evidence that those who do not believe the plan will protect the community are more likely to 
refuse to comply with the plan.  
 
SPECIAL SUB-POPULATIONS 
Based on conversations with community leaders, two sub-populations were identified as needing 
special attention in the emergency planning process.  These two sub-populations are families with 
children and special needs residents.  For each sub-population a comparison was made between 
their self-reported knowledge of the emergency plan and an indicator of actual knowledge of the 
plan.  Based on this comparison, some conclusions can be drawn regarding the current state of 
preparedness.  In addition to this general comparison, each sub-population will be assessed based on 
unique characteristics within the sub-population.  
Families with School Children 
The survey indicated that 29 percent of the Anniston population have children attending either 
school or daycare.  As indicated by Figure 3.4, these families are evenly distributed, between 16 and 
23 percent, among the five distance categories.  If the “pink zone” is defined as eight miles from the 
boundary, 40.9 percent of the families with children live inside the “pink zone” while 59.1 percent 
reside outside the pink zone.  The majority of families with kids stated that they were familiar with 
the emergency preparedness plan for Anniston.  On a scale of 0, no knowledge, to 10, extremely 
knowledgeable, the mean response was 6.01.  Looking at the distribution in Figure 3.4, it is evident 
that the distribution is skewed toward higher knowledge responses.  
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Figure 3.4: Families with Kids 
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SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
Despite the indication of knowledge of the plan, 82.3 percent of the families with children sub-
population could not properly identify whether or not they lived in the pink zone.  Looking at the 
data based on distance from the boundary, Table 3.7, yields the same result.  The lack of consistency 
on these two measures ranges between 80 and 90 percent regardless of the distance from the 
boundary.  Assuming that the basis of any emergency plan is zone identification, the lack of 
congruency between these two measures is alarming.  
 
Table 3.7: Reported Residence in “Pink Zone” by Distance from Depot 
Distance from Depot 
Boundary 
Don’t Know Zone Do Know Zone 
Zero to 4 Miles 81.1% 18.9% 
Five to 8 Miles 80.4% 19.6% 
Nine to 12 Miles 81.0% 19.0% 
Thirteen to 16 Miles 90.3% 9.7% 
Seventeen or More Miles 84.8% 15.2% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 
It is generally assumed that the first instinct of parents would be to protect their children from 
harm.  The survey data indicates that families with children are predisposed to place a high priority 
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on the safety of their children.  The survey asked parents what they would do if an accident 
happened while their children were at school.  Almost 59 percent of families stated they would pick 
up their kids from school (refer to Table 3.8).  Breaking the aggregate data down by distance from 
the depot boundary, residents within eight miles are more likely to leave their kids in the hands of 
school administrators.  Residents that live nine miles or greater are more likely to pick up their kids 
from school.   
 
Table 3.8: Response Options by Distance of Residence from Depot 
Distance from Depot 
Boundary 
Leave Kids (%) Pick Up Kids (%) 
Zero to 4 Miles 24.7% 15.4% 
Five to 8 Miles 28.8% 17.9% 
Nine to 12 Miles 16.4% 22.8% 
Thirteen to 16 Miles 16.4% 15.4% 
Seventeen or More Miles 13.7% 28.5% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 
Surprisingly, 41 percent of all residents with children would leave their children in the custody of 
school personnel. However, the public, as evidenced in Figures 3.5, holds school personnel in high 
regard. The survey asked respondents to rate the competence of teachers’ and administrators’ ability 
to protect their children in the event of a chemical emergency.  The response was based on a 0, low 
confidence, to 10, high confidence.  The average response was a 6.07, and the largest single category 
was a 10.  There is no statistical difference between the distance from the boundary and the attitude 
toward school personnel.  In other words, school personnel are highly trusted when it comes to 
ensuring the safety of children. 
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           Figure 3.5: Families with Children 
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How confident are you that school personnel would protect  
your child in the event of a chemical emergency? 
 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
Residents with Special Mobility Needs 
Many community leaders identified special needs populations as a preparedness concern. The 
survey indicated that only 12.4 percent of the population is self-described as a special need resident.  
The average age of the special needs sub-population is 51.41 years, and 61 percent are female. The 
educational attainment of this group is 47.6 percent with at least some college.  Additionally, 42 
percent of this sub-population resides within eight miles of the Depot boundary.  Almost 20 percent 
reside zero to four miles from the boundary.  
Although most residents in this sub-population indicated that they were extremely 
knowledgeable about the emergency preparedness plan (refer to Figure 3.6), only 17.8 percent of the 
aggregate could properly identify whether or not they lived in the “pink zone.” Looking at the data 
by the distance grouping, 60.2 percent to 87.5 percent of the special needs residents could not 
accurately identify whether or not they live in the “pink zone” (refer to Table 3.9). The fact that 82 
percent of all special needs resident could not properly identify their emergency preparedness zone 
is cause for alarm. 
 
Capstone Project  36 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
CHAPTER 3 
           Figure 3.6: Special Needs Population 
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SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 
 
Table 3.9: Reported Residence in “Pink Zone” by Distance from Depot  
(Special Needs) 
Distance from Depot 
Boundary 
Don’t Know Zone Do Know Zone 
Zero to 4 Miles 60.2% 30.8% 
Five to 8 Miles 87.5% 12.5% 
Nine to 12 Miles 83.3% 16.7% 
Thirteen to 16 Miles 87.5% 12.5% 
Seventeen or More Miles 84.6% 17.6% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
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CONCLUSION 
 In order for a community to be prepared to respond to an emergency, emergency-response 
strategies must be aligned with individuals’ ability to comply, in addition to their willingness to 
comply.  For instance, if an elderly person were told to shelter-in-place, but did not have the physical 
capabilities, he or she would be unable to comply with the plan. Similarly, if the community plan is 
to shelter-in-place, but the first reaction of residents is to flee and not comply, it could be concluded 
that the emergency plan does not adequately protect the community. Although this research does 
not cover every aspect of the emergency preparedness issue, the evidence suggests that there is both 
substantial confusion and substantial non-compliance over the current state of emergency 
preparedness in Anniston. As a result, residents are not prepared in the event of a chemical accident 
at the Anniston Army Depot. 
 There are four key findings imbedded in this analysis. They are: 
 
? Residents say that they have heard of the plan, but yet are not able properly identify whether or 
not they live in the “pink zone.” This finding not only applies to the general population, but cuts 
across both of the special sub-populations, families with kids and special needs, as well. 
? In the event of an emergency, community safety is dependent upon unambiguous emergency 
response instructions. Sixty-two percent of the respondents indicated that listening for directions 
was a required component of the emergency response plan. This finding places a high burden on 
government officials at all levels.  A coordinated emergency response plan is a must.  
? Emergency planners must take a serious look at mitigating non-compliance rates. If an accident 
happened today, the non-compliance rates for shelter-in-place would be 21 to 47 percent. 
Similarly, the non-compliance rate for evacuation measures would be 29 to 35 percent. 
? As expected, families with children are more likely to think of their children’s safety before their 
own. Of the parents living within eight miles of the Depot, almost 47 percent stated that they 
would pick up their child from school in the event of an accident. Residents living greater than 
eight miles felt even stronger about picking up their kids from school. This finding is despite the 
high level of trust the community places in school personnel. This measure is a strong indicator 
for emergency planners.  In order to have an effective community response plan, the needs of 
this sub-population must be incorporated. 
Capstone Project  38 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
CHAPTER 4 
COMMUNITY IMPACT 
In the last forty years, two opposing trends have occurred: the public is becoming more 
concerned with the environmental and health effects of industrial facilities, while their overall trust 
of technology and government has steadily declined.  But economic theory suggests that even with 
technological risks, the public will support hazardous facilities as long as the benefits sufficiently 
outweigh the risks (Flynn, et.al, 1992).  What economic theory does not always take into account, 
however, is that while the distribution of impacts at a worldwide, nationwide, or even statewide level 
can be beneficial to the public, the distribution of local impacts can be costly to the public.  Turning 
to the Anniston situation, the chemical demilitarization program is clearly of substantial benefit to 
the world and to the nation.  However, the cost in terms of the risk of continued storage and a 
potential accident during destruction is concentrated locally.  These conditions warrant a hard look 
at potential impacts of the chemical demilitarization program in the Anniston area.  
 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STUDY 
In June 2001, the Department of Defense (DOD) released the study Assessment of the Need for 
Assistance to Communities Affected by Chemical Demilitarization: Final Report.  The study was conducted to 
ascertain whether or not the federal government should compensate the eight communities affected 
by demilitarization activities, including Anniston, Alabama.  Using a regional economic model, the 
consultant for DOD, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), determined that the “Anniston core 
county could experience a net loss over 35 years of $1,800,000 and that the region could experience 
a net loss of $1,900,000, but the state of Alabama could gain $26,400,000 over the same period” 
(IDA, 2001, p. S-4).  In other words, even though the county and region would lose, the state of 
Alabama as a whole would be able to recoup to the tune of $22,700,000.  
When these figures were calculated, IDA omitted factors or “additional considerations” that 
were beyond the scope of the study.  According to the study’s authors, these were not factors 
included in the economic model.  It is possible that the report’s key finding - that Alabama is 
benefiting from the demilitarization activities - is a result of their omissions.   Consequently, this 
section on impacts will focus on some of these “additional considerations” in the DOD study and 
how they relate to community impacts.  
 
CHAPTER FOCUS  
The two primary concerns that went beyond the scope of the DOD study were 1) “the 
perceived inadequacy of evacuation options, and 2) the inability to attract and retain business 
investments. The latter concern was related to the common complaint of declining property values 
due to the stigma caused by chemical agent incineration and other demilitarization activities” (IDA, 
2001, pp. S5-S6).  Since we are using our survey data as the basis of our analysis, we can’t discuss all 
of the impacts regarding the perceived inadequacy of evacuation options, such as the cost of 
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improving infrastructure. However we will discuss the financial impact of having to make one room 
airtight for those members of the population, for whom, for a variety of reasons, evacuation is not 
an option.  Depending on the age and construction of residents’ homes, it may be necessary to make 
a financial investment to make one room sufficiently airtight for the purpose of sheltering-in-place. 
The second concern, stigma, we will discuss as it specifically relates to residential property values, 
use and enjoyment of property, and business attraction. 
 
AIR INFILTRATION REDUCTION 
According to the Department of Energy’s commissioned report Assessment of Housing Stock Age in 
the Vicinity of Chemical Stockpile Sites (1999), “the key factor in sheltering-in-place effectively centers on 
the level of protection offered by the structure.  Rate of air infiltration into a structure determines 
the ‘leakiness.’  Buildings with low infiltration rates will afford residents higher levels of protection 
during a plume passage than those with high infiltration rates” (p. 1).  A variety of factors can 
influence a structure’s infiltration rate, including outdoor meteorological influences, building design, 
general climatic conditions of the region, adequate building codes that contribute to energy 
efficiency, and age of building (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1999). 
Due to the high air exchange rate of old and/or poor structures, it is uncertain whether they 
would provide adequate protection should a chemical vapor release occur at the Anniston Army 
Depot  (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1999).  Since the age of the structure can be a major cause 
of high infiltration rates, the Oak Ridge National Laboratory did a survey for the Department of 
Energy assessing the age of the residential housing stock in each of the eight CW stockpile sites with 
chemical activities.   According to the Oak Ridge survey, Anniston has the largest number of 
dwellings built before 1970 and the largest number of dwellings built before 1950 of any of the eight 
sites. As can be seen in Table 4.1, a total of 60 percent of the entire Anniston housing stock is within 
a 15 km radius of the chemical stockpile site, as well as being built before 1970.   
 
Table 4.1: Anniston Housing Stock 
Distance from 
CSEPP 
stockpile 
Total housing 
units 
Built before 
1950 
% of total Built before 
1970 
% of total 
10 km (6.2 
miles) radius 
4,611 765 17% 2,489 54% 
15 km (9.3 
miles) radius 
25,066 6,244 25% 15,141 60% 
SOURCE: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1999 
 
To calculate the costs of reducing air infiltration the Oak Ridge National Laboratory looked at a 
study of almost 15,000 weatherized homes.  “According to this study it costs about $250 to caulk, 
weatherstrip, and seal a home” (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 1999, p. 12).  Based on this 
estimate it would cost almost $1.8 million to implement an air infiltration reduction program for just 
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the pre-1950 residential housing stock in Anniston and a little over $4.4 million to implement an air 
infiltration reduction program for the entire pre-1970 housing stock in Anniston.5’ 6
 In our own community survey of Calhoun County, only 59 percent of the respondents said 
it would be possible to make one room airtight in their home if they had to use a sheltering-in-place 
kit.  Of those 59 percent of the respondents, 37 percent said that it would cost less than $100 to 
implement an air infiltration reduction program or in other words, make one room airtight. The next 
largest group (26 percent), said it would cost between $1001 and $5000 to make one room airtight. 
The average household cost to “make one room airtight,” according to the respondents of the 
Calhoun County community survey, was $2961.27.  The median value was $700.00. The breakdown 
in cost for the respondents is as follows:  
 
Table 4.2: Cost of Air Infiltration Reduction 
Cost to make 
one room 
airtight  
Less than 
or equal to 
$100 
$101-500 $501-1000 $1001-5000 $5001-10,000 Greater than 
10,001 
Percentage of 
respondents 
who said it was 
possible to 
make one 
room airtight 
 
 
37.1% 
 
 
12.6% 
 
 
9.4% 
 
 
26.3% 
 
 
7.2% 
 
 
7.6% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
By applying the respondents’ average cost to make one room airtight ($2961.27) to Oak Ridge’s 
estimate of the Anniston housing stock (pre-1950: 6,244 & pre-1970: 15,141), the total cost estimate 
for the pre-1950 residential housing stock would be $18.5 million, and for the entire pre-1970 
residential housing stock, $44.8 million. By applying the median value ($700), the total cost estimate 
would be $4.4 million and 10.6 million, respectively.  In either case, using both the average and 
median values to estimate the total cost to Anniston produces significantly higher numbers than Oak 
Ridge’s estimate. If sheltering-in-place is required, these results show that there is a potentially 
significant financial impact on the Anniston community. 
 
STIGMA OF ANNISTON’S CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE AND 
DEMILITARIZATION FACILITY 
The potential stigma resulting from Anniston’s chemical weapon (CW) stockpile and 
demilitarization facility was the second concern of Anniston residents that wasn’t addressed in the 
DOD study.  “A ‘stigma’ is a term of art used by appraisers, developers, and financial institutions to 
represent ‘impacts on value stemming from the increased risk associated with the property’ and the 
resulting limits on an owner’s ability to sell or finance the property.  Generally it refers to the 
discount required to compensate buyers, investors, or lenders for the risks which affect the 
                                                          
5 Community Against Pollution, a citizen group in Anniston, is currently preparing to do a door-to-door assessment of 
resident homes in the “pink zone.” 
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property’s value” (Gibson, 1995, p. 391).  According to Peter J. Patchin (1991) of Contaminated 
Properties-Stigma Revisited, “some estimates have shown that an aggregate loss in property values due 
to hazardous contamination could well exceed ten percent of the total real estate value in the United 
States” (Gibson, 1995, p. 389).  The question for this study is whether the presence of the CW 
stockpile has stigmatized properties in the Anniston area. 
 
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY VALUES 
To assess the possibility of stigma in Anniston we conducted an experiment to determine if 
there was indeed a stigma.  Our test considered whether the attractiveness of a home in Anniston is 
materially affected by proximity to the Depot, holding other factors constant.  Put differently, does 
the distance from the Anniston Army Depot affect the likelihood that a buyer would purchase a 
home in Anniston?  In our experiment the respondents were randomly assigned into three different 
groups, those that were told: 1) the home they were considering to buy was 6 miles away from the 
Anniston Army Depot, 2) the home they were considering to buy was 1½ miles away from the 
Anniston Army Depot, and 3) the home they were considering to buy was ½ mile away from the 
Anniston Army Depot.  Once the respondents were assigned to the three distance groups, they were 
then each given a house price that ranged from $10,000 to $100,000.  Afterwards they were told the 
following story:  
 
In consideration of the sale, the realtor raises several issues. First, the realtor explains that 
the industrial area four miles away includes the site of a plant that once manufactured PCBs. PCBs 
are a possible cancer-causing chemical that leaked from the plant several decades ago. That site is 
now the subject of an ongoing lawsuit, although no PCBs have been detected anywhere in the 
neighborhood. Your realtor also explains that the Anniston Army Depot used to store CW, and 
that the Army plans to destroy these weapons over the next six years. The storage and destruction 
sites are in the middle of the depot, and the home is located [6, 1 ½, or ½ miles] (depending on 
treatment group) from the boundary of the depot. 
Over time, some of the CW stored at the depot have leaked, although none of the toxic 
chemicals have been detected off of the depot. On the advice of the National Research Council, 
the Army has decided to use incineration to destroy the weapons. The Army and National 
Research Council have concluded that the largest risk of chemical release comes from storage. 
However, several local citizen groups have argued that the incineration of the CW also poses a 
significant risk to the health of the community.  
Imagine that the seller of the home would finance the house and charge no closing costs. 
Your costs would only be the monthly payments, but of course this money would not be available 
for groceries, debt, or other expenses.   
 
In the story that was told to the respondent, both the distance from the PCB site and the 
neighborhood description were held constant.  (For complete question wording, see Appendix C). 
The only descriptor that changed among each of the three groups was the house’s distance from the 
“storage and destruction” site  (6, 1 ½, or ½ miles).  Therefore, if the experiment worked as 
intended, the only attribute of the home that varied systematically in the mind of the respondent was 
the distance from the Depot, and hence, proximity to the CW stockpile.  If the stockpile has a 
stigmatizing effect on home prices, we would expect a greater reluctance to purchase the home 
described as closest to the Depot. 
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To analyze the data we derived from the question above, we used a logistic regression to 
calculate the probability that a respondent would agree to buy the home, given the price offered 
($10,000 to $100,000), perceived risk of storage, and the distance from the storage and destruction 
site (6 miles and 1 ½ miles or 1/2 mile).  The estimated probabilities from the 1½-mile group were 
not statistically different from those for the 6-mile group; consequently, these groups were 
aggregated when plotting the probabilities that the respondent would purchase the home. 
In Figure 4.1 below, the probability of buying the house is shown on the Y-axis, whereas the 
price ($10,000 to $100,000) is shown on the X-axis.  The “triangle” curve represents the people 
closest to the depot (1/2 mile) and the “square” curve represents the people further away (6 and 1½ 
miles).  
  
Figure 4.1: Probability of Buying a House in Anniston Given the 
Distance from the Incinerator 
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   SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002
Shown in Figure4.1, as the price of a home goes up, the probability of buying that home goes 
down.  Over the entire range, however, the home that is ½ mile away from the Depot is much less 
likely to be purchased than the home at the 6- mile point.  As indicated in Table 4.3, if the home was 
described as being 6 miles from the Depot, 32 percent of the respondents said they would buy the 
average-priced house ($55,940).  If the house was described as being 1½ miles away from the 
storage and incinerator site, the probability of the respondent buying the average-priced house drops 
another 8 percent, to 24 percent.  When the house was described as ½ mile away, the probability of 
buying the average-priced house dropped to 12 percent, a difference of 20 percent from the original 
6-mile mark.  
 
Table 4.3: Distance from Incinerator and Probability of Buying a House 
House Distance from Incinerator and Storage 
Site 
Probability of Buying  
the Average-Priced ($55,940) House 
6 miles 32% 
1 ½ miles 24% 
½ miles 12% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
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Overall, the results of our experiment show that there is evidence of stigma; the closer the home 
is to the Depot, the lower the willingness to buy.  Thus, residents of Anniston who currently live 
within 6 miles of the Depot may thus be affected by the stigma of the storage and destruction site.  
As the proximity to the Depot reduces the attractiveness of the home to prospective buyers, the 
market price will fall as well.7  
 
USE AND ENJOYMENT OF PROPERTY 
Besides examining whether or not the stigma of demilitarization activities affects property 
values, we also wanted to know if stigma affected Calhoun County residents’ use and enjoyment of 
their property.  “The term ‘use and enjoyment’ comprehends the interests that a person may have in 
the actual present use of the land for residential, agricultural, commercial, industrial, and other 
purposes.  Additionally, it includes the pleasure, comfort, and enjoyment a person normally derives 
from the occupancy of land” (Gibson, 1995, pp. 408-409).  
Our question is whether living in close proximity to the Depot and the CW stockpile would 
affect the ways in which residents can enjoy their residential properties.  To determine how different 
uses and enjoyment of property correlates with proximity to the Anniston Army Depot storage site 
and incinerator, we asked respondents to think about the following four activities that would take 
place on their property:8
 
? Working on their lawn and in their garden, 
? Having outdoor barbecues and picnics, 
? Letting children play outside in their yard, and 
? Growing fruits and vegetables in their yard for their own use 
We posed the question, “Would living in a neighborhood next to the Anniston Army Depot 
storage site and incinerator cause you to stop the activity altogether, reduce it a lot, reduce it a little, 
or would it have no effect?”  Table 4.4 shows the pattern of responses.  For two activities – working 
on the lawn and garden and having outdoor barbecues – a majority of respondents said proximity to 
the Depot would have no effect.  Half of our respondents said they would curb their children’s play 
in the yard, and 59 percent would reduce or cease growing and eating fruits and vegetables grown in 
their yards.9   
                                                          
7 The actual magnitude of the price differentiated can be calculated using hedonic pricing techniques (see S. Farber for a 
comparison of techniques). Given the time and resource instrument for this study, we were unable to conduct such an 
analysis.  
8 The four activities were randomly applied to the Calhoun County community survey to avoid order bias.  
9 Though the question only refereed to the Depot and the CW incinerator, if is possible that the respondents’ answers 
could have been influenced by the presence of PCB’s in the Anniston area.  
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Table 4.4: Use and Enjoyment of Property    
  Have No Effect
Reduce It A 
Little Reduce It A Lot 
Stop the Activity 
Altogether 
Working on their lawn and in   
their garden 55 % 17 % 16 % 12 % 
Having barbeques and picnics 54 % 22 % 13 % 12 % 
Letting their children play 
outside in their yard 50 % 18 % 18 % 14 % 
Growing fruits and vegetables in 
their yard for their own use 42 % 12 % 16 % 29 % 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002    
 
Interestingly, those respondents who lived closer to the Depot (less than 15 miles) were less 
likely to say they would curtail the use and enjoyment of their property.  This may be due to a 
number of factors: selection bias (i.e., who chooses to live close to the Depot), psychological effect 
(i.e., the people who live closest to the facility have grown accustomed to the Depot and the possible 
threats), and variations in familiarity with incineration could all be reasons why the people who live 
furthest away would be more likely to stop all activities than the respondents who lived closest to 
the facility. In sum, our respondents indicated that proximity to the Depot and incinerator might 
well have an impact on the use and enjoyment of their properties.  Some activities in particular – 
such as allowing children to play outdoors and enjoying homegrown fruits and vegetables – appear 
to be vulnerable.  This data suggests that the losses to the community may extend beyond financial 
expenses and reduced property values. 
 
BUSINESSES ATTRACTION 
 As documented in other areas with hazardous facilities, such as Times Beach, Missouri, and 
Love Canal, New York, the stigmatization of a place could result in unfavorable responses on the 
part of potential immigrants as well as potential businesses (Slovic, Layman, Kraus, Flynn, Chalmers, 
Gessel, 2001). To find out whether residents of Anniston felt this way we asked the question, 
“Overall, do you think that the incineration of CW at the Anniston Army Depot would increase, 
decrease, or have no effect on the number of new businesses moving into your county?”   As you 
can see in Table 4.5, more than half, or 56 percent of the respondents said that they think the 
incineration of CW at the Anniston Army Depot would decrease the number of new businesses 
moving into their county.  This belief was also expressed in our interviews with representatives of 
citizen groups.  Most policy leaders – particularly those charged with representing and recruiting 
businesses – did not expect incineration to deter businesses from relocating to the Anniston area. 
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Table 4.5: Business Relocation   
Will incineration increase, have no 
effect, or decrease the number of 
new businesses moving in? 
 
Increase 
 
No Effect 
 
Decrease 
Percentage of respondents 13.4% 30.2% 56.4% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
 
Assuming that the Depot employees and the residents who live closest to the facility have 
greater familiarity with CW issues, we wanted to see if they would be more inclined to say that the 
number of businesses moving in would increase due to incineration.  We performed a crosstabular 
analysis to see if the respondents who were employed by the Anniston Army Depot were more 
likely to say that incineration would have no effect or would increase the number of businesses 
moving in than non-employees.  The data showed, however, that Depot employees were just as 
likely to say that incineration would have a negative effect on the number of businesses moving in as 
were non-employees.  Moreover, the data indicated that the respondents who lived closest to the 
Depot (0-4 miles) were more likely to say that incineration would decrease the number of businesses 
moving into the county.  In conclusion, both Depot employees and residents close to the Depot 
were no less likely to believe incineration would act as a deterrent to businesses moving to the 
County.  Apparently, then, this concern is broadly shared among the community residents.  
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CONCLUSION 
Are the “additional considerations” omitted from the IDA assessment of community impacts of 
the Anniston area of any significance?  Our analysis suggests that they are, and that the losses to 
Calhoun County residents may be substantial.  Overall, these findings show that:  
 
? The burden of cost weighs heavier on the people who live closest (0-4 miles) to the storage and 
incinerator site.  
? Property values in Anniston are predicted to be affected significantly by the stigma of the 
demilitarization site. 
? The use and enjoyment of property is predicted to be slightly affected by incineration. 
? Business migration into the county is predicted to be somewhat negatively affected by 
incineration.  
 
These findings mean that the demilitarization facility has a greater impact, both in terms of 
financial impacts and the impacts on property use and enjoyment, than have been previously 
identified in the IDA study.  Therefore, the impacts on Anniston residents, especially those who live 
closest to the facility, should be readdressed due to the costs associated with reducing air infiltration 
and the identified stigma of the demilitarization facility.    
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 INCENTIVES 
As mentioned previously, from the local perspective, Calhoun County is being asked to bear 
substantial costs, whereas the benefits derived from chemical demilitarization are realized by the 
state, nation, and world.  Incentives may help balance this perceived benefit/cost imbalance and 
decrease local opposition to hosting undesirable facilities (Carnes, et al., 1982).   
Incentives can be divided into two main categories: mitigation and compensation.  Mitigation 
refers to actions designed to decrease negative impacts and potential risks associated with the 
operation of a facility (Carnes, et al., 1982).  Alternatively, compensation is defined as payment for 
the assumption of risk or damages that occur as the result of an emergency or accident (Carnes, et 
al., 1982). 
This chapter discusses incentives as policy tools.  First, it contains a discussion of compensation 
and mitigation measures.  Then, it evaluates the use of incentives in Calhoun County by discussing 
the incentive preferences of stakeholders and the community.  Finally, it examines the effect of trust 
and risk on the incentive preferences of residents and evaluates the potential use of incentives in 
Calhoun County.   
 
MITIGATION 
Mitigation of risk is an essential step in the siting of an undesirable facility.  Appropriate 
mitigation measures are largely determined by the local community’s perception of risk.  Therefore, 
if mitigation measures are to be successful policy tools, the community must be involved in the 
development of mitigation options (Carnes, et al., 1982).   There are two categories of mitigation 
measures: engineering mitigation and institutional mitigation (Gregory, Kunreuther, Easterling, & 
Richards, 1991).   
 
ENGINEERING MITIGATION 
Engineering mitigation refers to technical precautions that are put into place to make a facility 
more resistant to accidents.  If risks associated with a facility are uncertain or unfamiliar, then 
engineering mitigation might not reassure a worried community.  Instead, it may increase public 
apprehension.  For example, “when the U.S. Army revealed plans to stockpile safety and emergency 
evacuation equipment near the site of a planned CW incinerator in Kentucky, local opposition to the 
project was reported to be heightened rather than calmed” (Gregory, et al., 1991, p. 672).   These 
types of reactions are particularly likely to occur when a community consistently hears that a process 
is safe, yet sees preparation for serious accidents.  Given that preparation for a worst-case scenario is 
necessary, this creates an almost inevitable tension between potentially hazardous activities and the 
local community. 
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INSTITUTIONAL MITIGATION 
Institutional mitigation involves decreasing risk through empowering the local community in 
siting decisions.  These types of efforts may be particularly useful for overcoming community 
mistrust of public officials involved in the siting and operation of the facility (Gregory, et al., 1991).  
Examples of institutional mitigation measures include: 
? Buffers/Land Use Management:  Land can be purchased around a facility in order to prevent 
human occupation.  This can include the use of relocation, development rights, and easements.  
? Relocation.  Relocation could include people living in homes near the facility or in homes that 
are unable to meet minimum safety requirements.  People wishing to relocate could dedicate 
their property to the government and be paid the fair market value.  
? Monitoring/Detection:  If there are doubts about institutional credibility, independent 
monitoring by the local community may decrease local apprehension. 
? Emergency Response/Preparedness:  Personnel, equipment, training, and plans should be in 
place to respond to any emergencies and promote a feeling of safety within the community. 
? Public Education:  Public education can include education about the facility and its safety 
features, as well as, the emergency response plan (Carnes, et al., 1982). 
COMPENSATION 
 
Mitigation used alone is unlikely to reduce opposition to an undesirable facility because it is not 
possible to eliminate all risk associated with a facility (Carnes, et al., 1982).  As a result, 
compensation measures may be needed to redress negative impacts resulting from a facility such as 
economic losses, impacts on human health, decreases in quality of life, and degradation of the 
natural environment (Jenkins-Smith & Kunreuther, 2001).  Examples of compensation measures 
include:   
? Trust Funds. Once created, trust funds would compensate people suffering damages from an 
emergency or accident associated with the facility.  
? Insurance Scheme.  An insurance pool could be created in which all, or part, of the premiums 
would be paid by the government. Residents would file claims for damages against this pool. 
Precedents for “federal involvement in insurance for low probability/high risk events include 
the Price Anderson Act and the National Flood Insurance Program” (Carnes, et al., 1982, p. 31). 
? Assumption of Liability.  The government could provide written assurance to assume liability 
for damages resulting from an emergency or accident associated with the facility. This could 
include assumption of medical costs in the event of an accident or land value guarantees.   
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? Contracts. The federal government and local governments could enter into contracts ensuring 
local compensation in the event of an accident  
? Economic Benefits. Economic benefits could include direct payments to the local community 
or families/individuals or tax incentives, such as credits and deductions  
? Provision of Bonus Community Services or Infrastructure Development.  Bonus services 
or infrastructure could be provided to the local community to compensate the perceived costs of 
the facility.  Examples include job training programs, scholarship funds, parks, cultural 
resources, schools, police protection, fire protection, roads, and bridges (Carnes, et al., 1982). 
 
USE OF INCENTIVES IN CALHOUN COUNTY 
The purpose and benefits of the incineration of CW in Calhoun County are national in scope; 
however the costs associated with incineration are localized.  Therefore, many residents of Calhoun 
County perceive a benefit/cost imbalance.  
 
PERCEPTIONS OF LOCAL COSTS  
As noted earlier in this report, the community perceives numerous costs associated with the 
incineration of CW.  These perceived costs impact every aspect of community life, and can serve as 
a basis for considering the use of mitigation and compensation measures.  These costs include the 
following: 
? Risk. Residents of Calhoun County perceive both the storage and incineration of CW to pose 
serious risks to the community.  However, on average the storage of CW is perceived to be 
slightly riskier than incineration.  Nevertheless, approximately 50.2 precent of respondents 
perceived the incineration of CW as presenting a high risk to the community (See Chapter 2). 
? Property values.  Our analysis demonstrates that respondents are willing to pay much less for 
homes near the Anniston Army Depot, than homes located further away.  In addition, the 
number of respondents who would consider buying a home decreases with distance to the 
Depot (See Chapter 3). 
? Business relocation. Many policy leaders perceive the presence of CW in Calhoun County to 
have a negative impact on the ability of the community to attract new businesses.  Survey 
respondents echoed this belief with 56.4 percent of respondents indicating that the incineration 
of CW would decrease the number of new businesses coming into the county (See Chapter 3). 
? Use and enjoyment of property. Many survey respondents indicated that living near the 
Anniston Army Depot would have a negative impact on their use and enjoyment of their homes.  
Approximately half of all respondents indicated that living near the Depot would result in their 
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decreasing or stopping activities such as working in their lawn and garden, having outdoor 
barbeques and picnics, and allowing their children to play outside (See Chapter 3). 
? Health.  Most survey respondents report being concerned about negative impacts on their 
families’ health.  In addition, many citizen groups believe that the incineration of CW in Calhoun 
County will release dangerous pollutants into the air that would have a negative impact on 
human health and the degradation of the natural environment.  These concerns are particularly 
relevant considering the background PCB contamination that has affected the local community  
(See Chapter 3). 
As a result of these perceived costs associated with incineration, incentives may be necessary to 
help balance the costs and benefits of hosting the incineration facility and to increase local support 
of incineration.  To determine the effect of incentives on this benefit/cost imbalance, we examined 
the effect of compensation and mitigation measures on an individual’s preferred method of CW 
destruction. 
 
INITIAL ACCEPTANCE OF INCINERATION 
At the time of the writing of this report, the presumptive method for the destruction of the CW 
stockpile is incineration.10  As indicated by our interviews with community leaders, most 
stakeholders prefer the method of incineration to other options of CW destruction.  Only citizen 
group representatives and several local officials were opposed to incineration.  In addition, 
stakeholders overwhelmingly felt that most residents prefer incineration and that only a vocal 
minority opposes it.   However, our survey found that the community is divided over the issue of 
incineration.  Slightly less than half of all respondents prefer incineration as a method of weapons 
destruction, while the other 50.9 percent of Calhoun County residents are divided between 
preferring to wait for the development of other methods or using an existing alternative technology.   
These percentages are shown in Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Preferred Method of Weapons Disposal 
Which of the following options most closely 
matches your preference for handling the CW 
stored at the Anniston Army Depot? 
Incineration Wait for other 
methods 
Alternative 
technology 
Percentage of respondents 49.1% 33.9% 17% 
 
R
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C
GSOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002
 
ESPONSIVENESS TO INCENTIVES 
The responsiveness of the community to incentives was determined in two ways.  First, policy 
eaders were asked what they believed would make the community more receptive to the idea of CW 
ncineration.  For purposes of comparison, community survey respondents were then asked their 
pinion of four mitigation measures and three compensation measures.  They were asked whether 
                                                         
0 It is not the purpose of this report to promote incineration or a particular technology.  Since incineration is the 
resumptive method of CW destruction, we tried to assess community receptiveness and acceptance of this method.   
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the measures would make them more favorable, less favorable, or stay the same regarding 
incineration.11   
 
MITIGATION 
Local policy leaders agreed that mitigation measures were extremely important.  This is because 
they overwhelmingly felt that Calhoun County is not prepared for a chemical emergency.  Concerns 
mentioned by policy leaders included the following:  
? First responders do not have necessary equipment and training to respond to an emergency. 
? The special needs population has not been identified, so many of them will not be able to 
respond to an emergency. 
? The community is confused about what do in the event of an emergency because of the 
“multiple voices” that are giving them conflicting information. 
? The community has not been educated about what to do in the event of an accident and there 
have been no practice scenarios.  
Mitigation measures that local policy leaders agreed were important were protective suits and 
equipment for first responders, more over-pressurized schools and buildings, public education, 
relocation, and the retrofitting of homes to be airtight.  Policy leader perceptions of protective 
hoods for residents were mixed, with many arguing that they gave residents a false sense of 
protection.  Concerns raised by local policy leaders about protective hoods included the following: 
? Inability of residents to carry the hoods everywhere  
? Inability of hoods to be effective for residents with facial hair, glasses, or who experienced 
weight loss/gain 
? Difficulty in training the public about the correct usage of hoods 
? Inability of hoods to protect infants and children 
From the public perspective, mitigation is equally important.  Most Calhoun County residents 
surveyed did not feel that the current emergency preparedness plan in Calhoun County provides 
adequate protection; 55.5 percent of respondents believed that the current plan provided little to no 
protection for the community.  Furthermore, 52.3 percent of residents do not feel that they would 
be notified soon enough to respond in the event of a chemical emergency.   
                                                          
11 Compensation and mitigation options were presented in random order to prevent an order effect in responses.  
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To gauge community receptiveness to mitigation measures, survey respondents were asked the 
following questions regarding four mitigation measures. 
Would your views regarding the incineration of CW at the Anniston Army Depot become 
more favorable, less favorable, or stay the same under each of the following 
circumstances? 
 
1. If protective suits were provided for local emergency responders? 
2. If protective hoods were provided for civilians living near the depot?  
3. If roads, highways, and bridges were improved to enable easier evacuation in the 
case of an accident? 
4. If you knew that residents living near the facility would be compensated for 
relocating?12 
The majority of respondents stated that all four mitigation measures would make them either 
more favorable to incineration or stay the same, and approximately half of all respondents stated 
that mitigation measures would make them more favorable to the idea of incineration.  As shown in 
Table 5.2, some respondents stated that mitigation measures would make them less favorable to 
incineration.  Therefore, it is important to look at the net increase in favorability (% more favorable 
- % less favorable) for the four mitigation measures to assess their effectiveness as policy tools.   
 
 
Table 5.2:  Overall Responses to Mitigation Measures 
 More Favorable Stay the Same Less 
Favorable 
Net 
Favorability 
Evacuation Route 
Improvements  
50.5% 34.5% 4.8% 45.7% 
Relocation 50.0% 33.2% 6.7% 43.3% 
Protective Suits for ERs 45.6% 37.5% 6.0% 39.6% 
Hoods for Residents 39.5% 40.2% 9.3% 30.2% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002  
 
As seen in Table 5.2, residents responded most favorably to evacuation route improvements and 
relocation.  Those preferring incineration responded most favorably to evacuation route 
improvements and protective suits for emergency responders, while those who did not prefer 
incineration responded most favorably to relocation and evacuation route improvements (see Table 
5.3).  As was true for the policy leaders, providing protective hoods for residents was the least 
effective mitigation measure for increasing acceptance of incineration. 
                                                          
12 For the purposes of this report, relocation is considered to be a mitigation measure.  This decision was based upon 
discussions with local stakeholders that indicated that requests for relocation were based upon safety concerns, not a 
desire for economic restitution.  
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 Prefer Incineration Does Not Prefer Incineration 
Evacuation Route 
Improvements * 
58.0% 45.2% 
Relocation 43.9% 52.4% 
Protective Suits for ERs 49.2% 42.3% 
Hoods for Residents 31.5% 36.1% 
*Difference of means is statistically significant 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002  
 
COMPENSATION 
Since the storage and incineration of CW involves inherent uncertainty and risk, mitigation 
measures can never achieve “zero risk.”  As a result, compensation measures may be necessary to 
redress the remaining negative impacts perceived by the community.  Local policy leaders 
consistently avowed that safety was the primary concern of the community and never specifically 
identified any compensation measures that they felt would make the community more favorable to 
the idea of incineration.  In general, it appeared to us that policy leaders perceived compensation as a 
second-order issue that should only be addressed once mitigation measures were explored. 
 To gauge community receptiveness to compensation, survey respondents were asked the 
following questions regarding three compensation measures. 
Would your views regarding the incineration of CW at the Anniston Army Depot become more 
favorable, less favorable, or stay the same under each of the following circumstances? 
1. If economic benefits were provided to residents living near the facility? 
2. If you were assured that medical costs would be covered for anyone harmed by a 
chemical emergency? 
3. If you were assured that the difference in value of your property before and after 
a chemical emergency was financially covered? 
As shown in Table 5.4, the majority of respondents stated that compensation measures would 
make them either more favorable to incineration or have no effect.  Table 5.5 shows the net effect 
of each of the compensation measures for those who prefer incineration as a means of CW 
destruction and for those who prefer an alternative option.  When looking at the net increase in 
favorability (% more favorable - % less favorable), it becomes evident that respondents who 
preferred incineration responded more favorably to every compensation measure.  Economic 
compensation was the least effective measure for both groups.   
 
Table 5.4: Overall Responses to Compensation Measures 
 More Favorable Stay the Same Less Favorable Net 
Favorability 
Medical Costs Covered 46.3% 36.1% 6.8% 39.5% 
Property Value Guarantee 42.2% 38.7% 7.6% 34.6% 
Economic Compensation 37.9% 42.5% 7.8% 30.1% 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002  
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Table 5.5:  Net Favorability of Compensation Measures 
 Prefers Incineration Does Not Prefer Incineration 
Medical Costs Covered* 53.8% 36.0% 
Property Value Guarantee* 47.7% 30.8% 
Economic Compensation 35.6% 33.4% 
*Difference of means is statistically significant 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002  
 
COMMUNITY PREFERENCES FOR INCENTIVES 
When ranking community responsiveness to the incentive measures presented, it is evident that 
mitigation is more important to the community than compensation.  This finding supports the 
judgment of local stakeholders that safety is the primary concern of the community.  Respondents 
preferred evacuation route improvements, relocation, protective suits for emergency responders, and 
the coverage of medical costs in the event of an accident over property value guarantees and 
economic benefits.   
However, perhaps the most important information this analysis yields is the effect of incentive 
measures on the opinions of those who were initially opposed to incineration.  Overall, those who 
did not prefer incineration responded most favorably to relocation programs, and evacuation route 
improvements, and least favorably to all of the compensation measures.  These rankings are shown 
in Table 5.6.  
 
Table 5.6: Community Rankings of Incentives 
 
Ranking of Incentives by Community Survey 
Respondents 
1. Evacuation Route Improvements 
2. Relocation 
3. Medical Costs Covered 
4. Protection Suits for Emergency Responders 
5. Property Value Guarantees 
6. Protective Hoods 
7. Economic Benefits 
Ranking of Incentives by Community Survey 
Respondents not Preferring Incineration 
1. Relocation 
2. Evacuation Route Improvements 
3. Protective Suits for Emergency Responders 
4. Hoods for Residents/Medical Costs Covered 
5. Economic Benefits 
6. Property Value Guarantees 
 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002 
If it is the desire of policymakers to increase public acceptance of incineration, especially the 
acceptance of people who do not currently prefer it, they should concentrate on the implementation 
of mitigation measures. 
 
IMPACT OF TRUST AND RISK ON RECEPTIVENESS OF INCENTIVES 
Trust and perceived risk are both considered important preconditions to the use of incentives.  
According to Carnes, et al, trust in siting officials and a minimum package of health and safety 
measures must be guaranteed before the use of incentives can be successful (Carnes, et al., 1982).  If 
these preconditions are not met, then incentives can be misunderstood by the community and 
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perceived as a bribe.  In light of this information, it is important to evaluate incentive preferences on 
the basis of perceived trust and risk. 
Trust 
As discussed previously in the report, respondents were grouped into trust clusters based on 
their views of federal, state, and local officials.  There were four trust clusters: 1) those who trusted 
all levels of government, 2) those who trusted local and state officials, but not federal officials, 3) 
those who had little trust in all levels of government, and 4) those who trusted federal and state 
officials, but not local officials.  The largest cluster was those who trust everybody (32.1 percent) and 
the smallest was those who trust nobody (14.4 percent).  On average those who trust everybody 
responded most favorably to the use of incentives, while those who trust nobody responded least 
favorably.  In addition, those who trust local/state officials responded more favorably to the use of 
incentives than those placing trust in federal/state officials.  These results are shown in Table 5.7. 
 
 
Table 5.7: Net Favorability of Incentives, Grouped by Trust Clusters 
 Trust Everybody 
(32.1%) 
Trust Local 
& State, Not 
Federal 
(29.0%) 
Trust Nobody 
(14.4%) 
Trust Federal 
& State, not 
Local 
(24.6%) 
Evacuation Route 
Improvements 
55.7% 54.8% 39.5% 49.4% 
Relocation  50.7% 47.8% 46.1% 45.0% 
Medical Costs Covered 51.3% 45.4% 32.9% 42.3% 
Protective Suits for ERs* 51.8% 50.0% 32.2% 39.5% 
Property Value Guarantees 39.9% 40.9% 37.3% 40.2% 
Protective Hoods for 
Residents* 
44.3% 36.8% 22.5% 28.2% 
Economic Benefits 42.4% 33.6% 27.3% 30.2% 
*Difference of means is statistically significant 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002  
 
Overall, there is an observed relationship between trust and the incentives that respondents find 
favorable. Trust had the greatest effect on acceptance of protective suits for emergency responders 
and protective hoods for residents.   Survey respondents who trust everybody or who trust 
local/state officials responded more favorably to all incentive measures, while respondents who trust 
nobody or who trust federal/state officials responded less favorably to all incentive measures.  These 
groups may be less responsive to incentives, because they do not trust that officials will deliver 
incentives or they do not feel that incentives necessary.  Nevertheless, respondents with low trust 
responded more favorably to mitigation measures and less favorably to compensation measures than 
other respondents.  This implies that mitigation measures are more effective than compensation for 
increasing acceptance of incineration for individuals who have low trust in public officials. 
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Risk 
Perceived risk can also affect the success of incentives as policy tools.  To determine the effect 
of risk on the preferred method of incineration, respondents were grouped by those who perceived 
low risk, moderate risk, and high risk in regards to the incineration of CW.  Approximately half of all 
respondents perceived the incineration of CW as presenting high risk to the community.   
Overall, perceptions of risk do appear to affect incentive preferences. As seen in Table 5.8, 
citizens who perceive incineration to be high risk responded more favorably to relocation and 
evacuation route improvements than any other measures.  Those perceiving moderate risk 
responded more favorably than other respondents to all incentives, except relocation.  Since citizens 
who perceive incineration to be high risk responded most favorably to mitigation measures, this 
would indicate that they do not believe that a minimum package of safety measures are in place in 
Calhoun County.  As a result, compensation measures presented to the community before additional 
mitigation could result in the community perceiving compensation as a bribe.   
 
 
Table 5.8:  Net Favorability of Incentives, Grouped by Perceived Risk 
 Low Risk  
(28.7%) 
Moderate Risk 
(21.1%) 
High Risk  
(50.2%) 
Evacuation Route Improvements 47.4% 58.3% 50.2% 
Relocation* 35.9% 51.4% 54.0% 
Medical Costs Covered* 48.7% 51.5% 39.0% 
Protective Suits for ERs* 44.2% 56.2% 40.1% 
Property Value Guarantees 40.9% 47.1% 35.4% 
Protective Hoods 29.5% 38.8% 34.6% 
Economic Benefits 33.6% 44.2% 30.6% 
*Difference of means is statistically significant 
SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 2002  
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CONCLUSION 
Incentives can be used to balance perceived benefit/cost imbalances in communities hosting 
undesirable facilities.  In Calhoun County, many residents perceive a benefit/cost imbalance within 
the community due to the concentration of local costs and the dispersion of total benefits.  To 
determine the effect of incentives on this benefit/cost imbalance, we examined the effect of 
compensation and mitigation measures on an individual’s preferred method of CW destruction. 
The majority of community survey respondents stated that mitigation and compensation 
measures would make them either more favorable to incineration or stay the same.  Those who did 
not prefer incineration responded more favorably to mitigation than compensation, particularly to 
relocation and evacuation route improvements.  In addition, respondents who have low trust in 
public officials or perceive high risk with the incineration process were more responsive to 
mitigation measures than compensation.  These findings support the judgment of local stakeholders 
that safety is the primary concern of the community, and that compensation is a second-order issue.  
Overall, the community preferred evacuation route improvements, relocation, the coverage of 
medical costs, and protective suits for emergency responders. 
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COMMUNICATION 
The premise of this paper rests upon the assumption that incineration is going to occur in 
September.  Given that assumption, the goal is then to consider what steps can be taken that will 
address the concerns of members of the community.   Understanding their concerns, and how those 
concerns can be addressed, can both facilitate steps toward emergency preparedness and reduce 
opposition to the Army’s efforts to destroy the stockpile of CW.  Community concerns can take 
several forms, but the most urgent may be 1) the perception that the lives and well being of the 
citizens are endangered by chemical weapon storage and destruction, and 2) that chemical weapon 
storage and destruction have imposed significant costs on the local community.  Broadly speaking, 
these concerns can be addressed in two ways.  The previous chapter addressed ways in which the 
federal government can reduce the cost that the Calhoun County community has been asked to bear 
by offering a variety of incentives.  This section will focus on how the state of interagency 
relationships and public communication has the potential to either create or assuage unfounded 
fears of the public.  Clearly, the goal is not to silence valid concerns; however, fear based on 
misinformation has ravaged the community for too long. 
  
INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS  
Legislation assigning responsibilities to various policy leaders has been passed in an attempt to 
ensure that communities are protected by an effective emergency preparedness plan.  However, the 
legislation is powerless to make sure that the agencies cooperate fully.  Calhoun County provides an 
example of how following the letter of law does not necessarily meet the intent of the law.  The lack 
of coordination among the agencies charged with the protection of Calhoun County has resulted in 
a nonexistent emergency plan and a community torn by fear and confusion. 
 
AGENCY PERCEPTIONS OF COMMUNICATION 
When we spoke with federal, state, and local policy leaders, there was no consensus as to 
whether a significant communication problem has impeded preparation for chemical weapon 
destruction.  Some of the leaders spoke of communication in terms of whether or not regular and 
consistent conversation occurred, or was possible, between the various parties.  However, other 
leaders spoke of communication in terms of how clearly they felt their concerns were heard and 
understood by other agencies.   
Generally, the leaders concurred that all of the local agencies involved were on “speaking 
terms,” meaning that at least these leaders verbally communicated.  Leaders referred to regular 
meetings in which the local representatives of federal, state, and local agencies discussed concerns.  
However, there does seem to be a split between the local agencies and the Army.  Both the Army 
and the local leaders spoke of this complete lack of communication.  The Army explained the 
breach as unwillingness of other leaders to cooperate with the Army.  Local policy leaders described 
the situation as one in which their repeated attempts to communicate or coordinate were ignored. 
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Addressing a different level of communication, great concern was expressed over the 
complicated plan for communication in the event of an accident.  Multiple phone calls and decision 
makers are involved in finally signaling the responders and the citizens.  Local policy leaders share 
the common belief that by the time all of the appropriate agencies and responders are alerted to the 
incident, too much time will have passed for citizens to react appropriately.   
Though there are many distinct meanings of “communication,” the reality is that the condition 
of communication in Calhoun County has to do with much more than just who is “only a phone call 
away.”  The state of communication rests heavily upon the degree to which concerns are heard and 
considered.  Several interviewees expressed concern that this type of communication was not taking 
place.  The rest of the chapter focuses on this level of communication. 
 
EVIDENCE OF FAILED COMMUNICATION 
On several occasions, the policy leader interviewees brought up the imbalance of authority, 
responsibility, and knowledge among themselves.  The current emergency plan does not effectively 
match duties with abilities.  For instance, CSEPP mandates that local elected leaders (the 
Commissioners) are legally responsible to ensure that an emergency plan is “developed . . . reviewed 
. . . adopted . . . exercised . . . and implemented” (CSEP Planning Guidance, 1988, ch.8-p.3).  The 
Commissioners are required to make the policy decisions, make the final call as to when and how 
the emergency plan should be executed, notify all of the appropriate responders, and decide when it 
is safe to return to normal life.  But not only are the Commissioners not the experts in chemical 
leaks or public health, they are also limited by their authority to fund their decisions.  The Alabama 
Constitution of 1901 does not permit the municipalities of Calhoun County the power and right to 
levy or collect taxes.  The Commissioners are, therefore, dependent upon the state and federal 
agencies’ decisions to fund any protective measure the Commissioners deem necessary (i.e., 
infrastructure improvements). 
Another issue raised was Calhoun County’s refusal to participate in scheduled “practices” in 
which first responders and the community act out their assigned duties and responses, as if an 
accident had taken place. While all of the surrounding counties have implemented and practiced 
emergency plans under the direction of CSEPP, Calhoun County has not settled on one plan, and 
they have refused to rehearse any kind of response.  Some believe that the Commissioners simply 
did not want to rehearse the wrong drill, leading to more confusion when the plan changed with the 
distribution of hoods and more SIP kits.  Others contend that the County refused to participate in 
drills as a means of manipulating FEMA into releasing more funds.  
Varying feelings about the Citizen Advisory Council (CAC) provide further evidence of a lack of 
communication.  Required by federal legislation and funded by the Army, the CAC is meant to serve 
as a liaison between the community and the chemical demilitarization program.  The governor 
appoints three citizens who live and work in the area to serve on the council.  One policy leader 
disclosed his impression that though the CAC members were once staunch anti-incineration 
proponents, the CAC has come to be made up of very pro-incineration citizens.  Various opinions 
were given for the change in perspective.  Those interviewees most prone to be opposed to 
incineration felt that the council has been “captured” by the Army.  The fact that the Army funds 
and houses the Council in one an Army building only supports the theory of capture.  The Army 
acknowledges the fact that Army funding of the Council could create the appearance of capture.  
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However, others feel that the CAC is an example of how education can change one’s opinions.  This 
group argues that as citizens become more knowledgeable about the process and the expertise of 
those performing the incineration, their fears are allayed and so they become honest converts to the 
pro-incineration side.   
 
POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR FAILED COMMUNICATION 
Throughout the interviews, the tendency to think of communication as “the other guy’s” 
problem dominated the conversation.  Most interviewees expressed frustration that after expressing 
their plans and concerns, the other officials still failed to listen or understand.   These concerns and 
the examples above have a common theme of mistrust.  The tendency of agencies to second-guess 
the “real” motives behind each other’s actions speaks volumes about the lack of confidence officials 
have in each other.  When asked about community perceptions, every official responded that he or 
she felt trusted by the community, but then often doubted the level of trust placed in other agencies.  
Why the perceived lack of trust?  Perhaps it stems from a lack of knowledge or understanding of 
each other’s position.   
Congress has passed legislation, such as the Super Fund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
(SARA), establishing the EPCRA.  Such legislation has resulted in an overlapping organizational 
structure that is meant to govern the emergency preparedness plan (see CSEPP Organizational 
Chart in Appendix E for a description of the structure).  This structure is open enough that the 
agencies included can easily escape responsibility and yet so narrowly defined in some areas that 
agencies can legitimately complain that someone else is not complying with the mandate.  
Consequently, agencies have avoided working together.  It is apparent that many of the officials 
have either been so narrowly focused on the scope of their own task, or so distracted by other 
agencies’ failure to accomplish their tasks, that the larger picture is often missed.   
Ultimately, the structure creates the greatest disadvantage for the local officials.  Typically not 
career-bureaucrats, these officials have found themselves striving to work within a federal process to 
request safety measures and fight for funding.  Placing the largest burden for acquiring knowledge in 
technology, funding, and communication on local officials, the structure provides no additional 
authority by which these officials can accomplish duties never provided for in a 100-year-old state 
constitution.  Several different local policy leaders defined the conflict in Calhoun County as the 
Commissioners’ “hang up” on the money or the politics of the situation.  The Commissioners, on 
the other hand, feel that because FEMA approval is the only means by which safety measures can be 
funded, these months before September are the last opportunity the Commissioners have to fight 
for the funding necessary to prepare the community.   
 
STEPS TOWARD EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION 
Clearly, the most important step is to bring together all of the actors to reach a level of 
consensus.  The issue at stake – the safety of the community – is worth going to great efforts, and 
the actors involved will be the first to acknowledge the urgency of the situation.  Given that much of 
the mistrust among the policy leaders can be explained by a lack of understanding of each other’s 
roles, a first step would be the creation of a discussion forum to bring together the various 
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government officials involved in the situation.  Clear role definitions must be set out.  The whole 
range of concerns, including the constraints that currently limit officials’ abilities to carry out their 
assigned responsibilities, should be openly discussed.  If a discussion forum proved ineffective, the 
introduction of a third party mediator may be necessary.  Given the entrenched positions and the 
long history of conflict, a third party mediator may present the most promising option.  Mediation 
has shown to be helpful in working through many public policy issues, especially land use issues 
(Lampe, 1999, 6).  Mediation would seek to involve all of the responsible officials together to 
discover creative solutions that all parties can endorse (2).  
Many of the same policy leaders met in a Task Force in the fall of 2001 that resulted in the 
Memorandum of Understanding in which FEMA made the infamous promise of “hoods.”  The 
initial reports from the Task Force were positive; policy leaders at all levels seemed to be in 
agreement over key issues.  However, as more time passed, the leaders all seemed to once again 
polarize.  Continual communication would have helped to prevent such regression.   
A successful discussion forum has the potential to yield great gains.  Policy leaders will have the 
opportunity to discover – and overcome – some very real institutional hurdles, such as the structural 
imbalance of responsibility and authority.  By combining the efforts of experts in emergency 
planning (FEMA, AEMA, CCEMA), CW (Army), and community needs (Commissioners, City 
Councilmen, Citizens Against Pollution), real resource needs can be identified.  Ultimately, the 
greater significance may lie in simply creating a level of understanding and trust among players as 
they get to know each other as people – not just as names filling a position.  The hope is that 
eventually, informal channels for communication will form as actors work together for a common 
goal – the protection of Calhoun County’s citizens.  Only when these officials have reached 
consensus, are they fully prepared to communicate with the public. 
 
PUBLIC COMMUNICATION  
Once policy leaders have agreed upon a community safety plan, they must turn their focus to 
communicating that plan to the community.  First, these leaders need to assess the condition of their 
relationships with the public.  The leaders’ ability to communicate rests upon the willingness of the 
community to trust the information they receive.  Next, policy leaders need to consider what 
education strategy to employ, including which communication mediums to use, and what role each 
leader will play. 
 
COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE ON COMMUNICATION 
There is little doubt in anyone’s mind that communication with the public has ultimately failed.  
Every policy leader interviewee acknowledged that the citizens were unsure of what to do in the 
event of an emergency.  The survey only confirmed what the leaders had told us.  Ninety percent of 
the residents surveyed said they had heard of the emergency plan, which would indicate that some 
communication has occurred.  However, we have already established that 83 percent of the citizens 
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do not even know what zone they live in, which is required to know the appropriate response.  
Furthermore, of the citizens that thought they knew what they should do, a large proportion of the 
population went on to say that they would not comply, which further indicates that misinformation 
is a serious problem (see Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 for a description of this group).  
 
CONDITIONS FOR COMMUNICATION 
Our goal is not to place blame for failed communication.  Rather, we want to identify the 
conditions for communication.  Communication is critical to the citizens’ safety.  Regardless of the 
citizens’ opinion of the policy leaders, they are dependent upon their leaders for information, 
guidance, and implementation of the emergency preparedness plan.  Citizens can only be 
comfortable with this dependency if they have high levels of confidence in those upon whom they 
are forced to rely.  Citizen compliance with policy leader information would naturally seem to be 
correlated with high confidence.  One way we attempted to get at this comfort level was to ask 
questions about how the community perceived the major players in the incineration and emergency 
preparedness context.  We used the following questions to address three aspects of trust to fully 
capture the nature of the relationships.   
? Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all likely and ten means very likely, 
how likely is it that the following groups or individuals would make decisions about the 
storage and incineration of CW in your area that are in the best interest of people in your 
community? 
? Now I would like to know how competent you believe various individuals or groups are to 
make decisions about the safe storage and incineration of CW.  On a scale from zero to ten 
where zero means not at all competent and ten means completely competent, how would 
you rate the following?   
? When thinking specifically about the CW at the Anniston Army Depot, I would like to know 
whether you would believe statements made by various individuals or groups. On a scale 
from zero to ten where zero means not at all believable and ten means completely believable, 
how would you rate the following individuals or groups? 
The survey focused upon those community leaders that were most involved in the decisions 
concerning the storage and incineration of CW, assuming that those same leaders would then be 
involved in emergency preparedness planning. 
Once we gathered the data for how the community perceived the policy leaders on the basis of 
community-mindedness, believability, and competency, we assimilated the information and broke 
the community into the following four broad groups on the basis of their trust levels: 1) those who 
trust federal, state, and local officials; 2) those who trust the federal officials and the Army, but do 
not trust local officials; 3) those who trust local officials, but do not trust federal or Army officials; 
and 4) those who do not trust anybody.   
The policy leaders we interviewed all told us that most of the community trusted the local 
officials because of their proximity to the citizens.  Policy leaders reasoned that identification of the 
leaders as “one of their own” would bring about greater confidence in their leadership.  However, 
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the survey did not fully support this assumption.  As the distribution chart below portrays, there is a 
significant portion of the population (29.0 percent) that does have confidence in the local and state 
officials.  Twenty-five percent of those surveyed placed confidence solely in the federal and Army 
officials.  Of course, there were also those who were confident in all of the policy leaders (32.1 
percent) and those who had no confidence in anyone (14.4 percent).  In analyzing the responses, it is 
evident that a citizen’s level of trust for one organization tends to move with the citizen’s level of 
trust of all of the leaders, as a whole.  In other words, as a citizen perceives the Army to show itself 
more competent, the citizen is more likely to trust the competency of local leaders.   
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 Figure 6.1. Community Breakdown by Trust Groups 
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George Bush ScTable 6.1.  Perceptions of Risk and Likelihood of AccidentLikelihood of Likelihood of Table represents mean scores of survey respondents who answered the four questions on a 
scale of 0-10 where 0 means an accident will not occur/no risk and 10 means an accident is 
certain to occur/extreme risk.    
Storage 
Accident 
Incineration 
Accident 
Riskiness of 
Storage 
Riskiness of 
Incineration 
Trust Everybody 3.91 3.41 5.72 5.29 
Trust Federal/Army 4.38 4.09 6.97 5.84 
Trust Local/State 4.63 4.38 7.2 6.55 
Trust Nobody 5.72 5.8 7.37 7.06 2SOURCE: Calhoun County Community Survey, 200lar to the problem of lack of trust among the policy leaders, the varying levels of trust 
ommunity can be explained by a lack of information.  The lack of a clear emergency 
o have created deep-seated fear in many of the citizens.  The understanding that local 
ot have the expertise to deal with demilitarization technology explains, in part, the lack 
e citizens place in them.  Citizens may also be much more aware of the limitations 
e local officials to raise funds to advance the safety of the community, and so citizens 
ederal and state officials to provide the help needed.  
aders may bear some responsibility for the lack of trust among the citizens.  To 
gree the leaders have sought to gain an audience by calling into question the 
 competency or community-mindedness of another group of leaders, public trust has 
.  The lesson here for policy leaders is that they must put aside their differences and 
ited front, if they hope to instill confidence – and ultimately compliance with an 
lan – in the community.  Distrust in any one of the policy leaders leads to increased fear 
ion.  Distrust of all leaders simply creates undue alarm.  This is not to say that legitimate 
ould not be voiced and addressed.  Fruitful discussion, however, should be sought 
g to undermine the legitimacy of the “other guy.” 
N STRATEGY 
alhoun County has sought to emphasize its uniqueness compared to the other eight 
 sites, its citizens also have unique needs that must be considered when forming an 
rategy.  Each zone around the depot may have its own set of needs, and within the 
 are unique needs of families and individuals.  Given the extreme time pressure of the 
tart date for incineration, decision makers must consider the most expedient, thorough, 
 methods for educating the public.  They need to consider using structures that are 
ace.  The Army has already spent considerable resources on education and has begun 
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working with local groups to discover the needs of subsections of the population.  Most recently, 
the Army contracted with the Community Against Pollution community group to perform a door-
to-door needs assessment in order to ascertain what families require in order to be properly 
prepared.  This bottom-up approach will allow officials to better address the safety of the special 
needs community.  Still more needs to be done. 
In keeping with the recommendation that policy leaders hold a discussion in which concerns are 
openly voiced and considered, similar communication with the citizens would be profitable.  Forums 
for discussion already exist on some levels.  The Citizen Advisory Council (CAC) is one example.  
Even policy leaders opposed to incineration cited the CAC as a potentially helpful institution – 
except that the credibility of the CAC seems to be in question, in the eyes of some.  The fact that the 
Army recognizes the possibility that housing the CAC meetings could create questions about the 
legitimacy of the CAC indicates awareness of the problem.  This awareness should be followed by a 
concerted effort on the part of the Army to separate itself from the operations of CAC.  Those who 
support incineration have the most to gain by separating the CAC so that it acts as a truly 
independent liaison to help policy leaders gauge the level of understanding among the community 
and to help the community keep up with the decisions made by policy leaders. 
An effective education strategy includes consideration of the best medium by which to convey 
information.  This decision is based upon the preferences of the audience.  The telephone survey 
asked citizens to what source of information they turned for local and state news.  As Figure 6.2 
indicates, citizens across the board replied that television was their primary source.   
 
Figure 6.2.  Primary Sources of Information  
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 performed more analysis to discover how the source of information was correlated to 
s about specific issues of emergency preparedness.  The three sources most significant, based 
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information sources with tendencies to trust one set of officials over another, it was clear that those 
who cited the newspaper and radio as their primary sources were significantly more likely to place 
higher confidence in the local and state officials.  In considering information sources and preferred 
chemical weapon demilitarization technique, regardless of the primary source of information, there 
was significantly higher preference for incineration, as opposed to waiting or using an alternative 
technology.  When comparing information sources and citizens’ perceptions of risk, there seemed to 
be no particular correlation.   It is interesting to note that citizens’ source of information did not 
correlate to significantly different reported levels of knowledge of the emergency plan and 
knowledge of shelter-in-place procedures.  
This information about the community’s information sources provides insight in planning an 
education strategy.  For instance, one could reason that newspaper subscribers and radio listeners 
are more confident in local and state officials because those mediums are more locally controlled 
(Anniston only acquired a local television news station this past spring), and so local and state 
officials may have had more access to this subgroup of the population.  One could also conjecture 
that the newspaper and radio will then be effective mediums to reach the portion of the population 
that has greater confidence in the local and state officials.  Television will be the quickest means of 
reaching the greatest number of people.  The fact that the source of information does not seem to 
affect the level of knowledge, allows policy leaders to place confidence in the effectiveness of 
television, newspaper, and radio instructions.   
 
EDUCATION ROLES 
When asked about who should be addressing the public with the emergency plan, local, state, 
federal, and Army officials agreed that the local officials were best suited to provide information to 
the public because their proximity to the people made them most trusted.  State and federal officials 
described their roles merely as ones of “support, backup, on an as needed basis.”  While trust, being 
the summation of believability, competency, and likelihood to represent local interest, is fairly high 
for local officials, the data shows that people are not relying solely on the local officials’ word for 
comfort.  In fact, those who show the highest level of trust in the Army consider a storage and/or 
incineration accident least likely.  Statistical regression indicates that the level of trust placed in the 
Army and local officials’ greatly affects a significant portion of the community’s perception of the 
risk posed by the stockpile and incinerator.  As Table 6.1 demonstrated, citizen comfort is best 
achieved when all levels of authority are highly trusted.  Therefore, the Army has no real choice but 
to step up to the challenge of education.  
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CONCLUSION 
The importance of communication in the issue of emergency preparedness cannot be 
overemphasized.  Until the relevant policy leaders at the local, state, and federal levels reach 
consensus on an effective emergency preparedness plan, scarce energy and time will be wasted.  
What is evident from our study is that each policy leader has a stake in increasing public trust for 
their counterparts in other involved governments.  Given the interlocking roles each plays in 
emergency preparedness, it should come as no surprise that community distrust for any of these 
policy leaders erodes confidence in the entire program.  The implication is that each leader must 
assist in the enhancement of the capacities, credibility, and community-mindedness of each of the 
others.  Additionally, consensus on the part of the officials will allow them to address the 
community in a unified voice that will dispel the confusion and fear currently felt.  Individually, 
agencies have good intentions and the capability to effectively reach subsections of the population.  
Unity among themselves has the potential to reach every segment of the population and result in a 
knowledgeable, prepared community. 
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AREAS OF FURTHER RESEARCH 
While the data included in this report has provided a great deal of valuable information 
regarding policy leader and community perspectives, further research should be conducted.  One 
area of future research would be a comparative analysis between the needs assessment currently 
being conducted by the Community Against Pollution and the reported results of our survey 
pertaining to the cost of “making one room airtight” to shelter-in-place.  By doing this comparison, 
one could assess what the actual costs were compared to the reported costs.   To quantify the stigma 
of the chemical weapons storage and incineration site on residential properties, we suggest using the 
hedonic pricing technique.  Hedonic pricing techniques allow the researcher to calculate the actual 
magnitude of the price differentiated. Lastly, to more fully represent the state and federal policy 
leader perspective, we suggest more interviews be conducted. 
 
Capstone Project  69 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
REFERENCES 
REFERENCES 
 
Carnes, S.A., Copenhaver, E.D., Reed, J.H., Soderstrom, E.J., Sorensen, J.H., Peelle, E., &  
Bjornstad, D.J. (1982). Incentives and the siting of radioactive waste facilities. Oak Ridge, 
TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
 
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. (Date Unknown). Planning guidance for the  
Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program. 
<http://emc.ornl.gov/EMC/PG/CSEPPplanGuideOL.html> (2002, March 30). 
 
Chemical Weapons Working Group. (2002). Location of U.S. chemical weapons stockpile site. 
http://www.cwwg.org > (2002, March 30). 
 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). (Date Unknown). EPCRA hotline training: emergency  
planning requirements. <http://www.epa.gov/swercepp/pubs/epr.txt> (2002, April 3). 
 
Farber, S., (1998).  Undesirable facilities and property values: a summary of empirical studies.  
Ecological Economics 24, 1-14. 
 
Flynn, James; Burns, William; Mertz, C.K.; and Slovic, Paul. (1992). Trust as a determinant of  
opposition to a high-level radioactive waste repository: analysis of a structural model. Risk 
Analysis 12, (3), 417-427. 
 
General Accounting Office (GAO). (2001, August). Chemical weapons: FEMA and the Army must  
be proactive in preparing states for emergencies. GAO-01-850. Washington, D.C.: General  
Accounting Office.   
 
Gibson, D.M. (1995). Stigma damages – the recovery of diminished property values as a result of  
environmental contamination. Journal of Energy, Natural Resources, and Environmental 
 Law15 (15), 385-435. 
 
Gregory, Robin, Kunreuther, Howard, Easterling, Doug, & Richards, Ken. (1991). 
Incentives policies to site hazardous waste facilities. Risk Analysis, 11 (4), 667-675. 
 
Capstone Project  70 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
CHAPTER 7 
Institute for Science, Technology, and Public Policy, Bush School of Government and Public 
Service. (2000).Leadership development for integrated emergency response. Limited 
Circulation. Available from: Institute for Science and Technology, Bush School of 
Government and Public Service, 4220 TAMU, College Station, Texas, 77843-4220.  
 
Jenkins-Smith, Hank, & Kunreuther, Howard. (2001). Mitigation and benefits measures as policy  
tools for siting potentially hazardous facilities: determinants of effectiveness and 
appropriateness. Risk Analysis, 21 (2), 371-382. 
 
Lampe, David & Marshall Kaplan. (1999).  Resolving land-use conflicts through mediation:  
challenges and opportunities.  Denver, CO: Lincoln Institute of Land Policy Working Paper. 
 
National Research Council (NRC). (1999). Review and evaluation of technologies for  
demilitarization of assembled chemical weapons. National Research Council (NRC).  
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press. 
 
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). (Date Unknown). Chemical  
Weapons Convention Treaty. <http://www.opcw.nl/ptsindyz.htm> (2002, March 10). 
 
Slovic, Paul, Layman, M., Kraus, N., Flynn, James, Chalmers, & Gessel, G. (2001). In James Flynn,  
Paul Slovic, & Howard Kunreuther (Eds.), Risk, media, and stigma: understanding public  
challenges to modern science and technology. (pp. 87-106 ). London: Earthscan Publications  
Ltd.  
 
U. S. Department of Defense. (2001, June). Assessment of the need for assistance to communities  
affected by chemical demilitarization: final report. Institute for Defense Analysis. 
 
Vogt, Barbara Muller, Hardee, Harriet K.., Sorenson, John H., & Shumpert, Barry L. (1999, April).  
Assessment of housing stock age in the vicinity of chemical stockpile sites. Oak Ridge, TN: 
Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
 
Vogt, Barbara Muller, Hardee, Harriet K., Sorenson, John H., Shumpert, Barry L., & Coomer,  
Cynthia. (1998, January). Compilation of demographic data for the Chemical Emergency  
Preparedness Program. Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory. 
  
 
Capstone Project  71 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 
Capstone Project   
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
APPENDIX A 
POLICY LEADER ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
? Michael Abrams, Anniston Chemical Agency Disposal Facility 
? David Baker, Community Against Pollution 
? Dr. Bennett, Anniston School District 
? C. Wayne Chandler, City of Anniston 
? David Christian, Serving Alabama’s Future Environment 
? Marilyn Daughdrill, Office of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization 
? Robert Downing, Calhoun County Commission 
? John Duncan, Alabama Emergency Management Agency 
? William Finch, City of Anniston 
? James Hall, Community Against Pollution 
? James Eli Henderson, Calhoun County Commission 
? Don Hopper, Calhoun County Economic Development Council 
? Hoyt W. “Chip” Howell, City of Anniston 
? Kenneth Joiner, Calhoun County 
? Rufus Kinney, Families Concerned with Nerve Gas Incineration 
? Brenda Lindell, Families Concerned with Nerve Gas Incineration 
? Benjamin Little, Anniston City Council 
? Misty Milam, Anniston Chemical Demilitarization Outreach Office 
? Herbert Palmore, Anniston City Council 
? Leon Smith, City of Oxford 
? Larry Sylvester, Calhoun County Chamber of Commerce 
? Erma Wilkins, Alabama Citizen’s Advisory Commission 
? Craig Williams, Chemical Weapons Working Group 
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 POLICY LEADER INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. How would you define or frame the current situation?   
 
2. What do you feel your role and responsibility is in the creation of an emergency 
preparedness plan? 
 
3. How confident are you that citizens will comply with the current emergency preparedness 
plan, including sheltering-in-place or evacuation? 
 
4. How would you define “maximum protection?” 
 
5. What obstacles do you feel are impeding the process of coming to greater consensus with 
respect to elimination of chemical weapons?   
 
6. Are you experiencing challenges in communicating with other stakeholders including the 
public?   
 
7. Do you have any suggestions as to how communication flow can be improved?    
 
8. What is the best way to educate the community on the current emergency plan and related 
issues?   
 
9. What do you think will make the public at large more receptive to the idea of incineration? 
 
10. Given the incineration start date of September 2002, what steps do you feel need to be taken 
in order for the community to be prepared? 
 
 
? Note: These questions represent the basic structure of the questions asked of local, 
state and federal policy leaders.  Depending on the interviewee, questions may have been 
adjusted and/or supplemented. 
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POLICY LEADER REQUEST FOR IN-PERSON INTERVIEW 
Date 
 
Name 
Address 
 
Dear , 
 
I am writing to request your assistance in a research project that is being undertaken by a group of my 
graduate students here at Texas A&M University.  You are one of about 60 community leaders and decision 
makers my students would like to interview regarding the issues of emergency preparedness and the 
incineration of chemical weapons in Calhoun County, Alabama.  Six of our best graduate students in public 
affairs are performing this study as part of their degree requirements.  The focus of the study is to determine 
how to improve communication and cooperation between government, community leaders and the public in 
order to assist in the design and implementation of effective emergency preparedness in Calhoun County.  
The study and report are undertaken as part of the graduate program requirements at the George H. W. Bush 
School of Government and Public Service. Congressman Bob Riley has graciously agreed to act as my 
students’ client for this project and will receive a report in May. 
  
An important aspect of the study is to develop an accurate understanding about how community leaders like you are 
thinking about the chemical weapons disposal issue, what organizations are planning or doing with regard to the 
potential risk presented by the chemical weapons, and what kinds of steps are being taken to address the issue of 
emergency preparedness in Calhoun County. Information derived from these interviews will be used in the 
development of a report for Congressman Riley. We will of course be happy to provide you with a copy of the 
report, once it is completed in May. 
 
The information you provide through an interview can be entirely confidential at your request. The interview 
will be conducted by telephone, though my students may request an in-person meeting to follow up on this 
initial discussion. These initial interviews will be coded at Texas A&M and only the researchers involved in 
the project will have access to them. All information will be aggregated and reported in summary form only.  
One of my students will be contacting you by telephone in the next week or so. I hope you will be able to schedule 
about 20 minutes of your time to respond to their questions. If you have any questions about this study, you may call 
me at (979) 862-3028 for more information. Alternatively you can send an email message to me at 
hjsmith@tamu.edu. 
 
As is true of any research of this kind at Texas A&M University, this project has been reviewed and approved by the 
University’s human subjects Institutional Review Board. For research-related problems or questions regarding 
subjects’ rights, the Institutional Review Board may be contacted through Dr. Richard E. Miller, Texas A&M’s IRB 
Coordinator, at (979) 845-1811. 
 
My students and I will greatly appreciate a few minutes of your time, and I believe you will find the results of their 
research to be of interest. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D. 
Professor of Public Policy 
Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Chair of Business and Government 
George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
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POLICY LEADER REQUEST FOR TELEPHONE INTERVIEW 
Date 
 
Name 
Address 
 
Dear , 
 
I am writing to request your assistance in a research project that is being undertaken by a group of my graduate 
students here at Texas A&M University.  You are one of about 60 community leaders and decision makers my 
students would like to interview regarding the issues of emergency preparedness and the incineration of chemical 
weapons in Calhoun County, Alabama.  Six of our best graduate students in public affairs are performing this study 
as part of their degree requirements.  The focus of the study is to determine how to improve communication and 
cooperation between government, community leaders and the public in order to assist in the design and 
implementation of effective emergency preparedness in Calhoun County.  The study and report are undertaken as 
part of the graduate program requirements at the George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service. 
Congressman Bob Riley has graciously agreed to act as my students’ client for this project and will receive a report 
in May. 
  
An important aspect of the study is to develop an accurate understanding about how community leaders like you are 
thinking about the chemical weapons disposal issue, what organizations are planning or doing with regard to the 
potential risk presented by the chemical weapons, and what kinds of steps are being taken to address the issue of 
emergency preparedness in Calhoun County. Information derived from these interviews will be used in the 
development of a report for Congressman Riley. We will of course be happy to provide you with a copy of the 
report, once it is completed in May. 
 
The information you provide through an interview can be entirely confidential at your request. The interview 
will be conducted by telephone. These interviews will be coded at Texas A&M and only the researchers 
involved in the project will have access to them. All information will be aggregated and reported in summary 
form only.  
 
One of my students will be contacting you by telephone in the next week. I hope you will be able to take about 15 
minutes of your time to respond to their questions. If you have any questions about this study, you may call me at 
(979) 862-3028 for more information. Alternatively, you can send an email message to me at hjsmith@tamu.edu. 
 
As is true of any research of this kind at Texas A&M University, this project has been reviewed and approved by the 
University’s human subjects Institutional Review Board. For research-related problems or questions regarding 
subjects’ rights, the Institutional Review Board may be contacted through Dr. Richard E. Miller, Texas A&M’s IRB 
Coordinator, at (979) 845-1811. 
 
My students and I will greatly appreciate a few minutes of your time, and I believe you will find the results of their 
research to be of interest. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, Ph.D. 
Professor of Public Policy 
Joe R. and Teresa Lozano Long Chair of Business and Government 
George H. W. Bush School of Government and Public Service 
Texas A&M University 
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ANNISTON ALABAMA SURVEY RESPONSES 
 
Q1_edu What is your highest level of education? 
  Some College Post-Grad  
 < H.S. Grad. H.S. Grad. Voca. Sch. College    Graduate Degree  
 % 1 2 3 4 5 6  
 12.0 27.8 2.7 28.9 19.2 9.3 
 
 
Q2_age How old are you? (verbatim response) 
 
 Mean 
 46.2 
 
 
Q3_gend As part of the survey, I am required to ask: are you male or female? 
 
 Female Male 
 % 0  1 
 58 42 
 
 
Q4_live Calhoun How long have you lived in Calhoun County? (verbatim response) 
 
 Mean 
 26.6 
 
 
Q5_Ownh Before continuing, I would like to remind you that this is not a sales call.  We are conducting 
public policy research, and at no time will I ask you to buy anything. 
 
I would like to know whether you currently own or rent your home? 
 
 Something Else          Rent Own Home 
 % 0 1 2 
 4.5 17.4 78.1 
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Q6_prb1 Using a scale where zero means you are certain you will not buy another home, and ten means 
you are certain that you will buy another home, how certain are you that you will buy another home in the 
next five years in Calhoun County? 
 
          Certain will not Certain Will
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 58.6 4.4 4.0 2.9 1.8 10.0 1.3 2.4 3.5 1.3 9.9 2.4 
 
Q7_prb2 Using a scale where zero means you are certain you will not buy a home, and ten means you 
are certain that you will buy a home, how certain are you that you will buy a home in the next five years?   
 
         Certain will not Certain Will
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 58.6 4.4 4.0 2.9 1.8 10.0 1.3 2.4 3.5 1.3 9.9 2.4 
   
 
Q8_dist To control for distance from the Depot affects in the previous question, respondents were 
randomly assigned one of three ranges of distance from the Depot. 
 
 One-half mile One and one-half miles Six miles 
 % 1 2 3 
 32.7 33.8 33.5 
 
 
Q9_cost To control for pricing effects in the previous question, respondents were randomly assigned one 
of eight prices of homes. 
   
%                   10              25             35            55          65         75      90  100          Mean 
 14.0 12.8 12.4 12.5 11.6 12.7 11.0 12.9 55.7 
 
 
Q10_cont Now I want you to think about a particular kind of home, and imagine that it has been offered 
to you for sale.  It was built in 1980, and has 3 bedrooms, 2 bathrooms, a recently remodeled kitchen, and 
is in good condition.  It has 1,600 square feet of living space, overall.  Most houses in the immediate 
neighborhood are owner occupied, though some are rentals. 
 
To put the location of the home in perspective, it is located in an Anniston suburb in a well-kept 
neighborhood with lots about a quarter acre in size.  Several parks are nearby and it is in the Anniston 
School District. There is an industrial area about four miles away, and the Anniston Army Depot is 
Çlabel(q10)È to the west. 
 
In consideration of the sale, the realtor raises several issues. First, the realtor explains that the industrial 
area four miles away includes the site of a plant that once manufactured PCBs. PCBs are a possible 
cancer-causing chemical that leaked from the plant several decades ago. That site is now the subject of an 
ongoing lawsuit, although no PCBs have been detected anywhere in the neighborhood. 
 
Your realtor also explains that the Anniston Army Depot used to store chemical weapons, and that the 
Army plans to destroy these weapons over the next six years. The storage and destruction sites are in the 
middle of the depot, and the home is located Çlabel(q10)È from the boundary of the depot. 
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Q11_cvq Imagine that the seller of the home would finance the house and charge no closing costs. Your 
costs would only be the monthly payments, but of course this money would not be available for groceries, 
debt, or other expenses.   
 
If the seller was asking Ç, label (q11) È, would you buy the house? 
      No                                 Yes 
 % 0  1 
 78.6 21.4 
 
Q12_cert To be sure I’ve understood your answer, let me ask the question in a different way.  Using a 
scale from zero to one hundred, where zero means you are certain that you would not buy the house for 
Çlabel(q11)È, and one hundred means you are certain that you would buy the house for Çlabel(q11)È, 
where would you place your answer on the scale? 
 
 Mean 
 20.5 
 
 
Q13_driv Now we would like you to evaluate the level of risk to you and your family that would be 
associated with different situations.  Using a scale where zero means there is no risk and ten means there 
is an extreme risk, how much risk do you associate with each of the following: 
 
Driving a car in your county. 
 
          No risk Extreme Risk
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 11.3 4 11 12.8 10 24.8 6.5 6.7 4 0.9 7.9 4.3 
 
 
Q14_h2o  Drinking the tap water at your residence. 
 
          No risk Extreme Risk
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 27.9 7.8 10.5 8.7 5.9 13.2 4.9 4.0 5.5 3.8 7.8 3.6 
 
 
Q15_incn Incinerating chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot. 
 
          No risk Extreme Risk
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 11.0 4.2 6.3 7.2 4.8 12.0 4.3 4.8 9.8 5.6 30.0 6.1 
 
 
Q16_stor Storing chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot. 
  
          No risk Extreme Risk
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 10.1 2.9 3.5 5.1 4.3 11.4 4.5 5.2 10.3 6.8 35.8 6.7 
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Q17_mile Approximately how many miles do you live from the boundary of the Anniston Army Depot? 
 
       %                        0-2             2.1-6             6.1-9           9.1-12           12.1-25         25.1+            Mean 
 15.8 16.5 13.2 19.1 25.7 6.4 3.43 
 
Q18_hpln  Have you heard or read about Calhoun County’s emergency preparedness plan for responding 
to a chemical emergency at the Anniston Army Depot? 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 11.3 88.7 
 
 
Q19_pzon  Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all knowledgeable and ten means 
extremely knowledgeable, how knowledgeable do you consider yourself to be about the Calhoun County 
chemical emergency preparedness plan? 
   
 Not at all knowledgeable                                                                  Extremely knowledgeable 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 4.5 1.3 3.9 6.6 8.3 16 9.2 12.8 13.3 6.5 17.5 6.3 
 
 
Q20_zone To the best of your knowledge, do you live in the emergency response "pink zone"? 
 
                                                                                      Yes    No 
 % 1 2 
 55 45 
 
 
Q21_strn To the best of your knowledge, what is the number of your emergency response zone? 
  
                               Provided Number                            Didn’t Know                           Reported No Knowledge  
 of the Plan (skipped question)  
 14.9 69.5 15.5 
 
 
Q22_prot Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no protection at all and ten means complete 
protection, please tell me how well the Calhoun County chemical emergency preparedness plan protects 
the residents of your community in the event of an actual chemical emergency? 
 
 No Protection                                                                                              Complete Protection 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 22.2 5.3 6.9 13.3 7.8 15.8 5.3 6.4 7.3 2.3 7.1 4.0 
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Q23_1,2,3,4,5,99,97,oth To the best of your knowledge, I would like to know what you think the 
chemical emergency plan says for you to do in the event that the emergency alarm sounds?  Does it say 
to: 
 
                  Listen for Directions   Immediately begin       Evacuate             Move to a          Do something         Don’t Know 
                         and follow them    shelter-in-place plan       the area            safe building               else                  
                                     1                               2                            3                           4                          5 
                        No         Yes          No      Yes           No     Yes          No     Yes          No     Yes             No    Yes 
 37.5 62.5 60.2 39.8 53.5 46.5 93.7 6.3 99.2 0.8 73.1 26.9 
 
 
Q24_1,2,3,4,5,99,97,oth Considering what you know about the chemical emergency plan, I would like to 
know what action you would take if you heard the chemical emergency alarm go off when you were at 
home. Would you: 
 
                  Listen for Directions   Immediately begin       Evacuate             Move to a          Do something         Don’t Know 
                         and follow them    shelter-in-place plan       the area            safe building               else                  
                                     1                               2                            3                           4                          5 
                        No         Yes          No      Yes           No     Yes          No     Yes          No     Yes             No    Yes 
 46.1 53.9 66.5 33.5 48.1 51.9 98.1 1.9 99.0 1.0 74.7 25.3 
 
 
Q25_1,2,3,4,5,99,97,oth What action would you take if you heard the chemical emergency alarm go off 
when you were away from home, such as at work or shopping?  Would you: 
 
                 Listen for Directions   Immediately begin       Evacuate             Move to a          Do something         Don’t Know 
                         and follow them    shelter-in-place plan       the area            safe building               else                  
                                     1                               2                            3                           4                          5 
                        No         Yes          No      Yes           No     Yes          No     Yes          No     Yes             No    Yes 
 43.6 56.4 69.4 30.6 50.9 49.1 97.9 2.1 98.9 1.1 65.2 34.8 
 
 
Q26_dayc Do you have children in school or daycare? 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 65.2 34.8 
 
 
Q27_teac Using a scale from zero to ten where zero is not at all competent and ten is completely 
competent, how competent do you consider school teachers and administrators to be when it comes to 
ensuring the safety of your children in the event that a chemical emergency took place while your 
children were in school? 
 
 Not At All Competent                                                                                     Completely Confident 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 8.8 1.5 5.4 6.8 7.3 15.1 4.4 9.8 15.1 4.9 21.0 6.1 
 
 
Q28_chld If the chemical emergency alarm were to sound while your children were in school, which of 
the following actions best describe how you would respond? Would you: 
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                                                       Leave your children at the school                      Pick up your children 
 % 0  1 
 37.8 62.2 
 
 
Q29_sned Do you, or anyone in your household, have special needs, such as difficulty walking or 
driving, which would require assistance in the event of an accident? 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 87.6 12.4 
 
Q30_hear Have you heard about the "safe and protective buildings" that are part of the chemical 
emergency preparedness plan? 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 60.8 39.2 
 
 
Q31_bldg Do you know where the nearest "safe and protective building" is located? 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 44.3 55.7 
 
 
Q32_safe Are you satisfied with the number of "safe and protective buildings?" 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 64.8 35.2 
 
 
Q33_sat Are you satisfied with the locations of "safe and protective buildings?" 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 49.8 50.2 
 
 
Q34_leak If a chemical leak did occur, do you feel that you would be notified soon enough to respond? 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 52.3 47.7 
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Q35_shkn Do you consider yourself to be very knowledgeable, somewhat knowledgeable, slightly 
knowledgeable, or not at all knowledgeable about sheltering in place? 
 
                                            Not at all               Slightly               Somewhat                 Very                                          
                                      Knowledgeable    Knowledgeable     Knowledgeable     Knowledgeable          Mean 
 %                          0              1                            2                            3 
 25.8 22.1 37 15.1 1.41 
 
 
Q36_kit Do you have a "shelter in place kit"? 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 89.1 10.9 
 
 
Q37_room If you were to use a "shelter in place kit," would it be possible to make one room in your 
home airtight? 
 
     No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 40.9 59.1 
 
 
Q38_cost How much do you think it would cost to make one room in your home airtight using a "shelter 
in place kit?" 
 
%                       <$100          $101-500       $501-1000      $1001-5000  $5001-10000    >$10000           Mean 
 69.8 4.8 3.5 9.9 2.7 2.9 $2961.27 
 
 
Q39_lik Now, using a scale from zero to ten where zero means an accident will not occur and ten means 
an accident is certain to occur, how likely do you think it is that there will be an accident involving the 
chemical weapons stored at the Depot? 
 
An accident will not occur                                                                                    An accident is certain to occur 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 13.2 6.9 11.9 8.3 7.2 21.5 4.7 6.9 6.6 2.0 10.8 4.5 
 
 
Q40_acci Using the same scale, how likely do you think it is that there will be an accident at the Depot 
during the chemical weapons incineration process?  
 
An accident will not occur                                                                                    An accident is certain to occur 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 16.2 9.7 11.4 7.9 6.3 19.2 5.4 5.1 6.7 1.8 10.2 4.2 
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Q41_army Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all likely and ten means very likely, 
how likely is it that the following groups or individuals would make decisions about the storage and 
incineration of chemical weapons in your area that are in the best interest of people in your community? 
 
The U.S. Army 
 
       Not at all likely                                                                                                           Very likely 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 11.3 4.1 5 5.7 5.6 16.7 6 7.5 10.8 6.3 20.9 5.8 
 
 
Q42_fema The Federal Emergency Management Agency or FEMA 
 
       Not at all likely                                                                                                           Very likely 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 8.3 2 3.4 6.5 4.6 16.9 8 10.2 16 4.9 19.1 6.1 
  
 
Q43_alab The Alabama Department of Emergency Management 
 
       Not at all likely                                                                                                           Very likely 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 7.7 2.4 4.4 5.2 5.2 17.8 9 11.8 14.3 6.1 16.2 6.0 
 
 
Q44_loc Local, city, or county officials  
 
       Not at all likely                                                                                                           Very likely 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 9.6 2.6 5.2 6.7 7 17.6 7.4 9.4 12.2 6.4 16 5.7 
 
 
Q45_army Now I would like to know how competent you believe various individuals or groups are to 
make decisions about the safe storage and incineration of chemical weapons.  On a scale from zero to ten 
where zero means not at all competent and ten means completely competent, how would you rate the 
following?   
 
 The U.S. Army 
 
            Not at all competent                                                                                         Completely competent 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 7.1 2.1 3 5.5 4.4 13.4 6.6 9.7 14.3 7.8 26 6.6 
 
 
Q46_fema The Federal Emergency Management Agency or FEMA 
 
            Not at all competent                                                                                         Completely competent 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 6.6 2 3.5 4.4 6.3 14.5 7.9 11.3 16.3 7.4 19.8 6.4 
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Q47_alab The Alabama Department of Emergency Management 
 
            Not at all competent                                                                                         Completely competent 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 9 1.8 4.4 4.6 6.8 16.4 9.9 11.7 13.5 6.1 15.8 6.0 
 
 
Q48_loc Local, city, or county officials 
 
            Not at all competent                                                                                         Completely competent 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 11.8 3 6.9 8.9 8 18.2 9.4 9.2 10.9 3.4 10.3 5.1 
 
 
Q49_army When thinking specifically about the chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot, I would 
like to know whether you would believe statements made by various individuals or groups. On a scale 
from zero to ten where zero means not at all believable and ten means completely believable, how would 
you rate the following individuals or groups? 
 
The U.S. Army 
 
            Not at all believable                                                                                        Completely believable 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 8.6 2.7 5.3 7.1 5.8 15.4 7.9 9 11.7 8.3 18.2 6.0 
 
 
Q50_fema The Federal Emergency Management Agency or FEMA 
 
 Not at all believable                                                                                        Completely believable 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 6.7 1.9 3.6 5.4 6.4 15.6 11.4 9.6 16.5 6.3 16.6 6.2 
 
 
Q51_alab The Alabama Department of Emergency Management 
 
 Not at all believable                                                                                        Completely believable 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 7.5 1.5 4.3 4.9 6.4 18.2 9.6 13.9 15.4 4.2 14.1 6.0 
 
 
Q52_loc Local, city, or county officials 
 
 Not at all believable                                                                                        Completely believable 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 10.2 1.6 7 7.7 8.1 17 8.3 13.5 12.9 3.9 9.8 5.4 
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Q53_frsk Considering the distance from your home to the Anniston Army Depot storage site and 
incinerator, I would like to know how concerned you are about the risks to you and your family's health? 
 
Please rate your level of concern on a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all concerned and 
ten means very concerned.   
 
 Not at all concerned                                                                                                    Very concerned 
 % 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 Mean 
 10.1 3.8 6.9 4.7 4.2 10.7 4.2 4.7 9.3 3.9 37.5 6.5 
 
 
Q54_lawn Thinking about the following activities, would living in a neighborhood next to the Anniston 
Army Depot storage site and incinerator cause you to stop the activity altogether, reduce it a lot, reduce it 
a little, or would it have no effect? 
 
Working in your lawn and garden?  
 
                                         Have no effect            Reduce it a little             Reduce it a lot            Stop the activity            
 %                             0                         1                2                                    3 
 54.7 17.4 16.2 11.7 
 
 
Q55_bbq Having outdoor barbecues and picnics? 
 
                                          Have no effect            Reduce it a little             Reduce it a lot            Stop the activity            
 %                             0                         1                2                                    3 
 53.7 21.6 12.6 12.1 
 
 
Q56_play Letting children play outside in your yard? 
 
                                         Have no effect            Reduce it a little             Reduce it a lot            Stop the activity            
 %                             0                         1                2                                    3 
 50.3 18.2 17.7 13.8 
 
 
Q57_vegi Growing fruits and vegetables in your yard for your own use? 
 
                                         Have no effect            Reduce it a little             Reduce it a lot            Stop the activity            
 %                             0                         1                2                                    3 
 42.3 12.3 16.4 29 
 
 
Q58_evac Are you or any members of your family or household employed at the Anniston Army depot?   
 
                                                                                       No   Yes 
 % 0  1 
 84.2 15.8 
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Q59_qol Overall, do you think living near the Depot would have a major effect, minor effect, or no effect 
on your quality of life? 
 
  No effect      Minor effect    Major effect 
 % 0 1 2 
 32.5 34.8 32.7 
 
 
Q60_bis Overall, do you think that the incineration of chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot 
would increase, decrease, or have no effect on the number of new businesses moving into your county?   
 Decrease      No effect    Increase 
 % 0 1 2 
 56.4 30.2 13.4 
 
 
 
Q61_cwpg Which of the following options most closely matches your preference for handling the 
chemical weapons stored at the Anniston Army Depot. Would you prefer to: 
 
                                                Incineration                 Wait until other methods                Alternative    
 %  
 49.1 33.9 17 
 
  
Q62_eben Now I would like to know whether your views regarding the incineration of chemical weapons 
at the Anniston Army Depot would become more favorable, less favorable, or stay the same under each of 
the following circumstances: 
If economic benefits were provided to residents living near the facility? 
 
                                                        Less favorable    Stay the same                        More favorable 
 % 0 1 2 
 8.8 48.2 43 
 
 
Q63_suit If protective suits were provided for local emergency responders?     
                                                                  
                                                       Less favorable                 Stay the same                        More favorable 
 % 0 1 2 
 6.7 42 51.2 
 
 
Q64_hood If protective hoods were provided for civilians living near the depot? 
 
                                                        Less  favorable    Stay the same                        More favorable 
 % 0 1 2 
 10.4 45.2 44.4 
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Q65_comp If you knew that residents living near the facility would be compensated for relocating? 
 
                                                        Less favorable    Stay the same                        More favorable 
 % 0 1 2 
 7.4 37 55.6 
 
 
Q66_evac If roads, highways, and bridges were improved to enable easier evacuation in the case of an 
accident? 
 
                                                        Less favorable    Stay the same                        More favorable 
 % 0 1 2 
 5.3 38.4 56.3 
 
 
Q67_mcos If you were assured that medical costs would be covered for anyone harmed by a chemical 
emergency? 
 
                                                        Less favorable    Stay the same                        More favorable 
 % 0 1 2 
 7.6 40.5 51.9 
 
Q68_vdif If you were assured that the difference in value of your property before and after a chemical 
emergency was financially covered?   
 
                                                        Less favorable    Stay the same                        More favorable 
 % 0 1 2 
 8.6 43.7 47.7 
           
 
Q69_hsiz Including yourself, how many people currently live at your residence? 
 
 Mean 
 2.8 
 
 
Q70_ph_l How many different residential phone lines do you have in your household? By this we mean 
phones with different numbers, but do not include business lines or cellular phones. 
 
                                        0                        1                       2                       3                       4                    Mean  
 0.3 84.2 13.6 1.6 0.3 1.2 
 
 
Capstone Project  C-12 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
APPENDIX C 
Q71_ethn From the following options do you consider yourself to be: 
                                                                                                                           
                             White, non-Hispanic         Asian           African American        Hispanic          American Indian                                    
                                             1                            2                            3                            4                              5 
 75.4 0.3 12.8 0.8 5.3 
 
Q72_oth What source of information do you most rely on for your local and state news? 
 
                                               Television     Newspaper          Radio          Magazines        Friends           Other 
Pub  02 63.7 26.4 5.2 0.2 0.8 3.8 
Capstone Project  C-13 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
APPENDIX D 
The University of New Mexico
 
 
 
 
 
 CALHOUN COUNTY, ALABAMA 
 CHEMICAL WEAPONS INCINERATION 
STUDY: 
 SUMMARY TECHNICAL REPORT 
 
 April 2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 PREPARED FOR 
 HANK JENKINS-SMITH, 
 TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY 
 
 by the 
 
 UNM Institute for Public Policy 
 1805 Sigma Chi Rd NE 
 Albuquerque, NM 87131 
 (505) 277-1099 
Capstone Project  D-1 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
APPENDIX D 
TECHNICAL SUMMARY REPORT: 
CALHOUN COUNTY, ALABAMA 
CHEMICAL WEAPONS INCINERATION STUDY 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 In collaboration with Texas A&M University, the University of New Mexico Institute 
for Public Policy (IPP) completed a random household telephone survey of residents in 
Calhoun County, Alabama to assess public perceptions of risk associated with chemical 
weapons and their incineration at the Anniston Army Depot. This technical report describes 
the final call dispositions, including the survey response, cooperation, and refusal rates. The 
survey questionnaire is included as an appendix. Overall, this report provides the basis for 
understanding the data collection methodology and for assessing the quality of the survey 
data. 
 
2. Overview of the Survey Methodology 
The survey method employed was a county-level household telephone survey, using a 
random-digit dialing (RDD) sampling frame that gives equal probability of inclusion to all 
households with working telephones in Calhoun County, Alabama.  The random sampling 
process was extended to the random selection of respondents within households by selecting 
from among adult residents (i.e., those 18 years of age and older) the individual who had the 
most recent birthday. 
The survey was conducted using the IPP Survey Research Center's computer assisted 
telephone interviewing (CATI) system and nineteen-station survey laboratory. Trained 
interviewers conducted the survey under full-time supervision using a protocol that includes 
10 call attempts per RDD number, respondent appointment tracking and follow-up, and 
reluctant respondent persuasion when necessary.13 The protocol is designed to maximize both 
the survey response rate and the consistency with which the survey is applied to assure 
maximum data validity and reliability. 
 
3. Survey Response Summary 
Overall, 734 survey interviews were conducted between March 5 and 31, 2002, which 
included 672 complete and 62 partial interviews. The overall survey response rate was 56% 
and the cooperation rate was 60%. Table 1 shows the final disposition codes for those 
surveys attempted in this study, as well as the final disposition rates. Note that the rates 
shown below reflect the maximum outcome rates for each of the three categories and are 
based on the publication Standard Definitions: Final Disposition of Case Codes and 
Outcome Rates for RDD Telephone Surveys and In-Person Household Surveys (AAPOR: 
1998).14
                                                          
13  The typical commercial standard is three call attempts. 
14  The following formulas were used to calculate the response, cooperation and refusal rates for each of the 
twelve monthly samples used in this study: 
Response Rate = Comp / Comp + Partials + Appts + Scr Ref + Others 
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Table 1: Final Disposition of Attempted Calls 
Category Totals 
Completes 672 
Partials 40 
Break-offs 22 
Appointments not Completed 0 
Screened Refusals/Not converted 451 
Other (Illness, Death, Language Barrier) 89 
Disposition Rates  
Response Rate 55.9% 
Cooperation Rate 60.1% 
Refusal Rate 37.1% 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Cooperation Rate = Comp / Comp + Partials + Scr Ref 
Refusal Rate = Partials + Scr Ref / Comp + Partials + Appts + Scr Ref + Others 
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APPENDIX A: RESPONSE SUMMARY 
ALABAMA CHEMICAL WEAPONS INCINERATION STUDY 
 
 
Included in this Appendix is a complete version of the final survey instrument implemented 
between March 5 and March 31, 2002. All skip patterns and experimental treatments are 
reflected in the survey instrument. 
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 Question # 1 Page # 1 
Hello, my name is _______.  I'm calling from the University of New Mexico. 
 
We're conducting research regarding issues that face Alabama residents.  This is not a sales call, and your telephone 
number was selected at random.  In order to be sure that I am speaking to an eligible household in our research area, 
I need to know what county you live in. 
 
[Calhoun County]   CONTINUE 
 
[OTHER COUNTIES or DK/NA, say]   Thank you for your time. Have a nice evening. 
[Classify as "WRONG LOCALE"] 
 
Of the adults who are at least 18 years of age or older living in your household, may I please speak to the one who 
has had the most recent birthday? 
 
[ORIGINAL RESPONDENT]  Should you choose to participate in our survey, your answers to the questions will 
remain confidential. The University releases no information as to how any particular individual answers the survey, 
and does not sell or give away the lists of randomly generated phone numbers used in our research. You can refrain 
from answering any questions that make you feel uncomfortable, and you can end the survey at any time. This call 
may be monitored for quality control purposes. Should you have any questions regarding our research I can give you 
the telephone number of our project director, Amy Goodin. Would you complete a survey with me? 
 
[NEW RESPONDENT OR APPT w/NAME]  Hello, my name is _____.  I'm calling from the University of New 
Mexico. 
 
We're conducting research regarding issues that face Alabama residents. This is not a sales call, and your telephone 
number was selected at random.  Are you the person at least 18 years of age who has had the most recent birthday?      
  
Should you choose to participate in our survey, your answers to the questions will remain confidential. The 
University releases no information as to how any particular individual answers the survey, and does not sell or give 
away the lists of randomly generated phone numbers used in our research. You can refrain from answering any 
questions that make you feel uncomfortable, and you can end the survey at any time. This call may be monitored for 
quality control purposes. Should you have any questions regarding our research I can give you the telephone number 
of our project director, Amy Goodin. Would you complete a survey with me? 
 
[ANSWERING MACHINES:  Remember we only leave 2 messages!] 
Hello, my name is ________.  I’m calling from the University of New Mexico.   This is not a sales call.  Our 
research group is conducting a study on important issues facing Alabama residents, and your participation would be 
greatly appreciated.   Your phone number was selected at random and your answers will be kept confidential. We'll 
call back in the next day or two.  Thank you.  
 
[Quick Hangup Intro] 
Hi, my name is ______. I'm a student at the University of New Mexico, and as part of a research project I am calling 
people like you about important issues facing Alabama residents. 
 
Are you the person in your household who has had the most recent birthday and who is at least 18 years of age? 
 
   [YES] Continue 
   [NO]   May I please speak to that person? 
            [NO] Thank you for your time; have a nice evening. 
 
Should you choose to participate in our survey, your answers to the questions will remain confidential. The 
University releases no information as to how any particular individual answers the survey, and does not sell or give 
away the lists of randomly generated phone numbers used in our research. You can refrain from answering any 
questions that make you feel uncomfortable, and you can end the survey at any time. This call may be monitored for 
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quality control purposes. Should you have any questions regarding our research I can give you the telephone number 
of our project director, Amy Goodin. Would you complete a survey with me? 
 
[HESITANT RESPONDENT INFO]   
If respondent asks what survey is about, tell them issues facing Alabama residents.  Also, this is an opportunity for 
them to express their opinion about public policy issues. 
 
Do not discuss clients -- have them call Amy. 
 
This is not a sales call.  
  
Your telephone number was chosen at random.   
 
This is public policy research and all of your answers will be kept confidential.  
  
If you have further questions, I can give you the telephone number of our project director: Amy Goodin (505) 277-
1099. 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Calhoun 
 
 Question # 2 Page # 2 
I would like to ask you a couple of background questions.    First, what is the highest level of education you have 
completed?  
                                             [DO NOT READ] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 8 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Elementary or some high school 
2 High school graduate/GED 
3 Trade or vocational certification 
4 Some college/Associates degree 
5 College graduate, or 
6 Post-grad degree 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 3 Page # 3 
How old are you? 
 
            [DK/NA = -99] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Age                                                          
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 999 » 
 
 Question # 4 Page # 4 
As part of the survey, I am required to ask: are you male or female? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Male 
0 Female 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 SKIPS from Q4 
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 IF q4=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 5 Page # 5 
How long have you lived in Calhoun County? 
 
[Interviewer note less than 6 months equals 0, more than 6 months equals 1.] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Number of years                                              
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 99999 » 
 
 Question # 6 Page # 6 
Before continuing, I would like to remind you that this is not a sales call.  We are conducting public policy research, 
and at no time will I ask you to buy anything. 
 
I would like to know whether you currently own or rent your home? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 Own home 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Rent 
0 Something else 
 
 SKIPS from Q6 
 IF q6=2 SKIP TO: 7 
 IF q6<2 SKIP TO: 8 
 IF q6=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 7 Page # 7 
Using a scale where zero means you are certain you will not buy another home, and ten means you are certain that 
you will buy another home, how certain are you that you will buy another home in the next five years in Calhoun 
County? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Certain you will not buy another home 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10  Certain you will buy another home 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 SKIPS from Q7 
 IF q7=1 SKIP TO: 9 
 IF else SKIP TO: 9 
 
 Question # 8 Page # 8 
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Using a scale where zero means you are certain you will not buy a home, and ten means you are certain that you will 
buy a home, how certain are you that you will buy a home in the next five years? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Certain you will not buy a home 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10  Certain you will buy a home 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 9 Page # 9 
[Do Not Read] 
 
Please pick the top option 
 
-Check List- (Random) (Number of items: 2 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Treatment 
0 Control 
 
 SKIPS from Q9 
 IF q9=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 10 Page # 10 
[Do Not Read] 
 
Please pick the top option 
 
-Check List- (Random) (Number of items: 3 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 one-half mile 
2 one and one-half miles 
3 six miles 
 
 Question # 11 Page # 11 
[Do Not Read] 
 
Please pick the top option 
 
-Check List- (Random) (Number of items: 8 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
100 $100,000 
10 $10,000 
35 $35,000 
55 $55,000 
90 $90,000 
75 $75,000 
25 $25,000 
65 $65,000 
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Now I want you to think about a particular kind of home, and imagine that it has been offered to you for sale.  It was 
built in 1980, and has 3 bedrooms, 2 bathrooms, a recently remodeled kitchen, and is in good condition.  It has 1,600 
square feet of living space, overall.  Most houses in the immediate neighborhood are owner occupied, though some 
are rentals. 
 
To put the location of the home in perspective, it is located in an Anniston suburb in a well-kept neighborhood with 
lots about a quarter acre in size.  Several parks are nearby and it is in the Anniston School District. There is an 
industrial area about four miles away, and the Anniston Army Depot is «label(q10)» to the west. 
 
 Question # 12 Page # 12 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CONTINUE 
 
 SKIPS from Q12 
 IF q9=1 SKIP TO: 13 
 IF else SKIP TO: 14 
 
In consideration of the sale, the realtor raises several issues. First, the realtor explains that the industrial area four 
miles away includes the site of a plant that once manufactured PCBs. PCBs are a possible cancer-causing chemical 
that leaked from the plant several decades ago. That site is now the subject of an ongoing lawsuit, although no PCBs 
have been detected anywhere in the neighborhood. 
 
Your realtor also explains that the Anniston Army Depot used to store chemical weapons, and that the Army plans 
to destroy these weapons over the next six years. The storage and destruction sites are in the middle of the depot, 
and the home is located «label(q10)» from the boundary of the depot. 
 
 Question # 13 Page # 13 
Over time, some of the chemical weapons stored at the depot have leaked, although none of the toxic chemicals have 
been detected off of the depot. On the advice of the National Research Council, the Army has decided to use 
incineration to destroy the weapons. The Army and National Research Council have concluded that the largest risk 
of chemical release comes from storage. However, several local citizen groups have argued that the incineration of 
the chemical weapons also poses a significant risk to the health of the community.  
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CONTINUE 
 
 Question # 14 Page # 14 
Imagine that the seller of the home would finance the house and charge no closing costs. Your costs would only be 
the monthly payments, but of course this money would not be available for groceries, debt, or other expenses.   
 
If the seller was asking «label(q11)», would you buy the house? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 SKIPS from Q14 
 IF q14=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 15 Page # 15 
To be sure I’ve understood your answer, let me ask the question in a different way.  Using a scale from zero to one 
hundred, where zero means you are certain that you would not buy the house for «label(q11)», and one hundred 
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means you are certain that you would buy the house for «label(q11)», where would you place your answer on the 
scale? 
 
[DK/NA = -99          DROPOUT = -97] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Level of certainty  (0 to 100)                               
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 100 » 
 
 Question # 16 Page # 16 
Now I would like you to evaluate the level of risk to you and your family that would be associated with different 
situations.  Using a scale where zero means there is no risk and ten means there is an extreme risk, how much risk do 
you associate with each of the following: 
 
Driving a car in Calhoun County. 
 
[NEXT 3 SCREENS ARE RANDOM] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 no risk 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 extreme risk 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 SKIPS from Q16 
 IF q16=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 17 Page # 17 
Drinking the tap water at your residence. 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 no risk 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 extreme risk 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 18 Page # 18 
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Incinerating chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot. 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 no risk 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 extreme risk 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 19 Page # 19 
Storing chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot. 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 no risk 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 extreme risk 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 20 Page # 20 
Approximately how many miles do you live from the boundary of the Anniston Army Depot? 
 
[DK/NA = -99          DROPOUT = -97] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Number of miles                                              
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 99999 » 
 
 SKIPS from Q20 
 IF Q20:2=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 21 Page # 21 
Have you heard or read about Calhoun County’s emergency preparedness plan for responding to a chemical 
emergency at the Anniston Army Depot? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
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1 Yes 
 
 SKIPS from Q21 
 IF Q21<1 SKIP TO: 32 
 IF Q21=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 22 Page # 22 
Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all knowledgeable and ten means extremely knowledgeable, 
how knowledgeable do you consider yourself to be about the Calhoun County chemical emergency preparedness 
plan? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all knowledgeable 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Extremely knowledgeable 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 23 Page # 23 
To the best of your knowledge, do you live in the emergency response "pink zone"?  
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Yes 
2 No 
-99      DK/NA 
-97      Dropout 
 
 Question # 24 Page # 24 
To the best of your knowledge, what is the number of your emergency response zone? 
 
[DK/NA = -99          DROPOUT = -97] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Zone number                                                  
«Text» 
 
 Question # 25 Page # 25 
Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means no protection at all and ten means complete protection, please tell 
me how well the Calhoun County chemical emergency preparedness plan protects the residents of your community 
in the event of an actual chemical emergency? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 No protection at all 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
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5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Complete protection 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 26 Page # 26 
To the best of your knowledge, I would like to know what you think the chemical emergency plan says for you to do 
in the event that the emergency alarm sounds?  Does it say to: 
 
[READ OPTIONS - CHECK ALL THAT APPLY] 
 
[IF "DO SOMETHING ELSE"]  What would that be? 
 
-Check List Open- (Number of items: 7 Min: 1 Max: 5) 
1 Listen for directions and follow them 
2 Immediately begin a shelter in place plan 
3 Evacuate the area 
-99      DK/NA 
-97      Dropout 
4 Move to a "safe building"; or 
5 Do something else  «» 
 
 Question # 27 Page # 27 
Considering what you know about the chemical emergency plan, I would like to know what action you would take if 
you heard the chemical emergency alarm go off when you were at home. Would you: 
 
[READ OPTIONS ONLY IF NEEDED - CHECK ALL THAT APPLY] 
 
[IF "DO SOMETHING ELSE"]  What would that be? 
 
-Check List Open- (Number of items: 7 Min: 1 Max: 5) 
1 Listen for directions and follow them 
2 Immediately begin a shelter in place plan 
3 Evacuate the area 
-99      DK/NA 
-97      Dropout 
4 Move to a "safe building"; or 
5 Do something else  «» 
 
 Question # 28 Page # 28 
What action would you take if you heard the chemical emergency alarm go off when you were away from home, 
such as at work or shopping?  Would you:  
 
[READ OPTIONS ONLY IF NEEDED - CHECK ALL THAT APPLY] 
 
[IF "DO SOMETHING ELSE"]  What would that be? 
 
-Check List Open- (Number of items: 7 Min: 1 Max: 5) 
1 Listen for directions and follow them 
2 Immediately begin a shelter in place plan 
3 Evacuate the area 
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-99      DK/NA 
-97      Dropout 
4 Move to a "safe building"; or 
5 Do something else  «» 
 
 Question # 29 Page # 29 
Do you have children in school or daycare? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 SKIPS from Q29 
 IF Q29<1 SKIP TO: 32 
 IF Q29=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 30 Page # 30 
Using a scale from zero to ten where zero is not at all competent and ten is completely competent, how competent 
do you consider school teachers and administrators to be when it comes to ensuring the safety of your children in the 
event that a chemical emergency took place while your children were in school?  
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all competent 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely competent 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
If the chemical emergency alarm were to sound while your children were in school, which of the following actions 
best describe how you would respond? Would you: 
 
 Question # 31 Page # 31 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 Leave your children at the school 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Pick up your children 
 
OR 
 
 Question # 32 Page # 32 
Do you, or anyone in your household, have special needs, such as difficulty walking or driving, which would require 
assistance in the event of an accident? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
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0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 Question # 33 Page # 33 
Have you heard about the "safe and protective buildings" that are part of the chemical emergency preparedness 
plan? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 SKIPS from Q33 
 IF Q33<1 SKIP TO: 37 
 IF Q33=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 34 Page # 34 
Do you know where the nearest "safe and protective building" is located? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 Question # 35 Page # 35 
Are you satisfied with the number of "safe and protective buildings?" 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 Question # 36 Page # 36 
Are you satisfied with the locations of "safe and protective buildings?" 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 Question # 37 Page # 37 
If a chemical leak did occur, do you feel that you would be notified soon enough to respond? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
University of New Mexico Institute for Public Policy - Texas Air Quality Campaign D-15 
APPENDIX D 
 Question # 38 Page # 38 
Do you consider yourself to be very knowledgeable, somewhat knowledgeable, slightly knowledgeable, or not at all 
knowledgeable about sheltering in place? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 6 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 Not at all knowledgeable 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Slightly knowledgeable 
2 Somewhat knowledgeable 
3 Very knowledgeable 
 
 Question # 39 Page # 39 
Do you have a "shelter in place kit"? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 Question # 40 Page # 40 
If you were to use a "shelter in place kit," would it be possible to make one room in your home airtight? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 SKIPS from Q40 
 IF q40=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 41 Page # 41 
How much do you think it would cost to make one room in your home airtight using a "shelter in place kit?" 
 
[USE A WHOLE NUMBER AND DO NOT USE A "$" SIGN -- Confirm amount] 
 
[DK/NA = -99           DROPOUT = -97] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Dollars as a whole number                                    
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 999999 » 
 
 Question # 42 Page # 42 
Now, using a scale from zero to ten where zero means an accident will not occur and ten means an accident is 
certain to occur, how likely do you think it is that there will be an accident involving the chemical weapons stored at 
the Depot? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 will NOT occur 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
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5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 CERTAIN to occur 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 43 Page # 43 
Using the same scale, how likely do you think it is that there will be an accident at the Depot during the chemical 
weapons incineration process? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 will NOT occur 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 CERTAIN to occur 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 44 Page # 44 
Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all likely and ten means very likely, how likely is it that the 
following groups or individuals would make decisions about the storage and incineration of chemical weapons in 
your area that are in the best interest of people in your community?  
 
[NEXT 4 SCREENS ARE RANDOM] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CONTINUE 
 
 Question # 45 Page # 45 
The U.S. Army 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all likely 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Very likely 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
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 Question # 46 Page # 46 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency or FEMA 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all likely 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Very likely 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 47 Page # 47 
The Alabama Department of Emergency Management 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all likely 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Very likely 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 48 Page # 48 
Local, city, or county officials 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all likely 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Very likely 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
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 Question # 49 Page # 49 
Now I would like to know how competent you believe various individuals or groups are to make decisions about the 
safe storage and incineration of chemical weapons.  On a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all 
competent and ten means completely competent, how would you rate the following?   
 
[NEXT 4 SCREENS ARE RANDOM] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CONTINUE 
 
 Question # 50 Page # 50 
The U.S. Army 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all competent 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely competent 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 51 Page # 51 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency or FEMA 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all competent 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely competent 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 52 Page # 52 
The Alabama Department of Emergency Management 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all competent 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
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5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely competent 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 53 Page # 53 
Local, city, or county officials 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all competent 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely competent 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 54 Page # 54 
When thinking specifically about the chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot, I would like to know whether 
you would believe statements made by various individuals or groups. On a scale from zero to ten where zero means 
not at all believable and ten means completely believable, how would you rate the following individuals or groups?  
 
[NEXT 4 SCREENS ARE RANDOM]  
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CONTINUE 
 
 Question # 55 Page # 55 
The U.S. Army 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all believable 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely believable 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
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 Question # 56 Page # 56 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency or FEMA 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all believable 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely believable 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 57 Page # 57 
The Alabama Department of Emergency Management 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all believable 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely believable 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 58 Page # 58 
Local, city, or county officials 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all believable 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Completely believable 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 59 Page # 59 
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Considering the distance from your home to the Anniston Army Depot storage site and incinerator, I would like to 
know how concerned you are about the risks to you and your family's health? 
 
Please rate your level of concern on a scale from zero to ten where zero means not at all concerned and ten means 
very concerned. 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 13 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 0 Not at all concerned 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
4 4 
5 5 
6 6 
7 7 
8 8 
9 9 
10 10 Very concerned 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 SKIPS from Q59 
 IF Q59=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 60 Page # 60 
Thinking about the following activities, would living in a neighborhood next to the Anniston Army Depot storage 
site and incinerator cause you to stop the activity altogether, reduce it a lot, reduce it a little, or would it have no 
effect? 
 
[NEXT 4 SCREENS ARE RANDOM] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CONTINUE 
 
 Question # 61 Page # 61 
Working in your lawn and garden? 
 
[Read only if ER needs prompting] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 6 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
3 stop the activity 
2 reduce it a lot 
1 reduce it a little 
0 have no effect 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 62 Page # 62 
Having outdoor barbecues and picnics? 
 
[Read only if ER needs prompting] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 6 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
3 stop the activity 
2 reduce it a lot 
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1 reduce it a little 
0 have no effect 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 63 Page # 63 
Letting children play outside in your yard? 
 
[Read only if ER needs prompting] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 6 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
3 stop the activity 
2 reduce it a lot 
1 reduce it a little 
0 have no effect 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 64 Page # 64 
Growing fruits and vegetables in your yard for your own use? 
 
[Read only if ER needs prompting] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 6 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
3 stop the activity 
2 reduce it a lot 
1 reduce it a little 
0 have no effect 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 65 Page # 65 
Are you or any members of your family or household employed at the Anniston Army depot?   
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 SKIPS from Q65 
 IF q65=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 66 Page # 66 
Overall, do you think living near the Depot would have a major effect, minor effect, or no effect on your quality of 
life? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 Major effect 
1 Minor effect 
0 No Effect 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 67 Page # 67 
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Overall, do you think that the incineration of chemical weapons at the Anniston Army Depot would increase, 
decrease, or have no effect on the number of new businesses moving into your county?   
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 Increase 
1 No effect 
0 Decrease 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
Which of the following options most closely matches your preference for handling the chemical weapons stored at 
the Anniston Army Depot. Would you prefer to: 
 
[CLICK on "A" and read options in ALPHABETIC ORDER -- DO NOT read the letters for each option] 
 
         Proceed with INCINERATION of the chemical weapons as planned;. 
 
         Wait until OTHER METHODS of destroying the chemical weapons are better  
         understood and then decide which technology to use;  
 
         Proceed with an ALTERNATIVE to incineration, such as using wet chemicals to  
         neutralize the nerve agents.  
 
 Question # 68 Page # 68 
-Check List- (Random) (Number of items: 3 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 A 
2 B 
3 C 
 
 Question # 69 Page # 68 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Proceed with the INCINERATION as planned 
2 Wait until OTHER METHODS are better understood 
3 Proceed with an ALTERNATIVE to incineration 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 70 Page # 69 
Now I would like to know whether your views regarding the incineration of chemical weapons at the Anniston 
Army Depot would become more favorable, less favorable, or stay the same under each of the following 
circumstances: 
 
[NEXT 7 SCREENS ARE RANDOM] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CONTINUE 
 
 Question # 71 Page # 70 
If economic benefits were provided to residents living near the facility? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 MORE favorable 
1 Stay the same 
0 LESS favorable 
-97 Dropout 
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-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 72 Page # 71 
If protective suits were provided for local emergency responders? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 MORE favorable 
1 Stay the same 
0 LESS favorable 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 73 Page # 72 
If protective hoods were provided for civilians living near the depot? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 MORE favorable 
1 Stay the same 
0 LESS favorable 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 74 Page # 73 
If you knew that residents living near the facility would be compensated for relocating? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 MORE favorable 
1 Stay the same 
0 LESS favorable 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 75 Page # 74 
If roads, highways, and bridges were improved to enable easier evacuation in the case of an accident?  
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 MORE favorable 
1 Stay the same 
0 LESS favorable 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 76 Page # 75 
If you were assured that medical costs would be covered for anyone harmed by a chemical emergency?  
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 MORE favorable 
1 Stay the same 
0 LESS favorable 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
 Question # 77 Page # 76 
If you were assured that the difference in value of your property before and after a chemical emergency was 
financially covered?   
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-Check List- (Number of items: 5 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
2 MORE favorable 
1 Stay the same 
0 LESS favorable 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
 
Finally, I need some basic background information about you.   
 
What is the zip code at your residence?                     
 
     [DK/NA = -99] 
     [Dropout = -97] 
 
 Question # 78 Page # 77 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Enter all five digits                                        
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 99999 » 
 
 SKIPS from Q78 
 IF q78:2=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
[Interviewers: 
Please CONFIRM zip code.] 
 
 Question # 79 Page # 78 
Including yourself, how many people currently live at your residence? 
 
          [DK/NA = -99; Dropout = -97] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Enter number in household                                    
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 99 » 
 
 SKIPS from Q79 
 IF q79:2<2 SKIP TO: 81 
 
 Question # 80 Page # 79 
How many of those are 18 or older? 
 
                 [DK/NA = -99; Dropout = -97] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Enter number 18 or older                                     
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 99 » 
 
 Question # 81 Page # 80 
What source of information do you most rely on for your local and state news? 
 
[DO NOT READ OPTIONS.  IF RESPONDENT NAMES SEVERAL SOURCES]: 
 
Which one is the most important source of information? 
 
[If "Other" and a source is not named, ask]:  What would that be? 
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-Check List Open- (Number of items: 8 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Television 
2 Newspapers 
3 Radio 
4 Magazines 
5 Friends and groups 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
6 Other  «» 
 
 SKIPS from Q81 
 IF q81=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
 Question # 82 Page # 81 
On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from strongly liberal to strongly conservative.   
 
Which of the following categories best describes your views?   
 
     Would you say that you are: 
 
         [READ OPTIONS] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 9 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Strongly liberal 
2 Liberal 
3 Slightly liberal 
4 Middle of the road 
5 Slightly conservative 
6 Conservative, or 
7 Strongly conservative 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
 
 Question # 83 Page # 82 
Do you belong to any environmental groups or organizations? 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 4 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
0 No 
-97 Dropout 
-99 DK/NA 
1 Yes 
 
 Question # 84 Page # 83 
How many different residential phone lines do you have in your household?  By this we mean phones with different 
numbers, but do not include business lines or cellular phones. 
 
    [DK/NA = -99; Dropout = -97] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Enter number of phone lines                                  
«Integer: -99 ≤ i ≤ 99 » 
 
From the following options, do you consider yourself to be: 
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[READ OPTIONS] 
 
 Question # 85 Page # 84 
-Check List Open- (Number of items: 9 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
5 American Indian 
2 Asian 
3 Black 
4 Hispanic 
1 White non-Hispanic, or 
-99 DK/NA 
-98 Refused 
-97 Dropout 
6 Something else  «» 
 
 SKIPS from Q85 
 IF q85=-97 SKIP TO: 89 
 
[IF JUST "White" ]: Is that "White, Non-Hispanic," or just "White?" 
 
[IF SOMETHING ELSE]: How would you describe your racial or ethnic background? 
 
 Question # 86 Page # 85 
I'm going to read you some broad income categories.  Please STOP me when I get to the one which includes the 
estimated annual income for your household for the year 2001.   
 
         Was it: 
 
[If the R interrupts you with their income go ahead and enter the value.] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 11 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Less than $5,000, 
2 $5,000 to less than $15,000 
3 15 to less than 25, 
4 25 to less than 35, 
5 35 to less than 50, 
6 50 to less than 75, 
7 75 to less than 100, 
8 100 to less than 150, 
9 More than $150,000 
-99      DK/NA 
-97      Dropout 
 
 Question # 87 Page # 86 
Thinking back to when I first contacted you, how would you describe your feelings about participating with us?  
Would you say that you were very reluctant, somewhat reluctant, slightly reluctant, or not at all reluctant to 
participate with our research?  
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 6 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
3 Very reluctant 
2 Somewhat reluctant 
1 Slightly reluctant, or 
0 Not at all reluctant 
-99 DK/NA 
-97 Dropout 
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 Question # 88 Page # 87 
Thank you, for taking the time to complete this interview.   
 
Good bye. 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 CIAO! 
 
 Question # 89 Page # 88 
[Did this respondent dropout?] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 2 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 Yes 
0 No 
 
 SKIPS from Q89 
 IF q89=0 SKIP TO: 91 
 
 Question # 90 Page # 89 
[At what number did the respondent dropout? Enter the number of the last valid response.] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Question number here                                         
«Integer: 0 ≤ i ≤ 88 » 
 
 Question # 91 Page # 90 
[Enter the number of attempts made to acquire this interview.  Count all calls including the current attempt.] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Number of tries                                              
«Integer: 1 ≤ i ≤ 12 » 
 
 Question # 92 Page # 91 
[ENTER COMMENTS] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 2) 
Comments                                                     
«Text» 
 
Was this survey conducted in: 
 
 Question # 93 Page # 92 
-Check List- (Number of items: 2 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
1 English 
0 Spanish 
 
OR 
 
 Question # 94 Page # 93 
[PRESS YOUR FORWARD BUTTON TO MOVE ON; THIS SCREEN ENTERS THE TIME ZONE, AREA 
CODE AND PHONE NUMBER FOR THE RESPONDENT.] 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 8) 
Time Zone                                                    
«Text» 
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Area Code                                                    
«Text» 
Phone Number                                                 
«Text» 
FIPS                                                         
«Text» 
 
 Question # 95 Page # 94 
Interview ID and Station Number 
 
-Dbase- (Number of items: 4) 
   Enter your name here                                      
«Text» 
   Enter your station number                                 
«Integer: 0 ≤ i ≤ 20 » 
 
 Question # 96 Page # 95 
[This completes the survey.  Enter Survey Completed  only after correcting all information.] 
 
-Check List- (Number of items: 1 Min: 1 Max: 1) 
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CSEPP Organizational Chart 
 
 
  
?  
 
 
SOURCE: Planning Guidance for the Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Program, Date Unknown 
Capstone Project  E-1 
George Bush School of Government and Public Service 
